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Educational research has a broad scope of interest; and, since Ancient Greece, it has 
constantly interacted with other fields such as ethics, social work, and psychology.  For 
centuries, scholars and researchers have struggled to answer the questions: What is moral 
knowledge?  How do we acquire moral knowledge?  What does education mean?  The need to 
answer these questions has motivated educational theorists and philosophers to construct new 
and thought-provoking educational theories.  Many educational theorists and philosophers have 
improved and/or challenged the theories of interest over time, but few have constructed their 
own theories.  Nel Noddings, a well-respected educational philosopher and a moral theorist, has 
provided comprehensive answers to these questions through the Theory of Care she constructed.  
The Theory of Care has been influential in different fields of research, and scholars have paid 
attention to her theory since Noddings has first discussed it in 1984.  The influence of Theory of 
Care (TC) has been documented in certain fields of research; however, its influence in the fields 
of moral education and philosophy of education, the fields harboring the essential research on 
this theory, has gone undocumented.  The aim of this dissertation was to fill this gap in 
educational research while providing insights regarding the influence of Noddings’s TC and how 
several authors have used TC in the fields of moral education and philosophy of education from 
2003 through 2013.  Drawing on the articles published in two journals representative of the fields 
of interest, an analysis was done about how Noddings’s TC has influenced and potentially 
contributed to the educational problems discussed in these fields of research and its influence 
through the issues discussed in these journals is described.  Because Noddings is one of the most 
frequently cited authors in the theoretical fields of education, for the sake of manageability, the 
sample for this project only included the articles, which mainly discussed Noddings’s TC and 
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were published in the Journal of Moral Education and the Journal of Philosophy of Education 
from 2003 through 2013.  There exist two different, yet interactive, phases in the analysis of 
these articles in addition to being able to read TC using a critical and systematic lens.  The 
analysis of articles for this dissertation revealed that TC has been mostly influential and 
contributed to the discussion of particular concepts, including school culture, relational thinking 
in/of moral education and philosophy of education, theories of moral philosophy and education, 
student’s needs, and the practical implications of theoretical knowledge.  Noddings’s Theory of 
Care has been discussed in connection with each one of these concepts, sometimes only in one 
field of interest, sometimes in both fields of interest.  These concepts indicated that the influence 
of TC in the fields of moral education and philosophy of education has been significant and has 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Ethics has been an important field of research from Socrates to our present day, and it is 
interested in describing the reasoning behind the thought process, including the result of this 
thought process, or in other words, the behavior “of each individual who must decide what to do 
in concrete situations and how to envision his or her life as whole” (Higgins, 2003, p. 282).  As a 
field of research, it has interacted with diverse areas of study, such as religion, philosophy, social 
work, feminist studies, education, and psychology.  Through these interactions, several bridging 
terms and concepts that might be of interest to the scholars publishing in different fields of 
research have been generated.  The moral value “care” has been one of these concepts and has 
become a crucial element of feminist moral thinking, moral education, and philosophy of 
education. 
After the 1980s, one major contribution to the field of ethics and moral education is the 
inclusion of the moral value care, the representative value of feminine moral thinking.  Several 
scholars (Held, 2006; Jackson, Sealey-Ruiz, & Watson, 2014; Shevalier & McKenzie, 2012; 
Slote, 2007; Wike, 2011) have thoroughly analyzed care in their studies; however, Carol Gilligan 
(1982) and Nel Noddings (1984) were the pioneers who conducted detailed research on care 
ethics and constructed comprehensive frameworks of care.  The framework of care ethics 
represents a significant challenge to the Western cannon1 and the male way of moral thinking, as 
it participates in the dialogue with other theories of moral philosophy, and it has been applied to 
various areas of research from medicine to sociology.   
Nel Noddings is an educational theorist, a well-known philosopher, and a feminist 
scholar who has contributed significantly to ethics and educational research, particularly in moral 
                                                 
1.Western cannon is discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.  
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education through her Theory of Care.  Noddings’s theory stands at the intersection of different 
fields of study, such as ethics, moral psychology, feminist thinking, moral education, and 
educational philosophy.  Well-respected scholars (Bergman, 2007b; Martin-Alcoff & Feder-
Kittay, 2007; Tappan, 2006) from the fields of moral education and educational philosophy have, 
directly or indirectly, acknowledged the influence of her theory in these areas.  Yet, no one 
before her has documented the details of this influence or has thoroughly studied how this 
influence contributes to the ongoing discussions occurring in the relevant literature.  In this 
dissertation, the aim was to fill this gap and document the influence of Noddings’s Theory of 
Care (henceforth TC) in two relevant fields of education and reflect on this influence through the 
articles published in two different journals of educational research.  My reflection and 
interpretation of these articles provides a philosophical portrait documenting how this influence 
has contributed to the discussions in the selected fields of education within a pre-set time frame 
and how scholars have approached TC in their studies.   
Noddings’s TC is a theory of ethics and moral education that encourages the formation 
and implementation of ethical caring relationships to improve students’ moral thinking as, 
according Noddings (1984/2003a/2013), human beings are motivated to act ethically/caringly to 
be in these relationships.  In Noddings’s (1984/2003a/2013) view, these ethical caring 
relationships are built and maintained through human interactions as these interactions nurture 
the ethical caring relationships. There are principal components of these ethical caring 
relationships and they are discussed later in this chapter.   
Noddings first presented TC in her book, Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and 
Education, when she published it in 1984.  Since then, she has published 17 books and 200 
articles and has worked in different universities, including Stanford.  Her philosophically 
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different and educationally interesting account/framework of care has not only inspired scholars 
to analyze her theory in detail, but also has encouraged the practitioners to use it in classrooms 
and other educational settings.  This being the case, it is possible to argue that Noddings’s TC 
has significantly contributed to educational research; even though its major contribution has been 
to moral education as it has been mainly influential in this field. 
Overview of the Chapters 
 In Chapter 1, I present the concept of moral care and Carol Gilligan’s argument 
regarding the exclusion of the women’s voice in moral psychology in Lawrence Kohlberg’s 
scale.  I begin this chapter with a discussion outlining Gilligan’s research about care and her 
debate with Kohlberg, because these are significant to Noddings’s TC.  Then, I explain TC in 
detail and continue the discussion of Noddings’s proposal(s) addressing the problems of the 
education system and schools of today.  I end this chapter after discussing the educational 
significance and purpose of this study and introduce the criteria selected in the collection and 
analysis of the articles used in this dissertation.   
In Chapter 2, I offer the literature that details the debate surrounding TC and other 
theories of moral philosophy while discussing its presence in and documenting its contribution to 
the fields of moral philosophy, moral education, and philosophy of education.  The literature on 
Noddings’s TC has been the basis of the research about TC in other areas of interest; therefore, I 
primarily provide the literature surrounding TC in these areas.  Moreover, the research questions 
guiding this dissertation are primarily of interest to the scholars working in these fields of 




In Chapter 3, I present several definitions/frameworks of moral education and familiarize 
the reader with the field of moral education.  After familiarizing the reader with this field of 
research, I introduce the Journal of Moral Education (JME), the journal considered as being 
representative of the field of moral education.  I explain the scope of this journal and detail my 
reasoning behind the selection of the articles used as data in this dissertation.  I analyze the 
influence of TC on the themes that are discussed in the articles published in JME and reflect on 
this influence and its potential contribution to the discussions covered to moral education by 
describing how the authors of the selected articles have approached TC in their articles to present 
their ideas. 
In Chapter 4, I introduce several definitions of the philosophy of education and 
familiarize the reader with Noddings’s perspective of philosophy of education, a philosophical 
perspective of education based on the main tenets of TC.  Then I introduce the Journal of 
Philosophy of Education (JPE), the journal selected as representative of the field of philosophy 
of education.  I explain the scope of this journal and the reasoning behind the selection of the 
articles used as data in this dissertation.  Following this, I analyze the themes in the JPE articles 
as related to Noddings’s TC and discuss how the authors of the selected articles have 
incorporated TC to present their ideas and improve the strength of their arguments. 
In Chapter 5, I present my concluding thoughts as I reflect on the themes present in these 
articles and discuss the findings of this research: how TC has influenced the debates occurring in 
these fields and has contributed to these fields through the discussion of particular problems of 
education.  I provide more information regarding how this study might be limited only to these 
fields within the chosen time frame and explain how these findings might alter if different 
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journals or time frames are selected.  In this chapter, I humbly offer several recommendations 
that might concern the future research on Noddings’s TC in educational research.       
The Concept of Care and Noddings’s TC 
In ethics and moral education, the word “care” is more than an ordinary word.  Care 
represents an alternate perspective concerned with giving voice to individuals who do not want 
to use existing frames of morality as these frames might be unappealing for several reasons. 
Ideally, this alternate perspective provides the opportunity to these individuals to reflect on and 
share their personal experiences, because it places the individual and his/her experiences 
generated as a result of his/her interaction with the social environment to its focus.   
Care exists as a concept similar to other concepts (justice, good, and evil) of morality that 
have been used to construct the long-standing theories of moral philosophy.  In the relevant 
literature, the concept of care has several interpretations, and each one of these interpretations 
focuses on another aspect of care.  For example, in her definition, Noddings (1984/2003a/2013) 
focused on the relational aspect of care and moral thinking.  However, Berenice Fisher and Joan 
Tronto (1990), focused on the active and healing feature of care.  Different from the previous 
accounts of care, Selma Sevenhuijsen (1998), in her work, framed care as a skill that helps “to 
‘see’ and to ‘hear’ needs, and to take responsibility for these needs being met” (p. 83).    
In the larger literature, various interpretations of care exist, and different perspectives 
depend on these interpretations, but here, I primarily focus on Carol Gilligan’s and Nel 
Noddings’s interpretations describing this concept.  The contributions of these authors (Gilligan, 
1982, 1995; Noddings, 1984/2003a/2013, 2002a) have played pivotal roles in establishing a solid 
theoretical and practical ground for the discussion of care ethics in the academic circles of moral 
philosophy, moral psychology, and education.  In fact, these works are more than 30 years old, 
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but scholars do not lose their interest in these authors’ works as Gilligan and Noddings are still 
cited for their earlier works.  Therefore, I think my selection is justified.   
Carol Gilligan is a feminist scholar specializing in moral psychology and social 
psychology, and earned her doctoral degree at Harvard University.  Gilligan (1982) has 
contributed to the construction of the concept of care in the field of moral psychology through 
her groundbreaking book In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s 
Development.  In this book, Gilligan (1982) not only discredited the validity of Lawrence 
Kohlberg’s Moral Judgment Scale, but also and presented her research findings, which have 
been contra to Kohlberg’s main assumption about individuals and moral thinking processes.2  
Gilligan’s research findings have suggested that Kohlberg has excluded the voice of 
women from his research and scale, in which he claimed to describe the moral development of 
human beings, but has provided a faulty lens/framework to employ in describing the moral 
development of the individuals.  Gilligan (1982) reported this situation as “In the research from 
which Kohlberg derives his theory, females simply do not exist” (p. 18), and she identified it to 
be extremely troubling. According to Gilligan (1982), any moral framework excluding or 
missing the voice of women is troubling because, roughly speaking, this voice is the voice of half 
the population of the world.  This being the situation, Gilligan (1982), in her research, has 
claimed that it was both impossible and inaccurate to draw conclusions of universality or 
construct a valid framework of morality when only the viewpoint of a particular group was 
considered as relevant.  [In his scale, Kohlberg has only used the viewpoints of young boys when 
                                                 
2. Lawrence Kohlberg presented his scale as the result of his PhD research, in which he analyzed the 




he built his scale and determined their objective moral reasoning process as the main reasoning 
process to be embraced to reach the final and the most advanced stage of moral thinking.] 
On Kohlberg’s (1958, 1971) original moral judgment scale, six different and cumulative 
orientations of morality exist, and this scale presented a developmental framework of moral 
thinking.3 In this scale, moving to the upper stages of morality is only possible by providing the 
accurate answer to the moral dilemmas4 presented in the scale.  Kohlberg has categorized these 
orientations of morality under three main stages: pre-conventional, conventional, and post-
conventional.  Each stage had two orientations in itself, and the individual could move to the 
upper orientations and stages only if the individual provided the correct answer and 
demonstrated that he/she had a certain amount of accumulated moral knowledge.  Kohlberg 
(1958, 1971) has listed these stages (from the early stages to the late/advanced ones) as: 
1.  Obedience-and-Punishment Orientation: In this stage, the individual makes a decision and 
carries out that decision based on the possibility of being punished if getting caught.  Obedience 
helps the individual to protect himself/herself from the punishment. 
                                                 
 
3. Kohlberg has constructed his scale based on Jean Piaget’s Cognitive Theory of Knowledge.  In his 
theory, Piaget (1932/1965) has argued that the individual goes through cognitive stages of mental development 
while constructing their knowledge regarding the world they live.  According to Piaget (1932/1965), there are four 
different and cumulative stages of development, and it is possible to see one individual goes through these stages 
respectively to acquire necessary knowledge in moral thinking. 
 
4. Moral dilemmas involve moral conflicts in which one struggles to make a decision as a result of the 
conflicting moral requirements one has. The most well-known dilemma presented in this scale is Heinz’s drug 
dilemma.  According to the story representing this moral dilemma, Heinz’s wife has cancer, and there is a radiation 
drug recently produced by a local pharmacist living in town.  Heinz has only 200 $ in his pocket and visits the 
pharmacist to buy the drug only to find out that he is selling it with a price tag of 2000 $.  Heinz explained his wife’s 
situation and tells the pharmacist he could bring the rest of the money later once his wife is in better condition. 
However, the pharmacist tells that he has the right to make a profit from the drug as he has worked hard to develop 
it, and refuses to sell the drug.  Heinz leaves the store empty handed and goes back to his house only to find out that 
his wife may not be able to survive the night without the drug.  The question posed to the participants in this scale is 
“What should Heinz do now? Should he steal the drug and save his wife, or should he refrain from committing the 
crime and let his wife die?”   
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2.  Instrumental Orientation: In this stage, the individual has a sense of rules that frame the moral 
behavior, and he/she performs the moral behaviors if performing these behaviors benefit the 
individual.   
3.  Good Boy/Nice Girl Orientation: In this stage, the individual’s understanding of morality is 
more advanced compared to earlier stages, yet he/she justifies his/her behavior based on its 
conformity to the general norms.   
4. Law-and-Order Orientation: In this stage, the individual makes a decision and carries out that 
decision based on the conformity of his/her behavior into the laws of the society. The 
justification of these behaviors is connected to the laws of the society. 
5. Social-Contract Orientation: In this stage, the individual makes a decision and carries out that 
decision based on the conformity of his/her behavior to the societal contract. The individual 
refrains from acting on the basis of self-interest and considers the societal peace to be his or her 
priority.   
6. Universal-Ethical-Principal Orientation: In this stage, the individual has a deeper 
understanding of morality and justice, and performs a moral behavior based on this 
understanding. When acting, the individual considers not just the moral principles governing 
his/her society, but also the moral principles of the general world. His/her justification of moral 
behaviors reflects his/her understanding of the universal principles of ethics.          
Kohlberg (1958, 1971) assumed that his scale was universally valid, meaning that 
everyone was experiencing similar things when they were moving from the lower stages of 
moral development to the upper and more advanced stages of moral development.  In her book, 
In a Different Voice, Gilligan (1982) criticized this foundational assumption of Kohlberg’s scale 
and argued that the scale has been blind to the alternate viewpoints, particularly to the viewpoints 
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of women, which focus on care and relationships and employ a relational and alternative 
perspective of moral development represented through their moral reasoning processes and how 
they answered the moral problems/dilemmas presented in this scale.  Therefore, Gilligan (1982) 
said the scale was unable to accommodate these individuals’–women’s–viewpoints and moral 
reasoning, and it limited their moral development to the Good Boy/Nice Girl Orientation.  As 
presented in the list on the previous page, this stage is located on the conventional stage of 
Kohlberg’s moral theory, and one needs to use the objective moral reasoning process 
representing the male viewpoint5 to move to the upper stages of morality.  Noting that this is a 
serious problem, Gilligan (1982) concluded the scale was biased and the moral framework it 
represented was troubling, as it failed to be a universal framework.   
Gilligan’s project of the inclusion of the moral value care, which is mainly present in the 
women’s voices, to moral philosophy and moral psychology has attracted the attention of 
scholars publishing in different disciplines of study, including feminist studies, practical ethics, 
critical thinking, moral education, and philosophy of education (Collins, 2004; Kuhse, Singer, & 
Rickard, 1998; Noddings, 1984/2003a/2013; Thompson, 1998; Tronto, 1995).  Nel Noddings is 
one of these scholars interested in Gilligan’s call to include the moral value care in the academic 
discussions, and she has constructed a whole theory of moral philosophy and moral thinking, the 
TC.  In this regard, TC becomes an important framework to study and through her publications 
Noddings (1984/2003a/2013, 2002a, 2005, 2007) structures this alternate perspective of moral 
thinking around the moral value of care and human relationships.  
                                                 
5. The male viewpoint present and promoted in the original scale of Kohlberg focused on the individual 
rights, consequences of the actions and rules, rather than care, relationships, and acquiring more information 
regarding the dilemma presented in the scale. 
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Noddings’s TC has promoted a relational approach to be implemented in education and 
offered an alternate framework of motivation to be moral, which redefined the scope of moral 
thinking and behaving.  Unlike other theories of morality that focus on deliberative justice, 
rights, and individual actions, with TC, Noddings (1984a/2003a/2013, 2002a, 2016) focused on 
human needs, care, and the maintenance of ethical caring relationships.  Noddings has published 
and edited several books and articles, and, through these writings, she has explained the possible 
ways of implementing care in education and contributed to the academic discussion.  Her books 
have been translated into 12 different languages, including Chinese and Turkish, and her theory, 
TC, has continued to be of interest to scholars and practitioners. 
In the first edition (1984), and other subsequent editions (2003a, 2013), of her Caring: A 
Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education book, Noddings claimed she was offering a 
framework/definition of ethics from the perspective of a woman, of an outsider to the field of 
ethics.  With this framework she was offering, Noddings was interested in meeting and relating 
to the other, which signals a developmental process of moral thinking and learning, not in the 
justification, or getting credit, for an individual’s one-time action or teaching an appropriate 
moral behavior to students by dictating rules and codes and using generalizations.  In fact, 
according to Noddings (1989), the current theories of moral philosophy were using the I 
language of the men and bearing the signs of the masculine, male way of thinking. 
With her framework/theory, Noddings (1984/2003a/2013) opposed the male way of 
thinking used in the fields of ethics and moral education and offered an alternate perspective that 
could be the voice of the women, an underrepresented group of people in this field.  As a woman 
philosopher, Noddings rightfully considered herself to be a natural member of this 
underrepresented group of people and criticized the present situation in the field of ethics in the 
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1980s.  Noddings (1984) has argued the field of ethics was a field of study highly dominated by 
the moral theories representing the male thinking and excluding the other voices by discrediting 
these voices’ way of thinking and described the exclusion she sensed as a philosopher defending 
female way of moral thinking and practicing ethics: 
 It sounds all very nice, says my male colleague, but can you claim to be doing ‘ethics?’    
After all, ethics is the study of justified action ...  Ah, yes.  But, after ‘after all,’ I am a   
woman, and I was not party [sic] to that definition.  Shall we say then that I am talking 
about ‘how to meet the other morally?’ Is this part of ethics? Is ethics part of this? (p. 95) 
 
 In the relevant literature, scholars (Bergman, 2004; Campbell, 2008; Carr, 2005b; 
Martin-Alcoff & Feder-Kittay, 2007) categorized Noddings’s framework of ethics, TC, as a 
relational, feminine theory of ethics because it promotes the maintenance and the establishment 
of the ethical caring relationships.  Ideally, these ethical relationships are constructed upon 
emotions, and emotions are mostly associated with the women’s culture.  In Noddings’s (2013) 
view, the maintenance of ethical caring relationships is necessary to motivate people to act 
morally because:  
 We want to be moral in order to remain in the caring relation and to enhance the ideal of    
ourselves as one-caring.  It is this ethical ideal, this realistic picture of ourselves as one-
caring, that guides us as we strive to meet the other morally.  Everything depends upon 
the nature and strength of this ideal, for we shall not have absolute principles to guide us. 
(p. 5)   
 
There are two parties involved in this ethical caring relationship: the one caring (the 
carer) and the one cared-for.  Noddings (1992) described this ethical caring relationship as the 
relationship in which “A, the carer, cares for another, B, and B recognizes that A cares for B” (p. 
91).  The roles of A and B may appear static at the first observation, but this is merely a 
misconception of the early writings of Noddings.  In the third edition of her book, Caring: A 
Relational Approach to Moral Education, Noddings (2013) has cleared this misunderstanding by 
explaining that these roles could be interchangeable, as everyone can be the carer in one 
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relationship and the cared-for in another relationship.  Ethical caring relationships are special 
kinds of relationships, in which both the carer and cared-for are dependent on each other if they 
want to maintain these relationships, improve their moral thinking, and become better persons 
through these relationships.  In Noddings’s (2013) view, these relationships are the motivational 
source to be moral as human beings and are first observed to be natural caring relationships.  
These natural caring relationships may develop into ethical caring relationships if the 
caring/carer and the cared-for individuals use the memories of being cared-for to construct new 
caring relationships. 
Noddings’s example of the natural caring relationship is the relationship present between 
a mother and an infant “in which we respond (to cared-for) as one-caring out of love or natural 
inclination” (Noddings, 2013, p. 5).  I think Noddings purposefully chose to offer this 
relationship as a representative of the natural caring relationship and analyze it in several editions 
of her Caring book (1984/2003a/2013) because, although it is very simple in form and could be 
observed anywhere in this world; it is still very important for becoming a caring person and 
living ethically.  Noddings believes this relationship may motivate one to act ethically and care 
because “there is no principle, no moral rule that prescribes a mother to love and care for her 
children” (Noddings, 2013, p. 5). In the same book, confident with the strength of this 
relationship, Noddings (2013) continued her discussion by stating that “We love not because we 
are required to love but because our natural relatedness gives natural birth to love.  It is this love, 
this natural caring, that makes the ethical possible” (p. 43).  
In Noddings’s (1984/2003a/2013) view, the natural caring relationships have the 
potential to develop into the ethical caring relationships because ethical caring relationships are 
derived from the natural caring relationships.  According to Noddings (2013), these two are 
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different from each other because the previous one is the source of the latter one as “Natural 
caring is the cherished condition; ethical caring seeks to restore or replace natural caring” 
(Preface Section).  Establishing a natural caring relationship is the first step taken in the direction 
of constructing an ethical caring relationship and Noddings’s ethical ideal.  This does not mean 
that the ethical caring relationships are in a more elevated position compared to the natural 
caring relationships; it simply means that ethical caring relationships are different and more 
developed versions of natural caring relationships.  
A necessary move regarding the definition and the scope of the ethical caring 
relationships is to distinguish it from the just relationships formed around the notion of equality 
between the involving parties.  First, the ethical caring relationship Noddings had in her mind 
differs from a just relationship established between two human beings, which is constructed upon 
the concept of equality in several ways.  In most caring relationships a difference of power and a 
degree of control exist between the parties involved, meaning that one party has a certain degree 
of power and control over another party (Benporath, 2003).  Conversely, in a just relationship, 
there is no power difference observed between the two parties involved in this relationship.   
Second, just relationships operate on the condition that everyone has the same chance to 
succeed under similar circumstances, and they embrace a philosophical view called “moral 
objectivity,” which promotes the treatment of identical equity among individuals.  [For more 
information on moral objectivity, see footnote #12 on page 40.]  In just relationships, a student 
gets the attention of the teacher because he or she deserves it, independent of the special 
conditions that constitute his/her character or status.  This means that another student would get 
the same attention from the teacher under similar circumstances, regardless of any particular 
condition (any obstacle, or any privileging relationships).  Teachers internalizing this perspective 
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disapprove of providing the same resources to the needy or vulnerable students and do not make 
decisions based on the principle of favoring the needy and vulnerable6 because they consider 
these special conditions as irrelevant of the distribution of attention, which is defined as a right, 
and do not provide it to the student unless the student deserves it. 
Third, an ethical caring relationship is dependent on the presence and the utilization of 
certain feelings in the direction of receiving the other (Noddings, 2013).  However, the just 
relationships described above are not dependent on the presence and the utilization of feelings 
because just relationships are contractual.  In a contractual relationship, the observed situation is 
similar to this: If as party A you do X, as party B, I promise to do Y in return.  Contractual 
relationships are mostly established between a legal entity and an individual who is connected to 
that legal entity through birth, mandatory sanctions, and inalienable rights (Rawls, 1971).7 
However, the situation observed in a caring relationship is different because caring relationships 
are dependent on the circumstantial human feelings; and there is no promise or contract to 
behave in a certain way.  Noddings (2013) has drawn attention to this difference by stating that 
“What the cared-for gives to the caring relation is not a promise to behave as the one-caring 
does” (p. 4), but his/her selective attention.  In most cases, the cared-for gives his/her attention to 
the caring relationship; and there is no contract requiring him/her to do this or stating the cared-
for is obliged to demonstrate his/her appreciativeness.  The intensity of this attention to the 
caring relationships determines the difference between the stages of caring, caring about, and 
caring for.  
                                                 
6. For more information about the discussion of vulnerability and care ethic, see Daniel Engster’s (2004) 
article titled “Care ethics and natural law theory: Toward an institutional political theory of caring” and Michael 
Kottow’s (2005) article titled “Vulnerability: What kind of principle is it?”  
 




In her theory, Noddings (2002a) identified two stages of caring; “caring-about” and 
“caring-for.”  In Noddings’s (2002a) view, caring about describes a stage of caring, in which 
people learn to care after being cared-for.  While being appreciative of this stage, Noddings 
(2013) stated that caring about is a limited version of caring she imagined because “‘Caring 
about’ always involves a certain benign neglect.  One is attentive just so far.  One assents with 
just so much enthusiasm.  One acknowledges.  One affirms.  One contributes five dollars and 
goes on to other things” (p. 112).  
According to Noddings (1984/2003a/2013), caring-for is the stage in which one truly 
experiences care and realizes its positive contribution to the holistic and comprehensive 
development of the individual.  Noddings (2002a, 2003a) claimed, in this stage of caring, the 
scope of caring-for is limited to people living at a close distance; therefore, distance becomes an 
important limitation in the act of caring.  Acknowledging this limitation, Noddings (2013) 
argued to care for everyone in this world happens to be an unattainable ideal because the 
capacity to care diminishes when the circles of caring enlarge, and:  
 Caring requires engrossment, commitment, displacement of motivation. The requirement     
that an ideal be attainable is attentive to this difference. It counsels that we construct an 
attainable ideal so that we will plan ahead and focus our efforts on what can in fact [sic] 
be done.  (p. 112)     
 
There are different sorts of relationships found among the society, and not all these 
relationships serve to the ethical caring ideal Noddings imagines or describes.  Considering this, 
it is necessary for one to distinguish the ethical caring relationships from other kinds of 
relationships. One way to separate these relationships from the others is to look at the important 





Essential Components of the Ethical Caring Relationships Promoted in Noddings’s TC  
Noddings’s TC is concerned with improving moral thinking and moral behavior in 
individuals through caring relationships and quality interactions and guiding them to be morally 
better and caring persons throughout their lives.  In Noddings’s (1989, 2003a, 2005, 2010) view, 
to act morally is equal to care, and to learn to care is a long and developmental process.  This 
long developmental process and any teaching activity constructed upon TC needs to include the 
four major components of ethical caring relationships.  Noddings (1995a, 2013) identified the 
essential components of the TC as engrossment, sympathy, reciprocity, and motivational 
displacement.   
As explained earlier, not every relationship qualifies to be an ethical caring relationship 
that leads to the ethical caring ideal Noddings had envisioned.  The ethical caring relationship 
has important components in itself: engrossment, motivational displacement, and reciprocity 
(Noddings, 1995a, 2013).  If a relationship lacks one or more than one of these components, then 
that relationship may not be considered as an ethical caring relationship.  Ideally, one will 
become a caring person practicing care after he/she remembers what it is like to be being cared-
for.  In these relationships, engrossment and motivational displacements are the characteristics of 
the carer/caring, while reciprocity is recognized as the characteristic of the cared-for.   
Engrossment is necessary for the establishment of an ethical caring relationship because 
“At bottom all caring involves engrossment” (Noddings, 2013, p. 17).  Engrossment is a concept 
referring to how the caring one understands and approaches the needs or demands of the person 
being cared-for.  Engrossment is mainly intrinsic, meaning that the will to become engrossed in a 




In a caring relationship between the teacher and the student, the carer/caring teacher 
becomes emotionally engrossed to the student (Noddings, 1992).  Moreover, the engrossment of 
the caring teacher is present in the acts of the caring teacher, and, as a result of this state of 
presence, the student knows that his or her ideas, experiences, and values are of interest to the 
teacher.  Engrossment is associated with an internal force: how the caring party feels about and 
sympathizes with the cared-for.    
Noddings used the word “sympathize” on purpose and refers to sympathy, not to 
empathy.  Sympathy asks for attaching, and relating, but not by being consumed by this attention 
and participating in this relation.  Unlike empathy, which is commonly associated to the father’s 
language by Noddings (2013), sympathy does not imply or refer to shrinking one’s personality 
and problems into units of analysis.  According to Noddings (2010a), sympathy plays an 
important role in a caring relation because “caring relation is colored throughout by sympathy—
an attitude of solicitude toward the cared-for and a willingness to listen and be moved” (p. 392).   
According to Noddings (2010b), there exists a fine line between sympathy and empathy.  
Ideally, this line reveals itself when the carer/caring decides what to do with the information 
obtained after understanding the other’s problems and conditions.  Noddings (2013) did not 
recommend analyzing the other’s condition as an information unit, and she argued that solving 
the problem for the other cared one refers to empathy.  In TC, solving the problem for the cared 
one is not recommended because it limits the moral development of the cared one.  What is 
recommended for the carer is sympathizing with the other: “receive the other into myself, and I 
see and feel with the other.  I become a duality…The seeing and feeling are mine, but only partly 
and temporarily mine, as on loan to me” (Noddings, 2013, p. 30).   
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Engrossment is connected to motivational displacement and sympathy.  With sympathy 
in the ethical caring relationship, the caring teacher, the carer/caring motivationally displaces 
with the cared for, the student.  Motivational displacement happens when the caring teacher 
willingly puts his or her own interests aside and approaches the cared-for’s situation to 
understand it.  Through motivational displacement, the caring teacher understands the needs, 
struggles and reality of the cared-for, the student from his or her standpoint.  With this new 
understanding of the cared-for’s reality, an ethical commitment to act emerges.  As Noddings 
(2013) stated in her book, “I feel also [sic], that I must act accordingly; that is I am impelled to 
act as though in my own behalf, but in [sic] behalf of the other” (p. 16).            
Here, the word “must” represents the commitment of the carer, the caring teacher, to the 
caring relationship.  The caring teacher constantly works to seek involvement and recognition in 
the cared-for (Noddings, 1992, 1995a, 2003b, 2013, 2015, 2016), and this requires an 
understanding of the student’s feelings and struggles toward the subject matter.  The ethical 
bond, the ethical caring relationship formed between the caring teacher and the cared student, 
grows stronger and thicker as both parties commit to the relationship through their acts.   
Reciprocity is the last component of this ethical ideal and refers to the recognition of the 
caring one’s acts by the cared-for.  Reciprocity may be defined as the contribution of the cared-
for to the ethical caring relationship, and its presence in the ethical caring relationship is 
significant for the improvement of the moral well-being of the carer/caring.  Unlike engrossment 
and motivational displacement, reciprocity is the responsibility of the cared-for in an ethical 
caring relationship (Noddings, 2013).  If the cared-for does not reciprocate or recognize the acts 
of caring and respond to them, then the ethical caring relationship may, and should, be 
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considered as incomplete.  This function of reciprocity in an ethical caring relationship is 
essential for the maintenance of the ethical caring relationship because:   
 What the cared-for gives to the relation either in direct response to the one-caring or in     
personal delight or in happy growth before her eyes is [sic] genuine reciprocity. It 
contributes to the maintenance of the relation and serves to prevent the caring from 
turning back on the one-caring in the form of anguish and concern for self. (Noddings, 
2013, p. 74)    
 
Several ways of reciprocation and completing an ethical caring relationship have been 
possible, as the ethical caring relationship occurs in multiple forms.  Noddings’s TC encourages 
this variety because it aims at the completion of an ethical caring relationship and it 
acknowledges there is no one standard form for the completion of this process.  One word of 
caution is necessary here, as one might get confused.  Noddings (2013) treated the completion of 
the ethical caring relationship as a process necessary to the realization of the ethical caring ideal, 
and she prefers the existence of this process over getting moral credit for acting in a certain way.  
This is an unlikely feature to be embraced for a theory of moral philosophy; in fact, this is what 
distinguishes her theory from other theories of morality, including Utilitarianism and Kantian 
ethics.  Noddings (1984) explained the reasoning behind her preference of continuation over 
product, people over principle, process over justification:  
 As one-caring, I am not seeking justification for my action; I am not standing alone    
before some tribunal.  What I seek is completion in the other-the sense of being cared-for 
and, I hope, the renewed commitment of the cared-for to turn about and act as one-caring 
in the circles and chains within which he is defined.  Thus, I am not justified but 
[sic]somehow fulfilled and completed in my own life and in the lives of those I have thus     
influenced.  (p. 95)   
 
In TC, the ethical caring relationships are required to construct the ethical ideal of care, 
and they aim to guide individuals to become better themselves and morally caring people 
(Noddings, 1984/2003a/2013).  In the second edition of her Caring book, Noddings (2003a) has 
stated: “It is that condition toward which we long and strive [sic], and it is our longing for 
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caring-to be in that special relation -that provides the motivation for us to be moral” (p. 5).  By 
nature, anything that helps to build and maintain this ethical caring relationship is nurturing and 
desired, but both parties involved in these relations need to recognize that they are in a 
relationship.    
Ethical caring relationships are nurtured through the construction of natural caring 
relationships.  Natural caring relationships are so fundamental to the survival of human beings, in 
fact, that Noddings (1984/2003a/2013) claimed that without having someone care for them, no 
individual would be able to pass through infancy and live.  Unlike ethical caring, this natural 
caring is spontaneous, and it “arises out of of [sic] love or natural inclination” (Noddings, 2003a, 
p. 5).  Noddings (2010a) challenged the dependence of moral thinking to moral principles found 
in ethics and differentiates thinking through natural caring from the principled thinking by 
stating “Natural caring …[and] it is exercised with no need for reference to moral principles or 
direct reasoning from such principles” (p. 350).  Natural caring is spontaneous, and may be 
found in any corner of this world where two human beings live.  Her insistence on natural caring 
and its spontaneity might be considered as another sign of Noddings’s defiance of the 
domination of the principled thinking in moral philosophy and moral education. 
Another reason for Noddings’s defiance of rules is that, in most cases, according to 
Noddings (1984/2003a/2013), rules come with the statements defining the exceptional conditions 
which tone down the practical implication of the moral rule.  Moreover, Noddings (2003a) 
argues the moral rule offered in the theories of moral philosophy is static, and in most cases, its 
practical implementation is nearly impossible to the moral issues found in real lives.  Moving 
from this limitation, Noddings (1984/2003a/2013) defended that the ethical caring relationships 
are in a more advantageous position compared to the static moral rules because she claimed these 
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relationships change quite often and assist individuals to adapt to the new situations.  Not only 
do these relationships change, but the context nurturing them also changes and makes everything 
almost non-identical to each other.  According to Noddings (2002a), these nurturing, caring 
relationships are the power source of the ethical ideal of care, and since life in educational 
settings is dynamic with the flexibility feature they have, they become more sufficient and better 
guides for teachers to improve the moral thinking of students compared to the teaching of moral 
behaviors through abstract rules and dictating school policies.   
The ethical act of caring needs to go beyond the verbal statements and emotions of the 
caring individual, and the ethical act of caring needs to be present in the actions of the one caring 
because caring relationships are responsive.  Noddings has stated this vital need for the 
representation and the responsive character of the ethical act of caring in the foreword section of 
Beck’s (1994) book, “To care is to respond” (pp. ix-x).  Through stressing the responsive 
character of the ethical caring relationships, Noddings drew a hypothetical line between merely 
thinking about ethics (theoretical knowledge of morality) and acting ethically (practical 
knowledge of morality).  In Noddings’s (2003a) view, this line begins to blur, if the one-caring is 
not present in his/her actions and is not responding to the cared-for in a meaningful way because 
“Caring is largely reactive and responsive” (p. 19).  If the one-caring is not present in his/her 
actions, then the caring relationship might not reach to its full potential. 
Noddings’s TC encourages the holistic and comprehensive education of the child and 
bridging the gap between the home sphere and the public/school sphere.  Her proposal of holistic 
and relational education puts Noddings in stark contrast to the practices and policies supporting 
traditional education and conventional methods of teaching.  Noddings (1995a) explained that 
the rationale stands behind the teaching of care and educating the individual for the better: “We 
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should want more from our educational efforts than adequate academic achievement and … we 
will not achieve even that meager success unless our children believe that they themselves [sic] 
are cared for and learn to care for others” (p. 675). 
Noddings’s TC and A Care-Based Approach in Education 
Noddings’s view of education naturally encompasses a moral flavor in it, but it does not 
limit itself to moral education as it suggests certain improvements to general education.  In fact, 
Noddings (2005, 2007, 2013) has opposed the educating of the individual if the definition of this 
education refers to the concentration on only one piece of education, moral or academic.  Her 
opposition called for the bridging of these pieces of education and constructs the bedrock of her 
proposal for the whole education of the student. 
Noddings’s proposal for educating the student through educative caring practices requires 
the practicing of a different understanding while teaching; it requires one to restructure his/her 
teaching pedagogy focusing on care and to promote holistic education of the child rather than the 
teaching of fragmented knowledge to the child. The teacher embracing this teaching through 
caring pedagogy knows that “the primary aim of moral education is to produce people who will 
engage successfully in caring relations” (Noddings, 2010a, p. 394).  In fact, this teaching through 
caring pedagogy underlines the implication of certain elements of care-based teaching and aims 
to create a caring, educative, and morally improving classroom.   
The Elements of Noddings’s Philosophy of Care-Based Teaching 
Dialogue is an important element of Noddings’s philosophy of care-based teaching since 
it is the first step taken to establish relations with students.  Noddings (2013) stated that the main 
purpose of having a dialogue with someone else is “to come into contact with ideas and to 
understand, to meet the other and to care” (p. 186), and caring teachers know this fact.  These 
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caring teachers carry on constructive and educational dialogues to understand the needs of their 
students, and they meet these needs when possible. 
Several kinds of dialogue exist; however, not every dialogue occurs in the same format or 
in the format Noddings envisioned.  In her writings, Noddings (2003a/2013, 2011, 2015) argued 
for a special kind of dialogue which enriches any teaching activity constructed upon TC.  When, 
in her writings, Noddings (2006a) discussed the importance of dialogue for the maintenance of 
the ethical caring relationships and their place in care-based moral education she envisioned an 
active and educative two-way conversation occurring between the students and the teachers.  
These conversations may be rooted in the ordinary life issues students and teachers experience, 
and the participation of both parties to these conversations mirror the multiple perspectives these 
parties have (Noddings, 2006a). 
This educative two-way conversation is different from the Socratic kind of dialogue 
found in the writings of the ancient Greek philosopher.  In a Socratic kind of dialogue, the wise 
one (the teacher) asks philosophical questions, leading the young (the student) to find the correct 
answers, and the ignorant one answers these questions from which the wise one will generate 
new questions.  The aim of the Socratic kind of dialogue is to reach the one true knowledge 
through dialogue, and it usually concentrates on the answers relevant to the subject matter.  In 
contrast to this, Noddings’s (2005) vision of “dialogue” is closer to the vision of Paulo Freire 
(1968/1996), and it functions as a tool to create open-ended conversations, in which neither the 
teacher nor the student pays significant attention to the delivery and acquisition of the end 
product, the subject matter.  Delivery and acquisition of the subject matter have secondary 
importance.  Confirmation is an important part of teaching care to individuals because it 
encourages teachers to ask multiple questions regarding the problematic situation.  Asking 
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multiple questions helps the teachers to see beneath the surface of the general situation when a 
student acts inappropriately.  The teacher constructs a caring dialogue with the student and 
confirms why an act is inappropriate in a certain situation.  The inappropriate act in this situation 
is the act that does not help the student construct a better and morally educated self; and the 
confirming teaching practices have been structured around the principle that “When we confirm 
someone, we identify a better self and encourage its development” (Noddings, 1998, p. 192).  
However, educators need to be careful when they use confirmation in their acts because it can be 
understood as glossing over the student’s mistakes if teachers do not correct these mistakes 
within a reasonable time frame.  Being aware of this fact, Noddings (1998) has drawn the line 
between the glossing over of the student’s mistakes and the confirmation by noting that “We do 
not confirm people in ways we judge them to be wrong” (p. 192).   
Modeling is an important part of Noddings’s philosophy of teaching that is based on TC.  
Caring teachers acknowledge that they model their students, even in their unconscious behaviors, 
since they know “everything we [they] do… as teachers has [sic] moral overtones” (Noddings, 
2013, p. 179).  The caring teachers show their students how to care and live morally by forming 
caring relations with them and make moral decisions as a result of these relations.  These 
teachers understand that modeling is a better way of improving a child’s moral thinking and 
shaping that child’s moral behavior compared with having the child reading the school rules 
describing what is an acceptable moral behavior and what is not. 
As a former high school math teacher, Noddings experienced the problems occurring in a 
classroom firsthand and observed that the academic survival of the students at school depends 
largely on their home environments and their carers.  I think the validity of Noddings’s 
observation and the importance of teachers functioning as role models has increased even more 
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because the number of young children who have only one parent at home to look upon and to 
take as a role model has risen to 20% (United States Census Bureau, 2016).  In fact, according to 
Veugelers and DeKat (2003), school administrators need to hire caring teachers who can be role 
models for all the students, particularly for the struggling students, as these students need more 
role models to look up to.  
Noddings was well aware of the fact that learning to care is a long process since there is 
no way to teach caring in a class period of 45 minutes.  Her solution to this problem is practicing 
care in various environments, making practice the final important element of Noddings’s 
philosophy of care-based teaching.  Noddings (1995b/2011) explained the importance of practice 
in her Philosophy of Education when she reported, “If we want to produce people who will care 
for one another, then it makes sense to give students practice in caring and, more importantly, 
reflection on that practice” (p. 191).   
In TC, Noddings (2002a, 2005, 2006) promoted an education system, in which the 
learning individual is a whole identity and he/she deserves more than the pieces and bits of 
knowledge the traditional system believes so.  The ideal education structured around the moral 
value care requires the school, academic face of the public sphere to be connected with the home 
sphere of the individual.  Understanding the importance of this connection, Noddings (2005, 
2006a, 2008) argued for the whole education of the child and defended that the ideal education, 
or in other words, care-based education focuses on the education of the mind (the academic 
education) and the heart (the moral education) of the child at the same time.   
In Noddings’s (2002a) understanding, holistic education requires the improvement of the 
relationship between school and home spheres.  She argued that educational settings should 
represent the caring homes, as children learn many things at home through constructive and 
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caring conversations conducted at the dinner tables.  Teachers may start these conversations and 
encourage students’ participation in these conversations since they would improve the children’s 
critical thinking skills (Noddings, 2006b).  Without these conversations happening in classrooms, 
students may miss the opportunity to improve their critical thinking skills.   
Aims and Restructuring of the Educational System Based on Noddings’s TC 
For Noddings (2015), the purpose of education is “to produce better adults,” who are 
“competent, caring, loving and lovable people” (p. 8). This being the purpose, Noddings (2015) 
claimed the schooling system in the United States is in deep trouble because it is focused on 
testing. Schools functioning to serve this purpose produce students who are excellent test takers, 
but not great translators of knowledge, as they have problems with translating school knowledge 
to home or street knowledge (Noddings, 2015). The care-based education system aims to extend 
the definition of ideal education and resets the priorities of the schools while redefining the aim 
of the true education (Noddings, 2006; Verducci, 2013).  
With her theory of TC, Noddings opposed the traditional ways of teaching and claimed 
that these ways are not capable of educating the child as a whole to be a better person and to care 
ethically. According to her, the students need to have enough time to experience care at schools 
because learning to care ethically is not something that could be learned without practicing it 
(Noddings, 1989, 2002a, 2003a, 2007). Anything that prevents this from happening should be 
considered as problematic and needs either to be replaced or complemented with other 
educational activities constructed upon care.  
One of the changes Noddings (2013, 2015) proposed is to redesign the curriculum in the 
broadest sense possible so that it would fit the unique needs of the students and include them in 
the learning process.  In TC, the importance of diversity and inclusivity in educational settings 
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and in the educational texts being taught to students is highlighted.  The aim in doing this is to 
prevent the exclusion and marginalization of certain groups of individuals, and, ideally, it 
increases the chance of the academic survival of the students belonging to the different groups of 
race, religion, and socioeconomic status.  Noddings’s statement provided below reveals how 
Noddings (1999) argued in favor of a differentiated curriculum addressing the needs of all the 
students: 
 I think care theory favors a differentiated curriculum because it seems likely that as we 
work closely with students, we will be moved by their clearly different needs and 
interests. In any case, our claim to care must be based not on a one-time, virtuous 
decisions, but rather on continuing evidence that relations are maintained.  (p. 13) 
 
The practical implication of Noddings’s holistic perspective requires the school 
curriculum to be restructured, so that it may be compatible with teaching care at schools.  This 
restructuring may mean the abandoning the college-bound curriculums found in schools if they 
only aim to improve the academic knowledge of the students (Stengel & Tom, 2006).  If the 
educators and curriculum designers are serious about educating the individual for the better 
whole person, then they need to prepare a school curriculum in which “The scope of the subject 
matter [must] be very broad” (Noddings, 2013, p. 191).  From a wide variety of good options 
within a broad curriculum designed through TC, students will be able to choose what they want 
to learn and how they want to learn. 
One of the changes this theory proposed is related to the school culture and educational 
administration, while it provided an alternate definition of education and a different function for 
the schools. Noddings (2005, 2015) is a strong supporter of the reduction of the number of 
students in schools by increasing the number of the schools established.  By reducing the number 
of students in schools, Noddings (1988, 2002b, 2013, 2015) envisioned things might eventually 
change in schools.  Teachers would have more time to get to know their students and care for 
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them.  When teachers have time to get to know their students, then they will be able to point out 
issues (e.g.  bullying, low grades, child abuse) to their students more easily and more quickly, 
and this may make schools safer (Craig & Pepler, 2007; Cunliffe & Eriksen, 2011; Smit & 
Scherman, 2016).   
Ideally, caring teachers working in the smaller schools have the opportunity to build a 
positive caring environment of teaching.  In this environment, caring teachers consider the 
positive behaviors as part of the classroom culture and norm; hence, they do not reward students 
for their one-time actions.  Their aim is to make sure that students build an internal way of 
controlling and improving their behaviors, and the mission of these teachers is “to preserve and 
enhance caring in herself and in those with whom she comes in contact” (Noddings, 2003a, p. 
172). 
Noddings (2002b) defined education as “a constellation of encounters, both planned and 
unplanned, that promote growth through the acquisition of knowledge, skills, understanding [sic] 
and appreciation” (p. 283), and these encounters may happen almost anywhere, including streets, 
community centers, and hospitals.  In fact, in her book, Starting at Home: Caring and Social 
Policy, Noddings (2002b) mapped out a large-scale social policy centering around care and the 
home sphere and discussed how odd places might transform into educative environments.  
Extending the education based on care to everyone, Noddings (2002b) has devoted an entire 
chapter to the education of homeless people and has argued that with the collaborating efforts of 
the schools “Perhaps … today’s homeless children will not be tomorrow’s homeless parents” (p. 
249-250).   
Noddings’s TC demands an educational system, which favors human encounters and 
interactions. According to Noddings (2003c), the caring teacher relates to students, and knows 
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that teaching a child is more than pouring information into his/her mind.  In her article, “Is 
Teaching a Practice?”, Noddings (2003c) discussed that teaching is a practice of altering human 
relations to better, and caring educators have the opportunity to “affect the lives of students not 
just in what we teach them by way of subject matter but in how we [they] relate to them as 
persons” (p. 250).  Relating to children and encouraging them to be better persons requires a 
different, a caring perspective to be implemented in moral education.   
In Noddings’s (2013) view, moral problems found in real-life situations, including 
educational settings, are not straightforward like math problems.8  Math problems represent the 
written forms of static conditions that do not change based on circumstances or the identity of the 
student dealing with the problem.  Therefore, a student should use pre-established formulas to 
address these problems.  Unfortunately, moral problems found in educational settings are 
circumstantial, meaning that how one student approaches a moral problem depends on the 
circumstances and the student’s identity and character.  Considering this, caring educators, who 
are working to improve students’ moral thinking skills and to guide them behave morally, need 
to know: 
 What we [they] do depends not upon rules, or at least not wholly on rules -not upon a 
prior determination of what is fair or equitable- but upon a constellation of conditions that 
is viewed through both the eyes of the one-caring and the eyes of the cared-for. 
(Noddings, 2003a, p. 13)  
 
In Nodding’s (1984/2003a/2013) view, to work through this new and different 
perspective on moral education, people should connect with the individuals affecting and 
                                                 
 8. These moral problems are more like wicked problems as they have more than one social factor 
complicating the problem further and they are not usually solved through mathematical formulations.  The term 
‘wicked problem’ is introduced to social science by the famous philosopher Charles West Churchman in 1967; 
however, there are different definitions of it as different scholars have defined it differently by employing their own 
perspectives.  If my reading of Churchman’s definition of wicked problems is accurate, then one of the defining 
characteristics of these problems is that the solution of the problem changes depending on how one frames it, 
meaning that it lacks a definite solution present in the math problems.  
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affected by the problem.  People usually establish this connection when they ask questions 
similar to “what conditions pushed this student to act in this inappropriate way of hurting other 
students?” and get answers before analyzing the conditions using multiple lenses, including the 
lenses of the wrongdoer students.  Asking these questions and transforming the answers to moral 
solutions require individuals to think outside the formal, abstract boxes of pre-established moral 
rules.  Noddings (2003a) identified this perspective as a new position to be considered and 
employed in moral thinking and stated “This position or attitude of caring activates a complex 
structure of memories, feelings, and capacities…the process of moral decision making that is 
founded on caring requires a process of concretization rather than one of abstraction.” (p. 8) 
Noddings favored neither the application of rules in the educating of students morally nor 
the globalization of her theory in moral education if this globalization requires standardization.  
[There are sections in Chapters 3 and 4 of this dissertation in which I discuss how other scholars 
have approached this issue in the fields of moral education and philosophy of education].  On the 
contrary, Noddings (2003a, 2005, 2013) was after construction of a framework of ethics and 
moral education that is compatible with the practical life, and she argued that her framework 
based on caring is more sustainable compared to other frameworks of moral thinking.  Noddings 
(2003a) explained her problem with the perspective supporting the concept of “generalized 
knowledge is good” in moral thinking and she described her framework/theory as: 
 an invitation to see things from an alternative perspective…To begin with, I am denying 
the sort of generalizability that would be required to make such a judgment. Situations of 
relatedness are unique, and it is my purpose to build a picture of one-caring from a 
collection of concrete and unique situations.  (p. 32−33) 
 
Noddings’s TC treats the uniqueness of situations and cultural concepts constructed in 
different societies as the tools that might be used for the construction of a richer perspective in 
education, specifically in moral education.  According to Collins and Ting (2014), Noddings 
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promoted diversity in education as much as possible because she was aware of the fact that 
“Diversity… is not about the survival of the fittest [standardized].  Rather, it is the non‐survival 
of the non‐fit. There can be many ways of being fit.  Diversity… provides creativity and 
multiple paths of action” (p. 15).  There are several ways to promote diversity in moral thinking 
and education, identifying the theories that do not promote is a common way to do. 
One way of promoting this diversity in the construction of moral thinking and in 
education is to protect the cultural identity of the unique concepts and discuss them side by side 
with other theories of moral thinking and education.  In their article, “The African Ethic of 
Ubuntu/Botho: Implications for Research on Morality,” Metz and Gaie (2010) volunteer for this 
task and discussed Ubuntu side by side with other theories of ethics and moral thinking, 
including Noddings’s TC.  [See Chapter 3 for the analysis of their article in connection to 
Noddings’s TC.] 
Shortly after the publication of the book Caring in 1984, articles and book chapters 
reviewing and discussing Noddings’s TC began and continued to appear in the qualified journals 
of education and moral philosophy (Bergman, 2004; Diller, 1988; Hamington, 2002, 2012, 2015; 
Li, 2015; Velasquez, West & Graham, 2013).  This has signaled that Noddings’s TC is on its 
path to be an influential theory in the relevant fields of research and is going to contribute to the 
academic production of knowledge in these fields for a long time.  My intention in doing this 
study was to understand how this theory has been present in the fields of moral education and 
philosophy of education from 2003 through 2013. 
Significance of the Study 
Noddings’s TC is a relational and practical theory of ethics and moral thinking; therefore, 
understandably, it has had a deep impact on moral education and ethics of teaching.  It has 
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offered an alternate, relational perspective to use on moral education, but its influence has 
extended to other fields of education, such as nursing education, curriculum and instruction, 
teacher education, and philosophy of education.  However, its influence in moral education and 
philosophy of education and how this theory has contributed to these fields has not been 
thoroughly analyzed before.  Through this study, my work primarily concentrated on offering a 
convincing argument on the influence of Noddings’s TC in the fields of moral education and 
philosophy of education starting in 2003 through 2013.     
The fields of moral education and philosophy of education overlap with each other; thus, 
certain debates in these fields tend to co-occur.  Moreover, it is difficult to draw a hypothetical 
line separating moral education and from philosophy of education, as most scholars ask 
questions that might be the focus of both fields of research.  Still, in order to document the 
influence of TC in several debates and for the sake of the clarity of the issues debated, I treated 
moral education and philosophy of education as two distinct fields of education.  
This study is a descriptive analysis documenting the influence of Noddings’s TC between 
the years of 2003 and 2013, including both years.  This study contributes to the relevant literature 
by explaining how Noddings’s TC has been both influential in and contributed to these fields 
within the selected time frame.  Through this project, as the researcher, I analyzed how 
Noddings’s TC has contributed to the discussions present in the well-respected journals which 
are also representative of these fields within a preset time frame.  I selected the Journal of Moral 
Education to use in this study because, according to Scimago Journal Ranking, and Journal 
Metrics, it is a well-respected journal representing the discipline of moral education.  Parallel to 
my selection of the Journal of Moral Education, I selected the Journal of Philosophy of 
Education to use in this study for of two reasons.  First, it is a well-respected journal representing 
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the discipline of the philosophy of education.  Second, according to Scimago Journal Ranking 
and Journal Metrics, it is comparable to the Journal of Moral Education in quality, but its 
emphasis is different from the first one.    
This study covered the years starting in 2003, the publication date of the second edition 
of Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education, through 2013, the publication 
date of the same book with a different title and an updated preface section.  Noddings did not 
change her theory significantly between the first and second edition of the Caring book, but due 
to the criticisms she received during this time period, she made a number of changes to her 
theory in the third edition of the Caring book.  For example, based on feminist criticism 
Noddings received between the years of 2003 and 2013, she removed it from the title of the third 
edition of the book.9  
Research Questions Guiding This Dissertation: 
1. Limited to and based on the articles published in the Journal of Moral Education, how 
has Noddings’s TC been influential in the field of moral education as the authors 
appropriated Noddings’s TC in this field between the years of 2003 and 2013?  
2. Limited to and based on the articles published in the Journal of Philosophy of Education, 
how has Noddings’s TC been influential in the field of philosophy of education as the 




                                                 
9. In the third and final edition of her Caring book, Noddings (2013) acknowledges the validity of these 
criticisms and states “I think critics are right, however, to point out that the connotations of ‘feminine’ are off-




Methodology: Collection and Analysis of Data 
Philosophy of education is a field of research in which philosophers of education study 
the problems of education using the tools of philosophy.10  Philosophical research is different 
from empirical research conducted in the natural sciences because the philosophers of education 
understand and classify different things as data.  They mostly evaluate the quality of the 
philosophical research by looking at the quality and clarity of the argument produced and 
conclude whether the argument is strong or weak, not right or wrong (Feinberg, 2008).  The data 
produced in philosophical research are unique, and they are not open to testing using control and 
test groups or to generalizations as a result of this testing. 
As a field of research, philosophy of education is a highly theoretical field of research, 
and philosophers of education usually employ a type of inquiry, which is mostly reflective by 
nature (Giarelli & Chambliss, 1984).  In fact, well-respected philosophers of education reflect on 
the educational problems as they witness and offer solutions to these problems.  For example, 
Paulo Freire (1968/1996, 1993, 1994) identified the oppressive education system in his country 
as a problem; he has provided his own system and theoretical framework after experiencing the 
oppressive system and reflecting on his experiences.    
Establishing a clear and satisfactory argument is the aim of the philosophical research, 
and one way to produce this clear argument is to analyze concepts in detail and conduct a 
conceptual research on the issues of interest to philosophers of education.  The utilization of 
conceptual analysis might be dated back to Plato, since he is considered as one of the earliest 
scholars interested in getting a clear answer to the concepts of a just state, good government, and 
                                                 
10. I provide detailed information on this issue in Chapter 4, in which I reflect on the influence of 
Noddings’s TC in the field of philosophy of education starting in 2003 through 2013. 
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moral education.  The aim of the conceptual analysis is to have a better understanding of a 
particular issue by breaking down concepts into its main components (Beaney, 2003). 
Clarity is the main aim of the scholars publishing in the fields of philosophy and 
philosophy of education, and one researcher may accomplish this aim by re-describing the 
situation of the problem or the educational theory in which he or she is interested.  In descriptive 
analysis, the researcher only aims to describe a situation “without directly attempting to change 
it” (Coe, Waring, Hedges, & Arthur, 2017, p. 10), and it addresses the question of “what is going 
on in a situation related to X?”.  Considering the research questions stated earlier, descriptive 
analysis befits the nature of this study and serves my purpose of documenting the influence of 
Noddings’s TC in the selected fields of education between the years of 2003 and 2013.  In this 
theoretical study, there is no control and test groups involved, and the researcher only aims to 
describe a situation in educational research in relation to a relatively new theory of ethics and 
moral education.   
As the research questions indicate, this is a theoretical study in which I have described 
the situation by analyzing the articles in the selected journals.  By looking at the data, I have 
described how the selected fields of education have treated Noddings’s TC within the years of 
2003 and 2013, the second and the third editions of the Caring book.  After describing the 
situation, I have reflected on and interpreted the data–the common themes discussed in the 
articles–as the influence of Noddings’s TC in the fields of interest.  My analysis of the selected 
articles citing Noddings’s TC was only aimed to provide insights regarding the influence of this 
theory in these fields and document this influence using the ideas presented in connection to TC. 
Providing insights regarding the influence of Noddings’s TC in the field of moral 
education required a careful reading of the articles published in the Journal of Moral Education.  
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I have selected the articles based on two important criteria.  First, they needed to be published 
between the years of 2003 and 2013.  Second, they needed to discuss Noddings’s TC as their 
main theme.  Through these criteria, I have conducted a descriptive analysis of the articles and 
explained how Noddings’s TC has been influential in this field by analyzing how scholars have 
approached and used Noddings’s TC in their articles.  This descriptive analysis has assisted me 
to take a picture of the influence of Noddings’s TC and its connection to the themes discussed in 
the field of moral education.  
 The number of articles citing Noddings’s TC published in the Journal of Moral 
Education within this time frame is 20.  My primary analysis began by dividing these articles 
into two main groups.  The articles in the first group are the ones that have analyzed and echoed 
Noddings’s TC.  The authors of these articles used this theory to discuss new ideas and 
constructed their solutions to the problems found in the field of moral education.  The authors of 
the second group of articles acknowledged the positive contribution(s) of Noddings’s theory to 
moral education, but they have provided detailed analysis regarding the shortcomings of this 
theory while discussing new ideas or their solutions to the educational problems related to the 
field of moral education on which they wanted to elaborate more.  Then, depending on the 
similarity of the educational problems these articles are discussing, I divided these articles into a 
number of smaller groups, which refer to phase two in this dissertation.  In this second phase of 
my study, I analyzed these articles and inquired whether I could group the ideas which are 
relevant to Noddings’s TC into common themes.  Through these themes, I explain how 
Noddings’s TC is influential, in other words, how Noddings’s TC has been received in the field 
of moral education between the years of 2003 and 2013.  I anticipated some of these themes to 
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be discussed in the literature review and in Chapter 4, but that is not a requirement.  Similarly, 
not all the issues discussed in the literature review are present in the themes of Chapter 3. 
I analyzed and documented the influence of Noddings’s TC in the field of philosophy of 
education by employing the same criteria for the selection of the articles and analysis tools I used 
in Chapter 3.  In Chapter 4, I shifted my focus to another field of education because of the 
second research question guiding this dissertation; however, everything else that matters in the 
design of this research (selection of the articles, phases of analyzing the articles, and the goal of 
analyzing these articles) has remained the same.  Still, the next paragraph describes the analysis 
process I employed to document the influence and the contribution of Noddings’s TC to the 
discussions ongoing in the field of philosophy of education starting 2003 through 2013.   
Sixteen articles were selected for this study that cite Noddings’s TC and were published 
in the Journal of Philosophy of Education within this time frame.  My primary analysis was 
begun by dividing these articles into two main groups.  The first group of articles refers to the 
ones that analyze and echo Noddings’s TC.  The authors of these articles have used this theory to 
discuss new ideas and construct their own solutions to the problems found in the field of 
philosophy of education.  The authors of the second group of articles have acknowledged the 
positive contribution(s) of Noddings’s theory to problems found in the field of philosophy of 
education, yet have raised serious challenges to Noddings’s TC while discussing new ideas or 
their solutions to the educational problems of philosophy of education on which they want to 
elaborate more.  Then, depending on the similarity of the educational problems discussed in 
these articles, I divided these articles into a number of smaller groups.  Dividing these articles 
into a number of smaller groups was the second phase of my study.  In this second phase, I 
analyzed these articles and studied whether they discussed common themes while using 
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Noddings’s TC.  Through these themes, I explained how Noddings’s TC is influential, in other 
words, how Noddings’s TC has been received in the field of philosophy of education between 
the years of 2003 and 2013.  I anticipated some of these themes would be present in the literature 
review and in Chapter 3, but that is not a requirement.  Similarly, not all the issues discussed in 
the literature review are present in the themes of Chapter 4.                    
 I have only analyzed a small sample of articles citing Noddings’s TC in educational 
research within the selected time range because Noddings has been one of the most cited 
scholars in these fields.  For example, her book, Caring: A Relational Approach to Ethics and 
Moral Education, has been cited 9,844 times since it was published on September 14, 2013, 
which is relatively recent.11  I have only used the articles present in the Journal of Moral 
Education and in the Journal of Philosophy of Education because they are representative 
journals publishing in the fields of interest and they are comparable in quality based on the 
journal ranking lists posted on the websites of Scimago Journal Ranking and Journal Metrics.  
Both of these journals have been essential journals, and the network of Kansas University 
Libraries provided access to the articles of interest published within 2003 and 2013.    
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I detailed the moral concept of care and presented several interpretations 
of care found in the different fields of research.  Carol Gilligan’s inclusive argument regarding 
care and moral psychology was significant for this research since her ideas on the care-based 
moral reasoning process and her contra arguments regarding Kohlberg have been of interest to 
Noddings.  In addition to Gilligan’s research and her ideas on the moral value care, I explained 
Noddings’s theory, TC in detail.  
                                                 
11. According to Google Scholar, the number of getting cited for this book changes daily as it increases 
each time when one cites this book; however, on the day of September 9, 2017 it is 9844.  
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The comprehensive discussion of Noddings’s TC has produced an important part of this 
chapter, as its influence in the selected fields of education starting in 2003 through 2013 is the 
subject of this dissertation project.  In here, the interested reader can find the main claims of 
Noddings’s TC and the essential components of this theory.  As a further step taken in building 
an accurate understanding of Noddings’s TC, I discussed Noddings’s philosophy of care-based 
teaching and how to implement caring in schools after restructuring the education system we 
know, including the definition and the function of the schools.   
I end this chapter, after having discussed the educational significance and purpose of this 
study, and introduced the criteria selected in the collection and analysis of the articles used in 
this dissertation.  The literature on Noddings’s TC has expanded to several fields of research, as 
the research conducted using Noddings’s TC has spread out; however, I limited my focus to the 
literature that provided the basis for my research questions.  Chapter 2 presents the discussion of 
this literature, a discussion of the influence of Noddings’s TC in moral philosophy, moral 
education, and philosophy of education, and offers the foundational debates centered around TC 




CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
In Chapter 2, the literature focusing on the influence and the contribution of Noddings’s 
TC to the ongoing conversations about moral philosophy, moral education, and philosophy of 
education is presented.  Since Noddings and her theory of TC have been mainly debated in these 
different areas of research, I primarily concentrated on them while writing this literature review.  
In this chapter, I connected my research to the literature and located it within this literature while 
documenting the need for this study.  
With the publication of Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education in 
1984, Noddings offered the world a care-based perspective of moral philosophy.  In this work, 
she provided a detailed account of the definition, the scope, and the characteristics of her 
perspective, a way of living ethically using the moral value of care as the basis.  Since then, it 
has been difficult for scholars publishing in philosophy and education, particularly in the fields 
of moral philosophy, moral education, and the philosophy of education to be indifferent to 
Noddings’s ideas and her theory of TC.  
The research conducted on care has been vast, and it has interacted with other areas of 
research (Bergman, 2004; Diller, 1988; Friedman, 2008; Hamington, 2002, 2012, 2015; Li, 
2015; Velasquez, West & Graham, 2013).  Therefore, for the sake of manageability of this 
project, the focus in this chapter is on the three distinct and main areas of research relevant to the 
research questions of this dissertation: moral philosophy, moral education, and the philosophy of 
education.  In this chapter, especially in the section detailing the influence of Noddings’s TC as a 
problem in moral philosophy, I have constructed the literature by describing and analyzing its 
relationship to other theories of ethics for two main reasons.  First, I agree with the statement that 
“Care ethics is motivated in large part by belief in the inadequacy of mainstream moral 
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theorizing” (Friedman, 2008, p. 544).  Second, I think the debate among the proponents of the 
major ethical theories has partially influenced the debate in the fields of moral education and 
philosophy of education.  The authors publishing in moral education and philosophy of education 
frequently refer to the major theories of ethics, including TC when they want to strengthen their 
position in academic discussions.  Therefore, TC’s connection to these theories of moral 
philosophy has significant importance in familiarizing the reader with the context in which 
Noddings’s TC is debated. 
Noddings’s TC and Its Influence in Moral Philosophy 
Since 1984, Noddings’s TC has contributed significantly to the field of moral philosophy, 
and scholars working in this field have studied the theoretical structure and the practical 
implications of this TC.  According to Daniel Engster (2007), one important topic of discussion 
has occurred between Noddings’s TC and the traditional understanding of the objective ethics12 
of justice.  In fact, theoretically speaking, TC is in stark contrast to the ethics of justice because 
of its characteristics and the philosophical tenets Noddings (1984/2003a/2013) promoted.  
Unlike Noddings’s TC, the framework represented by the ethics of justice relies on 
universally valid principles.  These principles are formulated in a deductive manner as rule 
statements describe what to do in concrete, real-life situations (Herman, 1993; Kant & Ellington, 
                                                 
12. Objective ethics is the general framework used to refer to the concept of moral objectivity and the 
ethical theories embracing this concept.  In moral objectivism, the definition of what is morally correct or wrong 
does not change based on what one thinks or the conditions.  The philosophers supporting this view and using the 
framework of objective ethics in their studies tend to believe in the idea that moral truths are similar to scientific 
facts they are universally accepted as true and there are principles from which one can derive these facts.  Therefore, 
the objective theories of morality are usually constructed around one major moral principle supporting the idea that 
impartial morality is an aim that might be attained, and these theories operate on in compliance with this principle.  
Objectivist theories of morality are present in the literature of moral philosophy and their practical implications 
might be found in the literature of moral education: Duty Based Theories (or Deontological Theories) as generally 
represented by Kantian moral theory and Consequentialist Theories (or Teleological Theories) as generally 




1785/1993; O’Dowd, 2012; Singer, 2005).  As discussed in Chapter 1, Noddings’s TC was 
presented as an argument in defense of a situational and sentimental understanding of ethics 
which discredits the objective, universal, principled, and impartial understanding of ethics.  
Therefore, Noddings’s defiance of the objective/universal/impartial understanding and 
framework of ethics has caused TC to be an important contributor to the ongoing debate between 
moral rationalism and moral sentimentalism (Bergman, 2005; Wike, 2011). 
Philosophers developing principled theories of ethics have long associated philosophy 
and rationality with each other (Kant & Ellington, 1785/1993; Korsgaard, 1996; O’Dowd, 2012).  
These philosophers have defended the idea that any satisfactory theory of moral philosophy 
needs to be constructed on a rational principle, not on moral sentiments. Unlike sentiments 
(experiences, feelings, and personal tastes) these principles tend to provide the fertile ground to 
build solid arguments.  Hence, rational theories of morality are also known as the principled 
theories of morality and they are primarily founded on a major principle, which focused on the 
theoretical ground and practical implication of this principle.   
Noddings’s TC is a theory of ethics promoting the human experience of caring over pre-
set moral rules; therefore, it has become a natural member of the debate between moral 
rationalism and moral sentimentalism.  This is a very large debate and to fully report this debate 
requires more space devoted beyond a literature review chapter; thus, I have provided only the 
most representative and detailed arguments generated in this debate as they become relevant to 
Noddings’s TC. To provide a good picture of the influence of Noddings’s TC in the field of 
moral philosophy, I have included how Noddings and her supporters have participated in this 
debate and responded to these claims.   
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The universal understanding of ethics is the common characteristics of the rational ethical 
theories, which justify the moral action based on a major principle.  For the developers and 
supporters of the preferred ethical theory, this first or major principle is sufficient to address all 
the moral concerns (Kant & Ellington, 1785/1993; Mill, 1864/1998).  Supporters of care ethics, 
including Noddings, have argued that these theories of ethics represent the justice ethics based 
on male thinking (Clement, 1996; Gilligan, 1982; Noddings, 2013); and these theories of ethics 
rely on extremely abstract principles when they motivate the individual(s) to perform the desired 
moral action(s).  Being uncomfortable with the capability of these rules in motivating the 
individuals to moral living and decision-making, Noddings (2013) stated: 
 What we do depends not upon rules, or at least not wholly on rules—not upon a prior 
determination of what is fair or equitable—but upon a constellation of conditions that is 
viewed through both the eyes of the one-caring and the eyes of the cared-for.  (p. 13) 
 
According to Noddings (1984/2003a/2013), there is another problem with these theories 
of ethics: they voice a Western cannon, which dismisses or mutes the woman’s language. In fact, 
in the care literature, ‘“Justice ethics’ denotes canonical Western ethical theories based on 
universal rules or principles” (O’Dowd, 2012, p. 407).  Care-favoring critics of justice ethics 
prefer context, particularity, and the uniqueness of situations over principle, abstraction, and 
universal rules when they argue how one tackles moral dilemmas in real-life.  Kantian moral 
theory and utilitarianism rely on the principled thinking and belong to the Western canon of 
rational man because they use the rational thinking process associated with male thinking and 
voiced through father’s language criticized by Gilligan (1982, 1995) and Noddings 
(1984/2003a/2013, 2002a).   
Scholars promoting justice ethics over care ethics have constructed several lines of 
arguments describing the need for a principled way of thinking and a rational 
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understanding/framework in moral philosophy while defending this understanding/framework 
against Noddings’s TC.  In this chapter, I have first provided the representative line of arguments 
constructed by philosophers promoting Kantian ethics, and then the arguments constructed by 
the utilitarian philosophers.  Philosophers defending the virtue ethics have been involved in this 
debate, but, since they have been more sympathetic to Noddings’s TC compared to the 
utilitarianism and Kantian ethics, the discussion that involves them is placed after the debate 
between the proponents of TC and the proponents of justice ethics. 
As part of the debate between Noddings’s TC and the Western canon of justice ethics, 
Kantian philosophers have debated whether or not all principled thinking, which is harshly 
criticized by Noddings (1984/2003a) in the first and second editions of her Caring book, is a sign 
of abstract thinking.  They have also debated whether TC could be converted to Kantian thinking 
or vice versa.  Utilitarian scholars, on the other hand, have analyzed the possibility of TC being a 
legitimate theory of ethics, even though it opposes to the objective/impartial and global 
understanding of morality.  As was discussed in Chapter 1, with TC, Noddings 
(1984/2003a/2013) reversed the main claims of these two principled theories of ethics and, 
eventually, located herself as an opponent to both of these theories.   
TC is a relational and emotional theory of moral philosophy.  Through this theory, 
Noddings (1984/2003a/2013) claimed emotions are not inferior to reason in guidance to moral 
thinking and behavior, and this is a serious challenge to Kantian ethics, in which reason is 
considered superior to emotions in guidance to good moral thinking and moral behavior.  
According to Noddings (2013), utilitarian thinking is at best “presumptuous to suppose that we 
can determine the greatest good for large numbers of people with whom we have no direct 
contact” (p. 154).  The principled theories of moral philosophy, theories promoting the reliance 
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of an impartial and objective framework of justice ethics in moral philosophy, tend to operate 
with objective principles of morality, which guide individuals to moral actions. 
Noddings’s TC, and an ethics system constructed upon this theory, challenge the Kantian 
ethical thinking in several ways. In Kant’s theory of ethics, an action is morally right if it 
conforms to the universal rational law, and this universal law is named as the Categorical 
Imperative. 13  In fact, Lawrence Blum (1982) claims that “Kant’s moral philosophy is perhaps 
the most explicit, most powerful, and most influential example of a philosophy which founds 
morality on reason” (p. 288).  As a moral rationalist, Kant provided a very straightforward 
definition of moral behavior, while arguing that emotions were distractions encountered in the 
path to moral thinking and living (Kant & Ellington, 1785/1993).   
Immanuel Kant14 has constructed his theory to be principle-based in the sense that the 
moral principle, Categorical Imperative, determines what individuals must or must not do in 
every situation possible, and this moral principle is the product of pure reason (Kant & Ellington, 
1785/1993).  In fact, according to Blum (1982), “For Kant being moral is being really or ‘purely’ 
rational” (p. 288).  A moral human being is a naturally rational man who applies this principle to 
                                                 
13. Kant’s moral theory is constructed around the Categorical Imperative, and he bases this imperative on 
reason (Beauchamp, 2008; Kant, 1785/1993; Rachels, 2003; Strike and Soltis, 2004).  Categorical Imperative is also 
a test statement, a rule which is stated as “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time will, 
that it should become a universal law” (Kant & Ellington, 1785/1993, p. 30).  In fact, any moral action human 
beings perform may be originated from this rule, and the moral actions rational human beings perform are 
categorized as moral in all around the world regardless of the geographical or cultural context, consequences of 
these actions, time, emotions or social relationships.  Finally, no action can be considered as moral if it is violating 
the principle of Categorical Imperative or offering an exception to it or is not defined within it (Kant & Ellington, 
1785/1993). 
 
14. Immanuel Kant was a German philosopher who lived during the Enlightenment period in the 
continental Europe and contributed significantly to the development of several branches of philosophy including 
logic, metaphysics, moral philosophy, and epistemology.  He was influenced by several philosophers (Aristotle, 
John Locke, and David Hume) and his theory of ethics is the representative theory of deontological ethics, or in 
other words, duty ethics.  In his work, The Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant (1785/1993) has argued 
that the moral principle guiding an individual to the moral action should be derived from reason and he has 
influenced many philosophers succeeding him. 
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all of the moral dilemmas he or she experiences and reaches for the correct moral behaviors 
(Frederick, 1991; Korsgaard, 1996).  If the principle instructs one to perform the prescribed 
action in this moral dilemma, then, for that individual, that action becomes a moral duty to 
perform.  In Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785/1993) book (James 
Ellington, Trans.), Kant discussed that moral duties are obligations for everyone to perform and 
they may only be originated from reason.   
Kant (1785/1993) has argued that the moral principle guiding people to the appropriate 
moral actions is absolute and universal, meaning that this principle does not change depending 
on the conditions, characters, and emotions.  In mathematics, it is self-evident that two plus two 
equals four, and anyone who has a capability of rational thinking knows this.  Similar to 
mathematics, in moral thinking, certain behaviors are moral and certain behaviors are immoral; 
and this is self-evident, meaning that anyone who has a capability of rational thinking knows 
this.  Therefore, the only thing human beings need to be moral is to hold onto the reason and 
adhere to the unchanging, and universal principle of morality derived from pure reason. 
In Noddings’s (1984/2003a/2013) view, this is a problematic approach employed in 
describing the moral thinking of an individual and the motivating source of moral behaviors. 
Hence, according to Noddings (1984/2003a/2013), the validity of Kant’s argument on moral 
thinking and the motivating source to behave morally needed to be reconsidered for several 
reasons.  First, reason should not hold an elevated status compared to emotions, as emotions can 
very well be the motivating force to moral behavior.  Second, it is difficult to separate reason 
from emotions, as if there really is a switch in a person that is designed to turn off the emotions 
on behalf of reason when that person decides to behave morally.  Third, treating morality as only 
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composed of reason is troubling because it does not reflect the truth about why one carries out 
certain actions:  
 Many object to the grimness, to the Puritanical tone, of ethics of duty.  Most of us prefer 
to be the recipients of acts done out of love, care, or inclination rather than duty.  
Recognizing this, Kantians have shrunk the moral universe.  Those things that are done 
out of love are often considered not to be moral matters at all.  (Noddings, 2002a, p. 143)  
 
Another problem with relying on the guidance of the rules as tightly as Kant (1787/2007) 
does is that it has resulted in the equation of moral problems to math problems in Kantian moral 
theory.  In real, practical life, morality refers to a complex set of behaviors and Kant’s 
straightforward definition of moral behavior, as he has argued, may not be compatible with real, 
practical life.  In Noddings’s (1984/2003a/2013) view, this is an impractical approach taken to 
morality because moral problems are not abstract math problems that can be solved using the 
pre-established rules and formulas (a priori15 statements) as Kant offered.  Pre-established moral 
rules and formulas, such as the Categorical Imperative, push one to the reign of abstraction, and 
that is an unwanted destination to reach because in there one can find “but the lonely wilderness 
of abstraction” (Noddings, 2013, p. 98). 
Kant’s followers have been right to argue that human beings depend on reason to decide 
whether something is right or wrong (Anderson, 1999; Bittner, 1989; Dudley & Engelhard, 2014; 
Korsgaard, 1996; O’Neill, 2013, 2016); however, with TC, Noddings (1984/2003a/2013, 2002a) 
claimed that they have overrated the role of reason in moral decision-making.  Moral rules’ 
origination from reason may explain why some behaviors are accepted by the society as moral 
                                                 
15. A priori statements are philosophical terms first originated in Latin, but later popularized by Immanuel 
Kant.  A priori statements are statements of knowledge, which are considered as true by the concept they are 
discussed, they do not need to be justified through experiencing, testing and experimenting; however, their validity 
might be understood through thinking and reasoning.  For example, the a priori statement of “lying is immoral” is 
essentially a true statement, and the accuracy of this statement is universal.  One can acquire this knowledge 
represented by an a priori statement simply by relying on reason, without testing it.  Kant has argued that moral 
knowledge is a form of knowledge best represented through synthetic a priori statements; therefore, reason may 
solely provide the necessary common ground to form this knowledge (1787/2007). 
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behaviors and why some behaviors are not accepted.  However, they have been inadequate for 
seeing why certain behaviors may not be explained by rational thinking yet should be 
categorized as moral behaviors.  For them, this is against the grain of the function of the major 
principle found in a moral theory, which is built upon reason and rational thinking.  Being 
observant of this inadequacy, Noddings (2013) opposed the belief that rational rules provide the 
required satisfactory motivation guide for moral actions in real life and claimed her care ethics 
framework would be a better guide, which relied “upon a constellation of conditions that is 
viewed through both the eyes of the one-caring and the eyes of the cared-for” (p. 13). 
With TC, Noddings has reversed the argument that Kant and his supporters made 
discussing reason provided a better, more reliable ground compared with emotions in the path to 
moral thinking and behavior.  First, Kant (1785/1993, 1787/2007) argued that sympathy was an 
emotion, and, like other emotions, it provided an unstable and unreliable basis for moral decision 
making not only because it was difficult to prove the relevance of this emotion to the moral 
dilemma, but also it changed frequently.  Second, in Kant’s (Kant & Ellington, 1785/1993) view, 
the capacity for sympathy was distributed unequally around the population; hence, sympathy was 
not universalizable and should be considered as irrelevant to moral thinking and moral behavior.  
Disagreeing with Kant on these arguments, Noddings (1984/2003a/2013, 2005, 2007) defended 
that emotions like joy and sympathy might guide us to moral behavior. 
Through the theory she developed, Noddings claimed that emotions, especially joy, might 
be an inspirational, motivating guide to ethical living and moral decision making.  In Noddings’s 
(1984/2003a/2013, 2002a, 2003b) view, emotions, for example, joy, might assist people to build 
ethical caring relationships; therefore, it can play an important role in the realization of a better 
and caring moral world.  In fact, Noddings (2013) believed that joy was different from other 
49 
 
emotions; therefore, its inclusion in moral thinking and the realization of the ethical ideal in 
living was necessary. In her book, Noddings (2013) stated that joy “accompanies our recognition 
of relatedness and reflects our basic reality.  Its occurrence and recurrence maintain us in caring 
and, thus, contribute to the enhancement of the ethical ideal” (p. 147). 
In her article titled “Canonicity and Critique: A Feminist Defence of a Post-Kantian 
Critique,” Pamela Sue Anderson (1999) argued that Kantian morality should and will be 
excluded from the Western Canon if scholars reread it with a different lens.16  She proposed to 
assess Kantian morality as a whole product of his era, and she offered to read other texts written 
in that era as part of the project.  She claimed that feminist critiques of Kant, including 
Noddings, fail to do this, as they tend to be stuck with the traditional reading of Kant.  The 
traditional reading of Kant suggests that rationality is an active skill usually associated with men, 
and people employing this skill are the moral ones who may build the kingdom of ends, the 
moral world.  Considering that women are rarely associated with rational thinking in the Western 
world of that era, scholars have interpreted Kant’s view “of women as passive by nature, as 
determined more by inclination than reason” (Anderson, 1999, p. 203).  Therefore, Anderson 
(1999) continued scholars have mistakenly interpreted Kant’s argument of reason and morality 
might be used to discredit the validity of women’s thinking because: 
they cannot be capable of scholarship [moral thinking]. Right from the beginning…, there
 is thought to be something deeply problematic for women (and for some men at least) in
 Kant’s conception of ‘pure reason’: its supposed independence from, but also its capacity
 to order, the realm of nature would seem to exclude the experience of women from all
 rational reconstructions. (Anderson, 1999, p. 203) 
 
In her paper, Anderson (1999) argued that the traditional reading of Kant has been both 
inaccurate and incomplete; therefore, feminist Kantian scholars need to reconstruct a feminist 
                                                 
16. The word ‘defence’ present in the title of “Canonicity and Critique: A Feminist Defence of a Post-
Kantian Critique” article is not a typo, it is the British spelling of the word ‘defense.’  
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reading of Kant based on the criticisms he received from Noddings and other feminist theorists.  
As one of these feminist Kantian scholars, Anderson claimed to provide a reading of Kantian 
morality which includes feelings about the moral thinking with reason and argued that Kant’s 
framework of morality is designed for all human beings with the capacity to think.  Throughout 
the article, Anderson (1999) discussed her belief that the traditional reading of Kantian morality 
is problematic as it currently offers only one version of it, and the feminist readers of Kantian 
morality, including Noddings, need to read other texts of Kant to avoid this problematic reading.  
For example, she invites them to read the conclusion section of the Appendix of Part One in the 
Critique of Judgment, in which Kant states, “Humanity signifies, on the one side, the universal 
feeling of sympathy, and, on the other, the faculty of being able to communicate universally 
one’s inmost self” (Anderson, 1999, p. 208).   
Similar to the point Anderson has made, Alison Jaggar (1991), in her book chapter called 
Feminist Ethics: Projects, Problems, Prospects, attempted to design a feminist account of 
Kantian moral theory and builds a Kantian world in the eyes of the reader which is based on 
“respect.”  Jaggar (1991) claimed that the inferiority of women to men is morally wrong and in 
none of his texts, is there proof that Kant has argued in defense of this inferiority; hence, scholars 
should not be advocating for that inferiority using Kant’s framework of morality, or, in other 
words, moral theory.  On the contrary, Jaggar (1991) suggested that the notion of respect in 
Kantian moral theory might be used to oppose all types of subordination, as it defends all kinds 
of moral experience and behaviors regardless of gender.  In Jaggar’s (1991) opinion, Kantian 
moral theory is a humanistic moral theory, which demands “the moral experience of women 
should be treated as respectfully as the moral experience of men” (p. 97-98).  In her argument, 
Jaggar (1991) stated Noddings’s belief of the caring experience of the mother is a moral 
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experience, and as long as Noddings agrees to include respect in her definition of morality 
Kantian feminists like Jaggar should be fine with this belief.  Confident with her concluding 
statement, Jaggar (1991) indicated TC was a humanistic theory of ethics, not a feminist one.  
[Remember that Noddings (2013) has responded to this claim of “care ethics is gender focused” 
in the third edition of her Caring book, and has attempted to remove the gender label her theory 
possesses.] 
Another claim established by the Kantian philosophers contrary to Noddings’s TC is that 
TC has been similar to Kantian moral theory if we treat principles as simple guidelines to rely 
on, not a strict set of rules that restrict actions.  Noddings (1984/2003a/2013) opposed Kant’s 
moral theory and other principle-based theories of ethics, as they promote rules over relation, and 
this is represented in the language they have used.  Since Kant’s moral theory argued for 
objective morality, which is obtained by following abstract moral principles and prefers the 
reliance on rules over relationships and conditions; Noddings (2003a) treated it as a moral theory 
free of emotions, a cold theory of morality. 
As a response to Noddings’s treatment of Kant’s moral theory, in her book Bounds of 
Justice, Onora O’Neill (2000), tried to distinguish rules from principles based on their meaning 
and their function.  She argued that one problem with Noddings’s reading of Kantian morality 
lay in the misinterpretation of the rules.  Noddings understands the moral rules in Kantian 
morality as rules that are rigid, universal and regulative, similar to the Honor Codes found in the 
colleges (DeGeorge, 1990).  Disagreeing with Noddings, O’Neill (2000) claimed that this is a 
problematic reading of the function of the moral rules found in Kantian morality, as these moral 
rules were only intended to draw some limitations to the actions of the moral agents in the 
general sense, using an ordinary language.  In O’Neill’s (2000) opinion, Noddings’s TC might 
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very well be a principled theory of ethics if one sums it up as “always act in a way that would 
enhance the ethical caring relationship.” 
Agreeing with O’Neill, Marilea Bramer (2010) advanced O’Neill’s argument, and she 
harshly criticizes Noddings’s TC.  Bramer (2010) argued that the correct reading of categorical 
imperative has no problem with having close relations or benefiting people close to us.  In fact, 
according to Bramer (2010), Kantian morality “not only allows but requires that we give 
particular consideration to family and friends. Thus, such actions are not just morally 
permissible, they also have moral value” (p. 124).  It may be a theory of reason, but it also pays 
attention to human relations when necessary. 
This line of argument, that Kant’s moral theory is not a cold theory designed to promote 
principled people without feelings, has been advanced by several other scholars (Meyers, 1994; 
Paley, 2002; Wike, 2011; Wood, 2008), and Ornaith O’Dowd (2012) is one of them.  In her 
work, O’Dowd (2012) pointed out that caring people might very well be principled people even 
though they do not consider themselves to be principled in the Kantian sense.  Their morality is 
not grounded in a stated abstract principle, but these caring people may have embraced the 
principle of caring and continued to live morally in this way.  In her article, O’Dowd (2012) 
suggested the debate should not be on preferring one way of ethical thinking over another.  On 
the contrary, according to O’Dowd (2012), the debate should be on promoting “to work for a life 
in which one’s relationships and principles align in a mutually supportive way” (p. 416).    
There exists another party in this debate between Noddings’s TC and the rational theories 
of morality, and this party stands on the side of the rational theories even though it runs counter 
to the Kantian understanding of morality.  Utilitarianism17 is another theory of ethics, which is 
                                                 
17. Utilitarianism is a moral theory developed by Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and John Stuart Mill 
(1806-1873).  This moral theory makes the distinction between right and wrong, good and evil, by looking solely at 
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considered to be a natural member of the Western Canon and the rational theories of morality 
discussed previously.  It supports an objective and global understanding of ethics, and it 
commands the rational moral agent to perform the moral actions after evaluating the 
consequences of his or her actions.  Since the time it was first originated in the 18th and 19th 
centuries, scholars have studied it (Biggar, 2015; Dorraj, 1997; Estlund, 2008; Schofield, 2006).  
In fact, the journal Utilitas, which is a high-quality journal publishing in the field of ethics, has 
limited its focus to publishing articles discussing only this theory.   
Noddings’s TC calls for a situational and relativist approach to moral living, meaning that 
TC defends a partial understanding of morality.  In TC, an individual’s obligation/motivation to 
act decreases as the circles of care extend (Noddings, 1984/2003a/2013, 2002a); therefore, the 
distance between the carer and the cared-for becomes an important factor in the discussion of 
moral duties to others.  With TC, Noddings argued that our duties to the people close to us have 
a larger place in our lives compared to the duties to strangers living in a distant place.   
In Peter Singer’s (2004) view, this is an inaccurate understanding of moral duties, and the 
moral individual knows that his/her intention, obligation to care/to aid is not dependent on the 
distance.  Singer is not the only utilitarian philosopher and scholar who debated with Noddings 
over this issue; however, his claims regarding TC are representative of this line of thinking.   
In his book One World (2004), Singer has posed the question “Am I obliged to give care 
to desperately poor strangers?” and he answers “yes.” In his book, Singer (2004) argued that TC 
                                                 
the outcomes/consequences of preferring one action over other actions and performing or not performing that action.  
This being the case, if a moral agent is committed to this kind of thinking, the individual proceeds forward beyond 
the net of his/her own interest(s); and he/she eventually takes into account the interests of others too.  Ideally, this 
agent has to treat his/her own projects as one among many and frequently needs to give up his/her commitments to 
be moral.  As the critics of this theory successfully pointed out, this is a very strict requirement to fulfill (Scheffler, 
1992).  To counter the stressing objections (unalienable rights vs. principle, and calculation problem of people) of 
utilitarianism, scholars have developed different versions of utilitarianism.  Act Utilitarianism and Rule 




answered “no” to this question by preferring the needs of the people close to the caring 
individual over to the less fortunate people living in the Global South; TC encouraged being 
immoral.  According to Singer (2004), the moral individual should move beyond the interests of 
his/her close friends and treat the world as a big community. Therefore, Singer (2004) continued 
TC provided a faulty lens when discussing one’s obligations to other people and feminist 
philosophers are in default of supporting TC and its reasoning because with TC Noddings “limits 
our obligation to care for those with whom we can be in some kind of relationship. Hence, she 
says, ‘we are not obliged to care for starving children in Africa’” (p.158-159). 
Singer (2004) challenged the argument Noddings makes regarding the starving children 
in Africa, and questioned whether an individual has the right to ignore the needs of others simply 
because they are living on a continent far away.  He aimed to redesign the world in our eyes as if 
the world is a big community, and people, who have the necessary means to aid, have to meet the 
needs of the ones dependent on these aids if only to survive one more day.  In this book (2004), 
and his other subsequent publications, Singer (2005, 2011) argued that Noddings’s TC was 
biased in itself, and, with her theory, Noddings tended to choose the needs of people close to the 
carer compared to the needs of people distant to the carer.  If Noddings claimed her theory to be 
a theory of practical ethics, then it is troublesome for this theory to be ignorant of the practical, 
real life problems of the people living in Africa, as surviving is one of the problems they 
experience.  [In Chapters 3 and 4, articles discuss whether TC is a legitimate theory since it 
promotes an impartial morality of this kind.] 
As a utilitarian philosopher, in his writings, Singer (2004) promoted the impartial and 
objective understanding of morality, which is the main tenet of the justice ethics, and criticized 
the frameworks of ethics like TC if they lacked this main tenet.  Singer (2004, 2005, 2011) 
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characterized morally exemplary people as impartial and objective human beings. He also 
defended the idea that people who are morally impartial/objective reach better and fairer 
solutions to moral problems, such as the mass starvation problem in South Africa, by weighing 
their roles as actors regardless of the personal interests in or distance from the outcome.  As a 
representation of this defense, throughout the book, Singer (2004) posed the question to the 
reader: “What impartial reasons can there be for favoring one’s compatriots over foreigners?” (p. 
167), and unlike Noddings (1984/2003a/2013), his answer is none. 
Singer is not alone in his criticism of Noddings’s TC and how TC has been unsatisfactory 
in solving the real starving problem in South Africa.  In her article, “Starving Children in Africa: 
Who Cares?” Lisa Cassidy (2005) challenged both Noddings’s TC and Singer’s utilitarian 
argument, and she built a utilitarian account for caring morality.  Her core argument was a 
synthesis of TC and utilitarianism and might be summed as “I should care for Africans with 
whom I will never have a personal relationship.  However, this obligation can be generated 
without relying on the impartialist understanding of morality” (Cassidy, 2005, p. 84).   
In Noddings’s (1984/2003a/2013) opinion, both lines of arguments are problematic as 
they fail to include certain characteristics of moral thinking in real, practical life.  Singer’s 
argument is problematic because the road to moral living is not as easy as Singer defends, and it 
is impossible to care for everyone (Noddings, 2013).  According to Noddings (2013), giving five 
dollars to a charity functioning to end the starvation problem in Africa, as Singer defends, might 
provide relief and comfort to the individual.  However, this relief is only temporary, and 
Noddings is interested in the behaviors that would provide permanent relief to the individual.  In 
fact, she argued that “We are not behaving morally if we turn our backs on the present other in 
order to give some good to a large number of others.  At best, we are behaving expediently” 
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(Noddings, 2013, p. 154).  The only permanent relief an individual would receive is the relief felt 
after the caring behaviors. 
In Noddings’s (2003a/2013, 2005) view, Cassidy is also inaccurate because any 
perspective constructed to synthesize TC and the utilitarianism is flawed.  Noddings 
(2003a/2013, 2005) argued that this perspective purposefully ignores an important fact about the 
ethical caring relationships; to build caring relationships with everyone around the world and to 
care for them equally is an impossible goal to reach.  On the contrary, each caring relationship, 
even the one between the mother and the child (the most intense and the purest form of caring 
relationships) is unique.  Any effort to transform this caring relationship to the universal and 
impartial statements of moral actions might weaken this caring relationship and, hence, is 
problematic in nature.  Noddings (2002a, 2003a/2013; 2005) discredited these efforts of 
universalizing care, and she noted that the caring relationship needs to be thick and deep if we 
want this relationship to result in a caring action.   
The discussion over the influence of Noddings’s TC on moral philosophy and how it is 
treated in that field would be incomplete without providing a discussion over the debate between 
TC and Aristotle’s Virtue Ethics Theory.  In the next few paragraphs of this section, I first 
describe the virtue ethics theory and then explain how certain scholars connect it to TC.   
Virtue ethics is a term used for moral theories that highlight the role of character and 
virtue in moral philosophy rather than either doing one’s duty stated in a moral principle 
(Kantian ethics) or acting to bring about good consequences (utilitarian thinking).  In Aristotle’s 
virtue ethics, the individual performs a virtuous action solely because that action is good or right 
in itself (Aristotle, Thomson, & Tredennick, 2004).  The virtuous moral action is the 
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representation of virtues and, like the desire and the need of caring, virtues, and vices are found 
in human beings naturally (Carr, 2005b).   
In Aristotle’s theory, virtue is the only influence that can guide people to ethical actions 
(Hardie, 1980; Price, 2011).  According to Aristotle, only virtues and vices exist in human 
character, and human beings should develop their virtues by repeating virtuous actions and 
excelling in their virtuous, moral character (Whiting, 1988).  A virtuous action is a good action 
by nature, and these virtuous actions will lead a person to have a good life, filled with 
eudaimonia.  18   
Aristotle19 developed his moral theory without stating a major, foundational principle to 
rely on, and throughout this theory, he argued that there needed to be a balance between excess 
and deficiency in human virtues.  In Aristotle’s (Aristotle, Thomson, & Tredennick, 2004) 
opinion, different kinds of virtues, such as justice, courage, and generosity exist in human 
beings, and human beings demonstrate these virtues in their actions.  Moral virtues can be listed 
as generosity, justice, and temperance, and intellectual virtues can be listed as contemplative 
wisdom, understanding, and practical wisdom (Curren, 1999).  To live a life filled with 
eudaimonia, one needs to practice and excel in them both. 
                                                 
18. Eudaimonia is translated into English from Greek as happiness, but Aristotle’s understanding of 
happiness is different from Bentham’s and Mill’s concepts of happiness (Bentham, 1789/2010; Mill, 1864/1998). 
Mill considered individual happiness as something that could be traded on the exchange of the societal happiness 
(Mill, 1864/1998).  Improving the societal happiness is the goal of a utilitarian society, and Aristotle would not 
defend this goal.  On the contrary, Aristotle treated happiness as an individual goal for a virtuous person to achieve. 
According to Curren (1999), “virtue is not simply an instrumental good, related to happiness only unreliably through 
external sanctions, but an internal good of the psyche, without which no one can have any prospect of happiness” (p. 
76-77). 
 
19. Aristotle was an ancient Greek philosopher whose works were acknowledged both in the Western and 
Eastern philosophy.  He became the student of another great philosopher, Plato at a very young age; and his 
contributions are significant to modern philosophy and he tutored Alexander the Great.  Nicomachean Ethics, his 
cornerstone work in ethics, is composed of 10 books in which Aristotle poses important questions regarding ethics, 
good living, and moral knowledge.  
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Aristotle defined the moral virtue as a particular state of a human being, and it is 
concerned with feelings and actions.   However, the moral virtue is not a temporary feeling; it is 
something permanent.  Virtue is part of a character that leads its owners to have a good life filled 
with eudaimonia if it is developed accordingly (Lickona, 1991).  When someone has a virtue in 
his/her personality, he or she does not refrain from acting on that virtue and feeling a predictable 
way in certain situations. 
According to Aristotle (Aristotle, Thomson, & Tredennick, 2004), people act virtuously 
in different degrees if they have virtue in their character.  The virtue ethics theory is a theory of 
action, meaning that people need to internalize virtues and perform virtuous acts habitually in 
order to become virtuous.  Excelling in and mastering a particular virtue, for instance, practical 
wisdom, requires learning and internalizing it through practice and getting more experience in 
the face of events (Whiting, 1988).  Through practice, an individual develops practical wisdom, 
an intellectual virtue necessary for a life filled with eudaimonia. 
Unlike previously discussed theories of ethics, Aristotle did not rely on moral laws and 
principles when he was first establishing his theory (Aristotle, Thomson, & Tredennick, 2004).  
As the reader of this dissertation remembers, TC has this feature too.  Since the two theories, TC 
and virtue ethics theory, share this common feature; the debate between them has occurred 
differently compared to the debate between TC and the principled theories of ethics.    
One representative argument commonly found in the debate surrounding Noddings’s TC 
and the virtue ethics theory is that TC has the potential to be converted to a feminine 
version/variant of the virtue ethics theory.  In Raja Halwani’s (2003) opinion, Noddings’s TC is 
an underdeveloped theory of moral philosophy, and some of the objections raised by the scholars 
promoting the language of justice ethics are valid.  To counter these objections, Halwani (2003) 
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claimed that “care ethics should be subsumed under virtue ethics by construing care as an 
important virtue” (p. 161) and in her paper, she has thoroughly investigated the possibility of 
subsuming care ethics under virtue ethics framework.  20   
As a virtue ethicist, Halwani (2003) argued that, for TC, one possible way of countering 
these objections is to incorporate within the virtue ethics theory.  In fact, for Halwani (2003), if 
care is defined as a relational virtue,21 then it can still rely on the feminine language and avoid 
being tested with the consequences of an individual’s actions as Michael Slote (1998) has 
suggested.  If care scholars agree to treat care as a relational virtue in the Aristotelian sense, then 
they have two important advantages.  First, they will be able to protect the tempting 
characteristics (moral partiality, relational care thinking, and woman’s voice) of the moral core.  
Second, the status of care ethics, especially debate on the status of TC as a legitimate theory of 
ethics, will no longer be a further issue to discuss within the circles of academia since it will 
have merged with another well-grounded theory of ethics that has been present in the history of 
ethics for a very long time. 
Certain scholars (Mann, 2012; McLaren, 2001; Slote, 2007) have positively responded to 
Halwani’s call and have offered different versions of care-virtue ethics theory.  In fact, before 
Halwani, Michael Slote (1988) examined this probability, and he has argued that the status of 
moral value care will be elevated if it is understood as a version of “agent-based” virtue ethics (p. 
173).  In Slote’s (1988) opinion, the moral virtue of care, shaping Noddings’s TC, has the 
                                                 
20. Michale Slote has worked on this possibility, the possibility of converting TC to a feminine version of 
the virtue ethics theory prior to Halwani, but in her article, Halwani has developed this idea in the fullest version 
possible. 
 
21. Halwani adopts a perspective that synthesizes virtue with relational thinking.  Her definition of 
relational virtue pays attention to motives and ends, not to consequences: “[virtue is] a deep and enduring acquired 
excellence of a person, involving a characteristic motivation to produce a certain desired end and reliable success in 
bringing about that end” (Halwani, 2003, p. 70).  
60 
 
capacity to undertake this role only if it becomes gender neutral and focuses more on the actions 
and the consequences of these actions.  As a result of this change in TC, the motivation to be 
moral will transfer from the relation to individual virtues and actions. 
Margaret McLaren (2001) disagreed with Slote over how to change the structure of 
Noddings’s TC.  Unlike Slote (1998), McLaren (2001) argued for the preservation of caring as a 
relational and feminine virtue.  Moreover, McLaren claimed that the union between TC and 
virtue ethics is easy because they both voice their concerns regarding the ethical and political 
concerns in a similar way.  Finally, according to McLaren (2001), since both of these theories 
keep their distance from the principled moral theories, it might be claimed that they promote the 
same partial and contextual understanding of morality. 
Similarities exist between virtue ethics and caring ethics; however, for Noddings (2003a), 
they are still different because ethical caring is a relational concept, not an individual character 
trait understood and encouraged in the Aristotelian framework of morality.  In the second reprint 
of Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education, Noddings (2003a) has 
highlighted this difference by stating that “The virtue described by the ethical ideal of one-caring 
is built up in relation” (p. 80).  According to Noddings (2002a, 2003a, 2005), any deviation from 
treating care as ethically basic and essentially relational might result in a combined concept of 
virtue and care; however, this concept would not reflect Noddings’s concept of the ethical caring 
ideal. 
In Noddings’s (2002a, 2013) view, considering ethics as an individualistic thing is a 
problematic approach employed in morality because it isolates people from their real-life 
conditions and social relationships, which cause the actions they perform.  The theory of virtue 
ethics evaluates moral thinking using a moral perspective and focuses on the individual’s virtue-
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based actions.  However, this viewpoint is not promoted in Noddings’s TC because it evaluates 
the actions by focusing on the relationships two parties have with each other.  Even though the 
moral value care has shared certain characteristics with virtue, care itself is more than an 
individual virtue because as Noddings stated (2013): 
 The genuine ethical commitment to maintain oneself as caring gives rise to the 
development and exercise of virtues, but these must be assessed in the context of caring 
situations…. We must not reify virtues and turn our caring toward them. If we do this, 
our ethic turns inward and is even less useful than an ethic of principles, which at least 
remains indirectly in contact with the acts we are assessing. The fulfillment of virtue is 
both in me and in the other.  (p. 96-97) 
 
Noddings’s framework of relational feminist ethics and her desire to maintain the 
relationships at almost any cost has concerned certain feminist philosophers.  These feminist 
scholars (Card, 1990; Davion, 1993) have opposed Noddings’s understanding of relationships, 
and they have criticized TC’s significant reliance on relationships.  In her work, Diemut Bubeck 
(1995) voiced this concern and stated that the definition provided in Noddings’s TC “lies at the 
heart of women’s exploitation as carers” (Bubeck, 1995, p. 176).  According to these feminist 
philosophers, Noddings, while constructing her definition, focused primarily on the well-being 
and the care of others, cared-fors instead of the well-being and the care of the carers, and this is a 
serious limitation to be fixed.   
Scholars criticizing Noddings’s TC use of this line of argument stated that there are 
relationships which are abusive and exploitative; therefore, they are harmful to human 
development (Hoagland, 1990; Keller, 1997).  These scholars claimed that if Noddings wants to 
ground her theory of ethics on the relationships, then she needs to provide a better definition of 
the caring relationships which would help people distinguish caring relationships from the 
abusive and exploitative relationships commonly found between abusive husbands and weak 
wives (Bartky, 1990; Houston, 1985).  Considering the situation observed between the abusive 
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husband and his caring wife, TC is immoral and promotes a dangerous framework of morality (a 
slave morality) because it defends the preservation of all the relationships whenever possible. 
Moreover, they (Card, 1990; Hoagland, 1990) continued if Noddings claimed that TC represents 
the voice of the women in ethics and advocates for the women’s rights and well-being, then she 
needs to provide a better definition of caring relationships and discuss when a carer is allowed to 
withdraw from the relationship.  
According to these feminist philosophers (Card, 1990; Hoagland, 1990), drawing a 
framework of morality only based on women’s relationships and their caring experiences is an 
inaccurate approach.  If Noddings wants to advocate for women’s rights, advocate for the 
women’s well-being, and improve the women’s position in their society.  These feminist 
philosophers (Card, 1990; Hoagland, 1990) have also argued that Noddings’s TC was incapable 
of representing the woman’s voice, particularly if it continued to remind to the advocates of the 
public sphere that men and women use different processes of moral thinking and behavior.  
Another group of scholars criticizing Noddings’s TC and her willingness to base her 
theory on these relations have asserted that relations may be the complementary source of 
motivating human beings to moral behaviors (Leffers, 1993; Rachels, 1999, 2003).  For them, 
relationships are only secondary sources of being moral and improving moral knowledge; 
therefore, Noddings is overestimating the power of these relationships (Rachels, 1999).  These 
feminist scholars argued for Noddings to combine her theory with other theories of morality, and 
examples of their arguments have been provided in the previous sections of this dissertation.  
In response to the first group of critics, Noddings has clarified her statement about caring 
relations and the characteristics of these relationships.  In the third and the most updated edition 
of her Caring book, Noddings (2013) stressed that, even though the moral development of an 
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individual is closely associated with his or her involvement in the caring relationship, this 
individual should withdraw from the relationship if it is limiting the carer’s potential to grow.  In 
most abusive relationships, for both parties, the potential to grow ethically is unlikely when “the 
demands of the cared-for become too great or if they are delivered ungraciously” (Noddings, 
2013, p. 48).  When a caring individual finds her/himself in this kind of relationship, for the one 
caring, the moral thing to do is to “withdraw her caring” (Noddings, 2013, p. 48) and leave the 
relationship. 
Noddings’s response to the second group of critics might be combined with her response 
to the other groups of critics who argued that her theory concentrating on the importance of 
relationships is not a sufficient guide to moral living and improving moral knowledge.  In the 
third edition of her Caring book, Noddings repeated that she is only offering a fresh perspective 
to moral education and moral thinking and is not aiming to build a theory providing 
justification(s) for an individual’s actions (Noddings, 2013).  In Noddings’s (1984/2003a/2013, 
2002a) view, any ethical theory needs to have a practical usage in real life, and TC is all about 
real life experiences and practical moral thinking. 
Another major objection raised against Noddings’s theory is that TC is either culturally 
color blind or naïve because she is silent on the cultural practices of oppression experienced by 
several groups of women, including lesbian, Black and Latina women.  According to the scholars 
(Cannon, 1995; Collins, 2002; Hooks, 1981; Thompson, 2003) voicing this concern regarding 
TC, the ethical ideals promoted in Noddings’s TC may be the ideals of White women, but they 
may not be the ideals of Black women or Lesbian feminists.  Therefore, Noddings’s TC cannot 
be a theory for all the women around the world.  [In Chapter 3 of this dissertation, there is a 
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section about how Noddings’s TC has been present in the articles discussing culturally relevant 
teaching.] 
In response to this group of scholars, Noddings herself has disapproved of any effort that 
will limit the scope of TC to one group of people or one gender.  On the contrary, Noddings 
(2002a, 2013) has extended her concept of caring to anyone who is interested in building ethical 
caring relationships, regardless of their gender, or ethnicity.  With TC, Noddings (2002b, 2005) 
treated the diverse points of experience as richness, and she did not limit the potential of this 
theory to echo the voice of only one group of people. 
Since the first edition of Noddings’s Caring book (1984), several scholars have studied 
Noddings’s TC and their works have been discussed throughout this dissertation.  In my opinion, 
there are two problems with studying Noddings’s TC and documenting its influence in the field 
of moral philosophy.  One problem is that they (Anderson, 1999; Bramer, 2010; Cassidy, 2005; 
McLaren, 2001) concentrate on developing this theory further by connecting it to other theories 
of moral philosophy as provided in the exemplary arguments. By connecting TC to other theories 
of moral philosophy or subsuming TC to these other theories, and they miss a crucial point: TC 
is an independent theory of moral philosophy, not a form or version of the other moral theories.   
Another issue with documenting the influence of TC in moral philosophy is that the 
authors (O’Dowd, 2012; O’Neill, 2000; Singer, 2004) analyzing TC and constructing the 
arguments surrounding TC evaluate its position, status, and validity in moral philosophy based 
on this one feature.  This proves to be a problematic way of analyzing a theory of ethics as TC is 
not limited to the one feature studied.  This dissertation contributes to moral philosophy by 
analyzing TC as a whole theory of ethics and moral education and providing a comprehensive 
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understanding of the influence of Noddings’s TC in two related fields of education; moral 
education, and philosophy of education. 
Noddings’s TC has posed a serious challenge to the principled theories of morality with 
the relational framework of morality and the care-based language composed of the alternative 
tenets she provided.  In fact, the tradition of studying TC has extended and contributed to other 
fields of inquiry, including moral education and philosophy of education.  In the next section of 
this chapter, how Noddings’s TC has been perceived in the fields of moral education and 
philosophy of education and how it has contributed to the ongoing arguments present in these 
fields is discussed.   
Noddings’s TC and its Influence in Educational Research: The Case of 
 Moral Education and Philosophy of Education 
 
Moral philosophy has been an important field of research since the time of Aristotle, and 
it has interacted with other academic disciplines, including political science, medicine, justice, 
feminist thinking, law, and education.  Originally, the word “moral” is from Latin (moris), and it 
represents the rules, the code governing people’s lives.  The term “moral education” refers to two 
things: efforts to shape moral development and the academic discipline concerned with research 
into the moral development (Noddings, 2013).  The discussions occurring in this academic 
discipline are usually parallel with the discussions occurring in the disciplines of ethics, moral 
psychology, developmental psychology, and philosophy of education.  The term moral education 
is an umbrella term that includes values education and character education. 
Values education focuses on helping children identify and cultivate the values the 
education system and the surrounding society prefer (Powney et al, 1995).  Activities that 
promote the maintenance of this value cultivation process can occur anywhere; thus, the scope of 
values education is not limited to schools.  International efforts have been made to construct 
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value education programs that appeal to children, and as a result of these efforts, several 
foundations (Human Values Foundation, Human Values in Action Foundation, The Living 
Values Education) were established around the world. 
The Human Values Foundation (henceforth HVF) was founded in 1994.  According to 
the information posted on its website, this foundation provides materials to individuals who are 
interested in value education, and these materials include lesson plans, stories, and group 
activities (HVF, 2017).  Even though this foundation was the first of its kind, other foundations 
and institutions, such as the Human Values in Action Foundation and the Living Values 
Education were established after the HVF and promoted the acquisition of the similar 
educational goals of the HVF.   
Most value education programs highlight teachers’ roles in cultivating the appropriate 
values in young children.  Several countries, such as Singapore (Thomas, 1992), Thailand 
(Kriengsak, 2006), and Australia (Lovat, 2006) have benefited from the advantage of teaching 
values education to their teacher candidates and included values education courses in their 
teacher education programs.  Different versions of value education programs exist, such as value 
clarification programs, value cultivation programs, and religious teaching programs. 
In the moral education programs embracing the values clarification approach, it is argued 
that students should be directed to the desired values’ learning process.  In these programs, the 
goal is to help the youngster develop authenticity in the moral decision-making processes and the 
commitment to a set of personal moral values.  Ideally, these programs concentrate on the 
individual’s own process of developing values and moral codes to live by; therefore, they value 
diverse values.  Finally, these programs avoid indoctrination because they promote the 
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individual’s personal value development and learning process rather than teaching a set of 
structured, rigid list of values (McClellan, 1999).   
Esther Schaeffer (2003) defined character education as “educating for understanding, 
caring about, and acting on such core universal values as respect, responsibility, honesty, and 
caring” (p. 37).  In her work, Schaeffer (2003) identified the main goal of character education as 
assisting students in learning to make decisions based on a set of values they have internalized.  
Ideally, the moral programs embracing this philosophy, assist students to develop their own 
skills to define, understand, and appropriately deal with emotions in problematic situations.  
Character educators also claim that these programs may help students to demonstrate a genuine 
interest and concern for others while they are producing decisions that are responsible and well 
thought (Lickona, 1996; McLaughlin & Halstead, 1999).   
Character education is rooted in the thought of the Ancient Greeks, Plato and Aristotle, 
and throughout history, and indeed to this day, many schools have used moral education 
programs embracing this theory (Carr, 2005b; Lickona, 1997; McIntyre, 2007; Prior, 1991).  
Character educators have assumed that one is usually born with a rough form of character trait, 
and teacher instruction, along with extensive practice, are needed to develop this character trait 
(Bergman, 2007a; Ryan & Bohlin, 1999).  Ideally, the character education is a long process in 
which students are taught to appreciate a character trait by using various methods of teaching 
(Arthur, 2008; Campbell, 2008; Fenstermacher, Osguthorpe, & Sanger, 2009; Hunt & McCurry-
Mullins, 2005; Lickona, 1991, 2004).  In her book, Noddings (2003a) argued this way of 
teaching morality and improving one’s character might be appealing to Aristotle, because the 
lessons found in these programs “were organized by ‘traits of character’: obedience, honesty, 
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unselfishness, consecration to duty, industry, courage, justice, patriotism, and many others” 
(Noddings, 2003a, p. 12). 
Character education programs are designed to improve the character and alter the 
behavior of the students in small steps (Bulach, 2002; Williams, 2000).  Most industrial societies 
approach the profession of teaching as a moral activity that is mostly carried out in schools.  In 
fact, these societies consider that teachers have the opportunity to shape the characters of their 
students and, hence, recognize that teachers are in the business of character education (Bergem, 
1993; Carr & Landon, 1998; Revel & Arthur, 2007).  Being aware of this fact, most societies 
encourage teachers to use at least one of the character education programs if using multiple sets 
of character education programs is unlikely.  Both for-profit and not-for profit organizations 
design multiple sets of character education programs, and politicians (Bush, 2002) support the 
application of these programs in the schools of the United States.  For teachers, the problem is to 
decide which program to use as there are multiple choices in these programs and there are 
multiple pedagogies, trends, and philosophical perspectives of teaching in moral education.  
Several definitions of moral education exist,22 and these definitions are constructed upon 
the various frameworks and perspectives of moral education—by reference to the diverse 
perspectives of aims and methodological thinking in moral education (Carr, 2005b).  The field of 
moral education is a transitive field; therefore, it is natural for different frameworks employed in 
this field to originate first in another field of research.  For example, Kohlberg’s (1971) 
framework of moral education was first originated in the field of moral psychology, but then it 
was transferred to the field of moral education.  The differences between the frameworks of 
                                                 
22. Other definitions of moral education are provided in Chapter 3. 
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moral education are the result of the differences in the perspectives of the scholars working in 
relevant fields of interest. 
With the moral cognitive model, Kohlberg (1958, 1971) has constructed one of the most 
frequently cited frameworks of moral education.  In this model and the framework based on this 
model, Kohlberg (1958, 1971) embraced a cognitive approach employed in moral education, and 
Howard (2005) described his model as the cognitive trend in the literature of moral education.  
According to Kohlberg (1971), moral education is “the attempt to promote the development of 
children’s and adolescents’ moral cognitive structures (moral reasoning stages) in school 
settings” (p. 53).  In the 1970s and 1980s, Kohlberg’s definition of moral education and his 
Moral Judgment Scale representing this framework were frequently cited in the field, but 
Kohlberg had his critics then (Gilligan, 1982, 1995; Noddings, 1984/2003a/2013).   
Noddings’s TC has been a competing trend in moral education, which is often discussed 
as a rival to Kohlberg’s definition of moral education and framework of morality.  With TC, 
Noddings (1984/2003a/2013, 2002b, 2005, 2007) challenged Kohlberg’s approach to moral 
education and argued for a developmental and relational framework of moral thinking and 
practical definition of ethics that might reflect the women’s voice.  I present here the main 
arguments and the heated debates formed around the TC to locate this research in this field of 
education after providing Noddings’s definition of moral education.  According to Noddings 
(2003a), moral education is: 
 a community-wide enterprise… not a task exclusively reserved served for home, church, 
or school. … It refers to education which is moral in the sense that those planning  and 
conducting education will strive to meet all those involved morally; and it refers to an 
education that will enhance the ethical ideal of those being educated so that they will 




Noddings’s definition of moral education includes two important components.  First, 
moral education is an inquiry, and the success of this inquiry is dependent on the other members 
of the community.  Second, this inquiry, this framework of education, is relational as it functions 
through the interactions of individuals; therefore, the success of this inquiry is dependent on the 
quality of caring relationships individuals construct and, ideally, through these relationships, the 
caring teachers guide students to the moral life that is sustainable and based on caring (Noddings, 
1989, 1995c, 2002a, 2003a/2013, 2003b). 
The debate between the scholars (Arthur, 2008; Hunt & McCurry-Mullins, 2005; 
Lickona, 1991, 2004) publishing on behalf of character education and Noddings is a continuing 
debate between these two parties, and it might provide an important insight regarding TC’s 
influence in the field of moral education.  Noddings is not a fan of character education programs, 
and she differentiates her work,23 TC, from character education or any moral education 
perspective based on Aristotle’s virtue ethics theory.  In fact, she criticized character education 
as an unsatisfactory and passive model of teaching moral education (Noddings, 2002a, 2003a) 
and identified two main issues with character education.  The first issue is that it is very difficult 
for a large community to agree upon a list of virtues to be taught, and even if the community 
agrees to the teaching of these values, it may be uncomfortable for certain members of the 
community.  The second issue is that teachers try to assess the influence of these stories and the 
effect of their teaching by looking at the behavioral changes of the students.   
                                                 
23. Noddings differentiates her work, TC from character education by noting several important points. 
First, moral educators embracing care TC “are far more concerned to concentrate on establishing conditions 
[through modeling, dialogue, practice, and confirmation] that will call forth the best in students, that will make being 
good both possible and desirable” (Noddings, 2002a, p. 2). Second, the moral education curriculum constructed 
upon TC is not a defined long list of abstract virtues, on the contrary, it is situational and relevant to life. Third, any 
moral education based on Noddings’s TC uses personal narratives to teach care; however, character educators use 
inspirational stories of heroes representing the chosen virtue in their teaching (Noddings, 2002a).   
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In her book, Educating Moral People: A Caring Alternative to Character Education, 
Noddings (2002a) reported the issues provided in the paragraph above and identified character 
education as a passive and problematic framework employed in moral education.  Noddings 
(2002a) continued her argument by highlighting that TC is a more active, hence a better, 
framework of teaching and education and stated that educators need to implement TC in their 
classrooms rather than sticking to the passive character education.  Reading stories might be an 
educative and effective approach employed in moral education, but limiting moral education to 
simply reading stories and not supporting this method with other things, such as an honest and 
caring dialogue, is troublesome (Noddings, 2002a). 
Character educators generated two major contra arguments to defend the status of 
character education against TC in moral education.  The first argument concentrated on the fact 
that there are multiple methods of teaching in character education, and, when examined 
carefully, Noddings is purposefully choosing the simplest version of character education 
programs (Davis, 2003).  In James Arthur’s (2003) view, by sticking to the simplest teaching 
method employed in character education and criticizing the whole framework of education, 
Noddings is trying “to enter a minefield of conflicting definition and ideology” (Arthur, 2003, p. 
1) with a defective armor.   
In a more advanced form of this argument, character education scholars (Campbell, 2008; 
Carr, 2005b; Hunt & McCurry-Mullins, 2005; Steutel & Spiecker, 2004) reminded Noddings 
that practice is an important component of character education and it has an active aspect.  
According to them, no wise teacher would expect students to internalize virtues without practice 
(Lickona, 2003; McIntyre, 2007; Steutel & Spiecker, 2004).  Therefore, they (Arthur, 2003, 
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2008; Carr, 2005b; Kristjansson, 2005) concluded that Noddings is mistaken when she claimed 
that character education is passive and troublesome for moral education.   
Another line of defense originated by character education scholars is that Noddings’s 
understanding of community and how this community shapes our moral understanding and moral 
behavior is unsatisfactory.  Character education scholars argued that community has a significant 
effect on shaping one’s moral behaviors; therefore, they paid particular attention to the 
improvement of the moral culture in a school community by making visible the desired virtues of 
that community (Berkowitz & Bier, 2005; Sergiovanni, 2005).  Noddings (1996, 2002a) agreed 
with the importance of community in moral education; however, she warned the practitioners by 
stating that some members of the community might be uncomfortable with the values chosen and 
taught in the school.  In fact, according to Noddings, the decision process of the values taught 
should be open to everyone; otherwise the obligatory teaching of these values may pave the way 
to the indoctrination of the students (Noddings, 2002a). 
In several articles, character education scholars touched upon this issue and defended this 
model of education by defending the need to build morally united school communities after 
agreeing to the definition of morality and moral behavior (Algeria & Sink, 2002; Hunter, 2000).  
For them, Noddings’s (1996) observation of the role of community in moral education was 
inaccurate and outdated, and by relying on this observation, she was focused on the so-called 
dark side of the community.  They questioned Noddings on how to teach moral knowledge to 
students by relying only on the possibility of creating good social relationships between the 
teacher and the students.  Therefore, they concluded that, compared to TC, character education is 
a better model of teaching to be employed in moral education (Carr, 2007; Kristjansson, 2012; 
Lickona, 2004).  For example, in his article, David Carr (2007) argued that Noddings’s heavy 
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reliance on these relationships demonstrates it to be a theory of moral psychology, which pays 
particular attention to the attachment qualities of human beings, not moral philosophy.   
Another major contribution of Noddings’s TC might be discussed under the inclusion of 
women’s thinking to moral thinking, ethics, and education.  The inclusion of the women’s 
experience and voice to moral thinking, ethics, and education is well beyond Noddings and her 
theory, as there are other scholars whose works have been important and should be noted.  24 
However, TC provides a strong argument in defense of the woman’s thinking in moral 
education; therefore, the debate on the status of women’s thinking in moral education should 
include Noddings’s TC.  Considering this, a discussion of women’s thinking and its connection 
to TC should be provided if one wants to report the contribution and influence of TC in moral 
education and philosophy of education.  
Women’s inclusion in moral education includes the debate centered around relational 
thinking, which is mostly associated with women, and the philosophy of education.  As a theory 
of education and moral thinking underlining the connection between forming caring relationships 
and moral living, TC promotes relational thinking in education, and certain scholars (Arnot & 
Dillabough, 1999; Diller, 1998; Thayer-Bacon, 1993, 1997, 2003) have focused on this point.  
One representative argument discussing TC’s connection to women’s inclusion in moral 
education and philosophy of education and how TC contribute to the advancement of these fields 
is the argument of Madeleine Arnot and Jo Anne Dillabough (1999). 
                                                 
24. Other feminist educators (Beauvoir, 1949; Greene, 1978, 1993; Martin, 1985, 1987, 2002, 2011; 
Nussbaum, 2000, 2004, 2005; Wollstonecraft, 1787/1972, 1793/2017) prior to Noddings have argued that women 
thinking needs to be part of the academic discussion in moral education and philosophy of education.  They have 
significantly contributed to the feminist educational thought.  For example, in her book The Schoolhome: Rethinking 
Schools for Changing Families which is published in 1992, Jane Roland Martin has claimed that the inclusion of the 
three ‘Cs’ (care, concern and connection) is necessary for a better education; for an education which is humanist and 




In their article, Arnot and Dillabough (1999) defended that Noddings’s TC may be used 
best to bridge the gap between these two voices, two ways of knowing, or male and female to be 
precise.  In fact, Arnot & Dillabough (1999) reported in their study that when teachers use TC in 
their classrooms and connect theoretical knowledge to practical knowledge, “students are 
empowered” (Arnot & Dillabough, 1999, p. 172) to construct their own frameworks of education 
and moral knowledge. Moreover, Arnot and Dillabough (1999) claimed that any educational 
program constructed upon the relational practices promoted in TC has a moral purpose, because 
it discredits the implication of fragmented knowledge in the classroom.  Noddings (1997) 
claimed, and Arnot and Dillabough (1999) agreed with Noddings on her claim that this 
fragmented knowledge is undesired in the classrooms as the society needs its children to be 
taught a more humanistic and integrated curriculum. 
 In his dissertation, Roger C. Bergman (2005) analyzed several important paths taken in 
moral education as a field of research to develop a critical theoretical perspective on the 
education of the moral self.  He described Noddings’s TC as a perspective, a trend in moral 
education focused on the education of the self, which offers a contemporary analysis using the 
language of women, the language of the other, and contributing to the field through this 
perspective.  Bergman (2005) identified Noddings’s TC as the “innovative language of 
engrossment and motivational displacement” found in moral education, and this identification 
implied Noddings was a “key contributor to the theory of the moral self and its education” (p. 
176).   
In his dissertation, Bergman (2005) referred to Noddings’s opposition to the individual 
selves defined in the Western canon of ethics.  Moral theorists (e.g., Immanuel Kant, and John 
Stuart Mill) contributing to the Western canon of justice ethics defined self as the individual 
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moral agents; however, with TC, Noddings challenged the notion of the individual self and 
argued on behalf of the relational self.  She employed an entirely different lens in defining and 
educating the self, and this lens is the care-based educational pedagogy which treats human 
beings as relational selves, not individual selves (Noddings, 1984/2003a/2013, 1995a, 2002a, 
2005).  Certain scholars, such as Barbara Thayer-Bacon (1993, 1997, 2003), 25 publishing in the 
field of moral education and philosophy of education have been very sympathetic to Noddings’s 
concept of relational selves, and they have discussed the potential of this relational lens in the 
improvement of critical thinking and in doing philosophy of education.   
The relational feature of TC has its critics, and Robert Nash (2002) is one of these critics.  
In his book, Nash (2002) criticized Noddings’s TC (2003) and its weighty reliance on caring 
relations.  According to Nash (2002), TC’s heavy reliance on relational thinking and how TC 
nominates relationships as the main source to be relied on in moral education is dangerous for 
this theory.  He continued with his discussion by stating that, without relying on a principled 
foundation, its contribution to the fields of moral education and ethics of teaching is limited at 
best.   
In their article, “An ‘Ideal’ Home for Care: Nel Noddings, Thomas Hill Green, and an 
Ontological Support for a Phenomenology of Care,” Decoste and Oise (2009) shared the concern 
of Nash even though they were more sympathetic to Noddings’s TC.  Due to this sympathy, they 
offered to improve the status of TC by combining it with another philosophical theory.  Their 
candidate theory was Green’s pragmatic work in philosophy.  Using Green’s work in their 
article, Decoste and Oise (2009) attempted to provide a principled and theoretical foundation to 
TC. 
                                                 
25. I interpret Barbara Thayer-Bacon’s analysis of Noddings’s TC in a later section of this chapter and 
discuss how she has used TC in her writings. 
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The fields of moral education and philosophy of education overlap with each other; thus, 
certain debates in these fields tend to co-occur.  Moreover, it is difficult to draw a hypothetical 
line separating moral education from philosophy of education, as most scholars ask questions 
that might be the focus of both fields of research.  One reason for this situation is that solid and 
innovative educational theories have both moral and philosophical aims regarding education.  I 
think Noddings’s TC is an example of these educational theories, but there are other educational 
theories that may be categorized as contributing to these two fields of education at the same time.   
As stated earlier, the influence of Noddings’s TC and its contribution to the ongoing 
conversations in the field of philosophy of education might be discussed mainly under the 
research about women’s inclusion in educational philosophy and educational theory.  In fact, 
Suzanne Rice (2016) reported that “There is perhaps no clearer example of feminist thought 
informing scholarship in the philosophy of education broadly than that provided by Nel 
Noddings’s (1984) Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education” (p. 2).  In this 
last section of Chapter 2, the first issue discussed here is how Noddings’s TC is generally 
understood as women’s inclusion in the field.  Second, the status of the relational epistemology 
in the philosophy of education and how its philosophical tenets offered an alternate personal 
pedagogy of teaching are analyzed.  Third, in representative of this personal pedagogy of 
teaching how Noddings’s TC offered a different aim for the ideal education, while offering a 
new definition of education and teaching is investigated.  As the concluding issue in explaining 
the influence of Noddings’s TC in the philosophy of education, Thayer-Bacon’s (1993, 1997, 
2003) account of critical thinking, which is established upon Noddings’s TC is provided. 
As a field of inquiry, the philosophy of education might be traced back to the Ancient 
Greeks since they were the first ones to write and inquire about the nature of education using the 
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tools of philosophy.  As a professional field of research, it is relatively young compared to other 
fields of educational research.  For example, according to Linda Stone (2003) the formal 
establishment of the Philosophy of Education Society in the United States dates back only to 
1941.  There are several scholars who have studied in this field, and their definitions of 
philosophy of education are presented in Chapter 4.   
The philosophy of education is a field of research that might be thought as the child of a 
marriage between philosophy and education, and it has been traditionally male dominated.  In 
her article “Mothers of In(ter)vention,” Mary Leach (1991) analyzed the situation and observed 
that only 52 essays were written and published by women philosophers of education compared to 
664 essays written and published in the leading journal of this field, Educational Theory, 
between the years of 1951 and 1982.  In their article, Thayer-Bacon and Turner (2007) claimed 
that the main reason for this situation is that, even though education has been eager to reflect the 
women’s perspective, philosophy has been extremely slow to respond to women’s perspective, 
language, issues and writing.  This slow response drew the attention of other feminist 
philosophers and theorists of education, including Jane Roland-Martin (1995), who summarized 
the problem as “philosophy of education cannot provide an adequate answer to the question of 
what constitutes an educated person” (p. 16), particularly when it is time to include women to the 
definition of an educated person. 
With TC, Noddings has been one of the few authors who managed to publish in this 
journal representative of the field of educational philosophy.  In her chapter, Stone (2003) 
considered Noddings to be one of the post-modernist philosophers of education because 
Noddings envisioned the path to knowledge to be in multiple forms, including women’s 
knowledge and used a situational/standpoint way of doing ethical and philosophical inquiry to 
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obtain knowledge.  This path to obtain philosophical knowledge may require the implication of 
relational thinking; hence, the current debate on relational epistemology in the pedagogy of 
teaching and critical thinking is relevant to the influence and contribution of Noddings’s TC in 
philosophy of education. 
Noddings’s TC supports a relational pedagogy of learning and teaching in educational 
thought and, according to Michael Katz (2007), this relational pedagogy is a personal pedagogy, 
a choice. However, Katz (2007) continued that the teachers should embrace a professional 
pedagogy, preferable the pedagogy he offered as he claimed the professional pedagogy, a 
professional form of caring is needed in the classrooms of today.  In his article, Katz (2007) 
acknowledged the contribution of TC to the field of philosophy of education has been notable; 
however, he argued that it will be limited if it is not transcended to a professional form of 
thinking, namely to professional caring.  
In his article, Katz (2007) defended the idea that Noddings’s TC has been insufficient to 
describe the professional caring framework using the experiences of a teacher within the 
classroom.  Moreover, according to Katz (2007), the personal account of caring TC supports 
only a limited account of caring, and the teachers serving in the classrooms need something 
beyond, something better than this personal account of caring.  Katz (2007) claimed the teachers 
need a professional caring framework, a perspective of caring that might be categorized as 
contractual caring.  In contrast to Noddings’s TC, this professional framework of caring treats 
students as learners who need to commit to the learning of the subject matter and excel in the 
subject through professionally caring teachers.  The professional caring teacher cares 
conditionally, meaning that he or she withdrew his or her caring if the student does not commit 
to the learning of the subject matter. 
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Katz (2007) treated the caring pedagogy of teaching promoted in Noddings’s TC as a 
personal thing; therefore, he equated it to a personal choice.  One crucial point missing in his 
argument is that Noddings is explaining things in the way that they should be, not in the way that 
they are.  Moreover, it is hard to find a contract, written or unwritten, in which the teacher has 
divided his/her attentive caring into percentages and equated these percentages to grade letters 
for students to obtain.  Finally, the caring of a teacher is not an extra reward for a student to 
receive in exchange for committing to learn a subject because students should already excel in 
the learning of the subject (Noddings, 2007). 
In caring pedagogy, the teacher acts as a guide to the knowledge, not a dispenser of 
knowledge.  This guide concentrates on helping students deliver their own thinking and 
knowledge (Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger, & Tarule, 1986; Noddings, 1988, 1989, 1995b, 
2013), and addresses the emotional needs of the students as well as their academic needs.  This 
caring teacher has a framework of “connectedness,” in which understanding, trust, and seeing the 
student as a whole identity is important (Noddings, 2003b).  In his work, Donald Blumenfeld-
Jones (2004) identified the caring teacher described in Noddings’s TC as a professional who is 
“responsible for seeing each other as human beings rather than as representatives of categories 
(including the social categories of race, social class, ethnicity, gender, and so forth” (Jones, 2004, 
p. 276). 
In his work, Blumenfeld-Jones (2004) argued that the relational pedagogy offered by TC 
is an important, alternate; yet unknown pedagogy of learning in educational thought and 
philosophy of education.  Blumenfeld-Jones (2004) continued his discussion by stating that even 
though the relationship formed between the teacher and the student “is not a peer relationship,” it 
still is an important acquisition on behalf of both parties because it is “a relationship of mutual 
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respect built on the mutuality of not knowing” (p. 276).  Therefore, he concluded that we need to 
think about TC as an alternate perspective focusing on the relationships formed between human 
beings in the classrooms.  I think it is a perspective helping us redefine the frameworks of 
“pedagogy,” “learning,” “teacher-student relationships,” “the role and identity of the teacher,” 
and “critical thinking,” and its most significant contribution to the philosophy of education is 
through these redefinitions.  As an alternate perspective in the history of educational thought and 
philosophy of education, TC is aimed at improving students’ academic learning by improving 
their social and emotional learning capacities, and it argued that the aim of the education should 
be to educate students so that they will be happy and caring members of the community. 
The influence of Noddings’s TC can also be seen within the debate about “the aim of 
education,” which is an important debate in the field of educational philosophy.  This debate is 
an interactive and ongoing conversation found in the field of the philosophy of education and is 
composed of the cumulative reflection of several philosophers of education to the question of 
“What is/should be the aim of education?”  As an important philosopher of education, Noddings 
(1995b/2011, 2002a, 2003b, 2005, 2015) has not been indifferent to this debate either, and her 
response has attracted the attention of several scholars.  
Noddings’s response (2003b) to the aim and education question is that the aim of 
education should be to educate the individuals so that they become happy and caring members of 
the community in which they live.  Noddings’s TC’s contribution to this debate has been mostly 
through TC’s efforts to redefine the aim and the function of education, and this contribution has 
made up an important part of TC’s influence in the field of philosophy of education.  In this 
debate, the focus of the scholars has been mostly on evaluating the degree of satisfaction of 
Noddings’s answer to the questions of “What is the aim of education” and “Who is an educated 
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person?”  For instance, Susan Verducci (2013), Hanan Alexander (2013), and Andrew Gibbons 
(2013) have discussed whether or not it is an attainable aim and who is qualified to be an 
educated person in compliance with Noddings’s TC and the aim to which it is leading us.   
Verducci (2013) is one of these philosophers, and in her article titled “Happiness and 
Education: Tilting at Windmills,” she investigated whether or not Noddings’s aim of happiness 
in and through education is an accessible aim.  Verducci (2013) acknowledged Noddings has 
proven to be a visionary educator who understands education has a meaning beyond tests and 
college applications.  However, unlike Noddings (2003b), Verducci (2013) thought educating for 
happiness in schools is impractical considering the conditions of the schools of today, and 
Verducci concluded her article by stating that Noddings’s aim of happiness is an ideal, not an 
aim in itself.  According to Verducci (2013), Noddings’s courage and insistence on discussing 
happiness as an aim is significant in the aims talk of today; however, in the end, Noddings is 
pointing towards an ideal, and “Ideals are not themselves ends, objectives, or goals; we 
understand that they cannot be achieved” (Verducci, 2013, p. 499).  The ‘aims talk’ is important 
in the philosophy of education because it is intended to answer one of the essential questions 
posed in the field of philosophy of education, which is “What is the aim of education and 
schooling?” Even though Alexander (2013) sided with Verducci in this debate, Gibbons (2013) 
disagreed with them.   
In his article, Gibbons (2013) disagreed with Verducci (2013) and stated that it is not 
only possible but also necessary to create an educational system aimed at happiness in education.  
Attempts to hinder this system, such as combining two different levels of education, is 
problematic and decreases the opportunity of having an open conversation that would improve 
the critical thinking skills of the students.  In Gibbons’s idea (2013), and I think Noddings will 
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sympathetically alsoagree, the aim of education is more than educating the individual for a 
particular career, it is educating the individual to learn and teach care, and be happy in their 
careers of choice. 
Another debate documenting the influence of Noddings’s TC in the field of philosophy of 
education, concentrates on its contribution to critical thinking.  Thayer-Bacon (1993, 1997, 2003) 
is a prolific scholar contributing to this debate, and she stated that through TC, it is possible to 
extend the scope of critical thinking and who is a critical thinker, a philosopher of education in 
this regard.  In fact, according to Thayer-Bacon (1997), Noddings’s TC has the potential to 
establish a much larger framework of critical thinking, which is a reflective, sensitive, and 
transformative way of acquiring and constructing philosophical knowledge and critical thinking 
that is based on women’s care-based relational thinking.   
In her concept of “constructive thinking,” which is a reflective and feminine form of 
critical thinking, Thayer-Bacon (1993, 1997) argued that there is an important need to redefine 
objective critical thinking.  She based this need on her observation that there are more multiple 
forms of critical thinking found in the field of philosophy of education and educational thought 
compared to the 1980s, and more and more women philosophers of education participate in the 
discussions occurring in these fields using one of these forms of thinking (Thayer-Bacon, 1993).  
In her article, Thayer-Bacon (1997) claimed Noddings’s frame of critical thinking through caring 
provided a “vital [step] to a nontranscendent [relational] (e)pistemology” (p. 119). According to 
Thayer-Bacon (1997), this relational epistemology is required in understanding the different 




In her article, Thayer-Bacon (1997) detailed relational epistemology and reported that it 
is a new form of critical thinking, the feminist constructive thinking dependent on care-based 
critical thinking, or in other words, care reasoning.  Moreover, Thayer-Bacon (1997) argued that 
her concept/form of critical thinking, care reasoning promoted the concept of active and 
experiential learning because it “considers being (knowers) as directly connected to knowing, 
which makes this theory pragmatic in a traditional philosophical sense” (Thayer-Bacon, 1997, p. 
243).  Due to this direct connection between the knower and the known, Thayer-Bacon (1997) 
categorized care-based critical thinking and the relational epistemology it employs as a social 
form of critical thinking which “views knowledge as something that is socially constructed by 
embedded, embodied people who are in relation with each other” (Thayer-Bacon, 1997, p. 243).   
In this kind of feminine constructive critical thinking, caring reasoning is an act of care, 
and it involves acknowledging the presence of the other while listening the other’s concerns and 
issues before making a critical decision.  With, and as a result of, the caring reasoning, Noddings 
(1984/2003a/2013, 1995b/2011) and Thayer-Bacon (1993, 1997, 2003) continued, we have an 
alternative framework of critical thinking while not relying on reason as tightly as the male 
philosophers of moral thinking and educational philosophy do.  According to Thayer-Bacon 
(1997), the constructive thinker possesses and employs a different lens of critical thinking and 
practicing educational philosophy.  The constructive and relational thinker embraces the fact 
that: 
 from other hu,ans [sic] we learn to differentiate, and we learn what is correct and 
incorrect. The concept of what is correct and incorrect, the concept of truth, is necessary 
for knowledge to exist. Since we learn what is truth from our interactions with others, 
knowledge can only exist in creatures which are capable of interrelationships that have 




As the reader of this dissertation realizes, the influence of Noddings’s TC in educational 
research, particularly in the fields of moral education and philosophy of education has been vast 
as it has contributed several different academic conversations.  To document how this influence 
is perceived in the educational research and how it has contributed different academic 
conversations is a need that has not been adequately fulfilled yet. This dissertation tackled this 
problem in the literature of educational research, especially in the literature about the moral 
education and philosophy of education, by documenting how this theory has been influential in 
these fields issues from 2003 through 2013.   
There have been works (Diller, 1998; Goldstein, 1998; Lake, 2012; McKenzie & 
Blenkinsop, 2006; Shelby, 2003) analyzing the influence of Noddings’s TC and documenting 
how it has contributed to the more general educational research; however, these works either are 
outdated or provided shallow analyses by discussing only one feature of this theory.  This 
constitutes a big limitation for other scholars in need of understanding the influence and 
contribution of this theory to educational research.  Considering this, I think this dissertation fills 
a potentially important gap in the relevant literature by answering how Noddings’s TC has been 
influential in moral education and philosophy of education while pinpointing the conversations it 
significantly contributed as appropriated by the authors analyzing it in their articles.  
Noddings’s TC offers a different framework to be used in moral education and in the 
philosophy of education, and one may find important studies which analyze and document the 
influence of Noddings’s TC and how it contributes to educational research (Beck, 1992; Crigger, 
1997; Goldstein, 1998) in more practical fields of education compared to the theoretical fields of 
moral education and philosophy of education in which one expect to find it is a theoretical 
framework of education.  This is a surprising, yet problematic, result considering that these are 
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the two fields that harbor the major lines of discussions relevant to TC.  The only works 
attempted to deal with this problematic result are produced by Roger Bergman (2004) 26 and 
Robert Lake (2012).    
In his book, Dear Nel: Opening the Circles of Care (Letters to Nel Noddings) Lake 
(2012) attempted to document the influence of Noddings and her work in the field of educational 
research; however, his work falls short of this task for several reasons.  First of all, he limited his 
discussion of Noddings’s influence in the field of educational research to the letters, in which 
authors personally describe their memoirs and report important discussions with Noddings.  
Second, Lake divided his book into thematic chapters and employs a thematic lens to make his 
case as I do.  However, his argument regarding the thematic discussion of the influence of TC, 
needs more detail.  Third, the conclusion of this book is somewhat vague as it fails to pinpoint 
what these themes mean for general educational research.  Considering this situation, I 
constructed my own solution to this problem and explained the influence of TC in moral 
education and the philosophy of education by providing the debates of which it became a part, 
and, finally, reflecting on these debates. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I provided a detailed picture regarding the influence of Noddings’s TC in 
the relevant areas of research: moral philosophy, moral education, and the philosophy of 
education.  In an attempt to locate Noddings’s TC in these areas of research, I explained its 
relation to other theories of moral philosophy and offered several lines of arguments as the proof 
of how Noddings and TC have attracted the attention of the scholars publishing in these fields.  
Their attention has come in several ways and has built an interesting debate surrounding the 
                                                 
26. Roger Bergman has written an evaluative article on the influence of Noddings’s TC in the field of 
moral education, and this article is analyzed in Chapter 3 of this dissertation.  
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theoretical essence and the practical implications of Noddings’s TC in these areas of research.  
As the reader of this chapter will see, there is no comprehensive work analyzing the influence 
and the potential contribution of Noddings’s TC to the ongoing discussions in these fields and 
with this dissertation I intend to fill this gap. 
This chapter ends, after locating the need for this dissertation.  In Chapter 3, the 
discussion continued to interpret the influence of Noddings’s TC in moral education by 




CHAPTER 3: THE INFLUENCE OF NODDINGS’S TC  
IN MORAL EDUCATION: 2003-2013 
 
In this chapter, several definitions of moral education and an introduction to the Journal 
of Moral Education (henceforth JME), including an explanation of the scope of this journal and 
the selection of the articles used as data in this dissertation are presented.  The main focus in this 
chapter is an analysis of the authors’ ideas, which are the main sources of the themes, present in 
the published articles of JME as related to Noddings’s TC and a discussion of how the authors of 
the selected articles viewed and have used this theory.  There are 20 articles that fit the criteria 
selected in this study, and the results of their analysis under five different themes are discussed.  
The word “theme” only refers to the group of ideas found in these journal articles. 
What is Moral Education? 
In his book Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle described moral education as the habitual 
development process of intellectual and moral virtues, and he drew attention to the regular 
performance of these virtues in different situations (Aristotle, Thomson, & Tredennick, 2004).  
In Aristotle’s (2004) view, there was no final stage of perfection to be reached in moral 
education because one needs to practice these virtues and be virtuous throughout one’s life.  
Hence, according to Aristotle (2004), moral education is a lifelong process largely dependent on 
the practice of the good character traits, in other words, virtues through the repetition of the 
“similar activities” (Aristotle, 2004, p. 32). 
Jean Jacques Rousseau was a philosopher and educational theorist who lived during the 
18th century, and his framework/definition of moral education differed from Aristotle.  In Emile, 
Rousseau (1762/1979) defended the idea that true moral education needs to nurture the growth of 
a child’s inner-self and explained that this inner development may not be observed in the child’s 
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behaviors in a short period of time.  Rousseau (1762/1979) claimed nurturing this inner-self as 
the beginning of moral education, and he identified moral education to be the “true study” of 
knowledge, in which the human condition is analyzed.  According to Rousseau (1762/1979), the 
ideal moral educator:  
 knows how to bear the goods and ills of this life is to my taste the best raised: from which 
it follows that the true education consists less in precept than in practice. We begin to 
instruct ourselves when we begin to live. Our education begins with us. (p. 42)  
 
In Rousseau’s (1762/1979) understanding, moral education should begin in the early 
years of childhood, and the ideal educator responsible for providing this education should be able 
to synthesize reason with compassion to develop the inner-self of the child while educating the 
child morally.  In his book, Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, Rousseau (1755/1992) 
claimed both reason and compassion (an emotion) to be the important components of moral 
education.  According to Rousseau (1755/1992), without reason being included in moral 
education, the uneducated child could harm himself, and without compassion being included in 
moral education, the morally uneducated child could harm other students.  In his writings, 
Rousseau (1755/1992, 1762/1979) defended the idea that the child should be educated in a 
natural environment distant from society’s ills if we want the child to have a real education, and 
the practice shall provide sufficient ground for this kind of education, not the rote memorization 
of the selected texts found in the curriculums of that day. 
John Dewey, an important philosopher of education and an educational theorist of the 
19th and 20th centuries, wrote Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social 
Psychology in 1922.  Dewey’s (1922/2012) ideal framework of moral education, which is 
discussed in this book, is a social one, and in this framework of moral education, moral 
knowledge is created from the “real stuff” of life.  In Dewey’s (1922/2012) framework of moral 
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education, the aim of moral education for the learner should be to form his or her own 
knowledge after experiencing the real stuff of life.  In this experiential and social framework of 
moral education, Dewey (1922/2012) identified moral education as the process of “learning the 
meaning of what we are about and employing that meaning in action” (p. 280).  Moreover, 
according to Dewey (1922/2012), moral education should include the knowledge of how one 
may control his/her behaviors because “The good, satisfaction, “end,” of growth of present 
action in shades and scope of meaning is the only good within our control, and the only one, 
accordingly, for which responsibility exists” (p. 280-281).   
In Dewey’s (1922/2012) thinking, to have a satisfactory moral education, one needs to 
develop good habits that will be the building blocks of moral and educated life.  In Dewey’s 
(1922/2012) opinion, good habits are the kind of habits that would promote growth in the 
individual, and these habits are the resulting products of the social and experiential learning.  
These habits form the individual’s concept of moral life, and they are relevant to the real-life 
experiences of the individual.  Unlike some religious teachings, which are extremely theoretical, 
these habits do not promote any disconnection from the real life to prepare for heaven or reach to 
Nirvana.   
In his book, Moral Principles in Education, Dewey (1909/2009) opposed the passive 
framework of moral education present in the schools of the United States in the 19th and 20th 
centuries, as this method was composed of the teacher reading moral and religious texts and 
having students memorize them.  Dewey (1909/2009) observed that “The influence of direct 
moral instruction, even at its very best, is comparatively small in amount and slight in influence, 
when the whole field of moral growth through education is taken into account” (p. 17). Thus, 
Dewey (1909/2009) claimed that an experiential/practical framework of moral education 
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provided by schools might be more beneficial to the students in the process of solving real life 
moral dilemmas. 
In addition to Noddings27 and Dewey, other scholars have provided 
definitions/frameworks of moral education that reflected their perspective.  For example, in their 
article titled “Seven Worlds of Moral Education,” Pamela Joseph and Sara Efron (2005) 
described moral education as “a process by which students engage in ‘moral conversation’ 
centered on dilemmas” (p. 531).  Joseph and Efron (2005) argued that a satisfactory framework 
of moral education should include a clear set of goals describing who is responsible for doing 
what in the classroom environment, and ideally, teachers need to expand this framework of 
moral education to use outside of their classrooms depending on their goal. 
In his article, Robert Howard (2005) defined moral education as the “education [that] 
helps students to recognize and respond to ethical issues” (p. 44).  Unlike Noddings and 
Rousseau, Howard (2005) categorized moral education as a kind of subject knowledge which 
needed to be taught to students using the school curriculum.  Ideally, according to Howard 
(2005), this school curriculum should state the goals of education and schooling; and the 
commonly agreed and standardized definition of moral education should be added to the school 
curriculum.   
Different frameworks/definitions of moral education originated from the trends present in 
the field of moral education and in the fields interacting with moral education.  As a field of 
research, moral education is focused on the ethical dimensions of the individual and society and 
examines how certain standards of right and wrong are developed (McClellan, 1992).  In the 
field of moral education, scholars use a variety of research methods and do not limit themselves 
                                                 
27. Noddings’s framework of moral education are present in the earlier chapters of this dissertation.  
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only to theories from the field of ethics.  They also use theories originated in the field of moral 
psychology, and they base their research on the definitions coming from this field.  For example, 
Kohlberg first developed his moral theory in the field of moral psychology, but then it became 
the most influential theory in moral education in the 1970s and 1980s (Carr, 2007) until the 
challenge of primary care ethicists (Gilligan, 1982; Noddings, 1984).  In fact, Kohlberg’s (1958, 
1971) definition of moral education28 and Noddings’s TC can conceivably be seen as two 
competing definitions. 
Noddings’s TC has been influential in the field of moral education since the 1980s, and 
her influence through TC is represented in articles in the selected journal.  To explain TC’s 
influence in moral education, I analyzed in this chapter a representative sampling of articles 
within a selected time frame from JME, a journal dedicated to moral education.  According to 
Scimago Journal Ranking and Journal Metrics, JME is a well-respected journal representing the 
discipline of moral education.  It has been published for more than two decades, and the 
University of Kansas library system has online access to its issues published after 1990.  This 
journal is representative of the field of moral education because it only publishes papers 
associated with research conducted in moral education and limits its focus to: 
 the discussion and analysis of moral education and development throughout the lifespan. 
The journal encourages submissions across the human sciences and humanities that use a 
range of methodological approaches and address aspects of moral reasoning, moral 
emotions, motivation and moral action in various contexts (e.g., cultural, gender, family, 
schooling, community, leisure, work) and roles (e.g., parent, teacher, student, civic, 
professional). The journal encourages proposals for special issues that address a topic 
relevant to these aims and scope. (JME, 2017) 
 
                                                 




The articles selected as the data set for this study drew extensively on Noddings’s TC, 
and they were published in JME from 2003 through 2013.  There were 20 articles which fit these 
criteria, including a few book review articles.  The content of these articles revealed how 
Noddings’s TC has been influential in the field of moral education and how this influence has 
been received by other authors publishing in this field, as their discussions of Noddings’s TC 
contribute to the discussion of several problems/issues of education.  In this chapter, I described 
this influence by analyzing the content of these articles and interpreting them. 
Themes Present in JME in Relation to Noddings’s TC 
Noddings’s TC and School Culture 
The first group of the authors, who were analyzed, discussed the connection of 
Noddings’s TC to the discussion of school culture in the academy.  Several descriptions and 
frameworks of school culture exist in the literature; however, among the others, Michael Fullan’s 
(2007) framework of school culture–the guiding beliefs and values evident in the way a school 
operates–relates best to moral education.  Fullan’s (2007) framework of school culture shares an 
important common ground with moral education because, like school culture, moral education is 
also deeply concerned with the guiding beliefs and values present in the school environment.  
This common ground has attracted significant attention from a number of authors, including four 
different authors who have published in JME between 2003 and 2013, and connected Noddings’s 
TC to the school culture.   
One of these authors, whose article is analyzed, is Chi Ming Lee (2009).  In her article, 
Lee (2009) introduced a moral education program that improved the school culture through 
caring relationships, which was implemented in a Taiwanese elementary school.  Even though 
the moral education program of concern in this article is constructed upon three different theories 
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of morality; the moral education program is primarily centered around and constructed upon 
Noddings’s TC. 
In Lee’s (2009) view, one of the main characteristics of this moral education program is 
its focus on the building of a positive school culture through caring relationships, and she argued 
that the behaviors of the students have improved through these relationships.  Lee (2009) argued, 
prior to the implementation of the moral program, that the school culture was focused on 
academic success and testing, not on human interactions.  According to Lee (2009), after the 
implementation of the moral education program, although the focus has shifted from academic 
success and testing to the improvement of the school culture and student behaviors, the students’ 
academic success has not declined.  On the contrary, both the students’ academic success and the 
school culture have improved after the implementation of Lee’s program, in which she drew 
upon the importance of ethical caring relationships promoted in Noddings’s TC.  Lee’s (2009) 
study supported Noddings’s claim that schools become a community and school culture 
improves through caring relationships promoted in TC.   
The importance of having quality caring relationships has been stressed through Lee’s 
(2009) entire article, including the findings section.  In the findings section, Lee (2009) 
mentioned that one of the advantages of the moral education program developed and 
implemented in this Taiwanese school is that it has significantly improved both the students’ 
moral thinking and their reasoning capacity.  In fact, according to Lee (2009), at the end of the 
study, some students have identified this moral education program as a great program, because 
the program helped them not only to change their behavior, but also to increase awareness: 
 Because I have participated in this project, I am now more concerned about the moral 
behaviour of my [sic] classmates.  I will give advice to those whose behaviour I feel is 
not correct.  And I always remind myself that I have to be a role model for other students 
as well.  (Lee, 2009, p. 179) 
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Ideally, moral education programs are designed to assist the students in improving their 
moral thinking and moral behaviors.  However, students are not the only ones benefitting from 
these programs, as they frequently interact with their teachers.  In fact, teachers may very well 
increase their awareness of moral knowledge and learn how to be the caring members of the 
larger communities, such as schools, if they are willing and equipped with a specific skill set of 
thinking and acting.  According to Noddings (2008), teachers learn to care and be a caring role 
model to their students using this specific skill set of thinking and acting “to respond to the 
expressed needs of students and to build a moral climate in school which reinforces students’ 
selfworth [sic] and moral decency” (pp. 166-167).  This particular skill set of thinking and acting 
is already present in good and solid moral education programs because it helps to build a positive 
school culture constructed upon the maintenance of these ethical caring relationships in schools.    
In the findings section of her article, Lee (2009) reported why and how multiple parties of 
people benefit from the ethical caring relationships formed in this Taiwanese school through the 
implementation of her moral education program.  According to Lee (2009), “the entire school 
culture and the professional development of staff [are] just as important as students’ character 
development” (p. 182) because the program identified everyone in the school as individuals 
capable of reflecting on their caring behaviors and moral actions.  Lee’s (2009) analysis of who 
benefits from the ethical caring relationships is important because it supported Noddings’s 
(1995a, 2003a/2013, 2005) discussion that the act of caring is not limited to one party in an 
ethical caring relationship, and the roles of carer and cared-for are interchangeable.   
In Noddings’s (2002a, 2003a, 2005) view, both the caring teacher and the cared-for 
student should participate in the ethical caring relationship for two reasons: (a) they benefit from 
the relationship and (b) their active contributions to the caring relationship are equally important.  
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Unlike those who structured the teacher-student relationships in more authoritarian ways, with 
the teacher delivering and the student receiving, in TC, Noddings (1995a, 2003c, 2006) 
structured the teacher-student relationship as an active interaction between the parties involved in 
these relationships.  In her book Educating Moral People: A Caring Alternative to Character 
Education, Noddings (2002a) indicated that the ethical caring relationship is a mutually 
satisfying relationship formed between the carers and the cared-fors that would influence the 
behaviors of the individuals and improve the school culture in a positive way without relying on 
the authoritarian methods of teaching and school discipline. 
In Joan Goodman’s (2006) article, she stated that “Discipline is central to a school’s 
ethos” (p. 214) and discussed the role of school rules and school discipline in building a school 
culture.  According to Goodman (2006), school discipline is usually constructed through school 
rules, and these school rules include the descriptive statements either of conditions in which 
punishment is required or a reward is offered to a student.  Following the conclusion Noddings 
(2002a) reached (mentioned in the previous paragraph), Goodman (2006), in her book, argued 
that we should not rely heavily on the strict, rigid school rules while building a positive school 
culture, especially if these rules treat very minor moral problems and more serious moral 
problems as equal.  One consequence of treating these problems as equal might be that students 
perceive these “rules and sanctions…as irrational, trivial, unfair or arbitrary” and causing “other 
school efforts to support a moral outlook [which] are likely to be dismissed” (Goodman, 2006, p. 
214). 
In her article, Goodman (2006) identified the moral problems that might potentially be 
present in a school environment and assigned them to different categories based on how serious 
they are.  In assigning them to different categories, Goodman drew on Noddings’s TC to support 
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her reasoning of the construction of her categories (Goodman, 2006).  Citing Noddings’s 2005 
book, Goodman (2006) claimed that not only every problematic behavior of the student is a huge 
problem to fix, but also school discipline and prescribed school rules are incapable of fixing 
every problematic behavior and the moral problem it is rooted.   
Being aware of this incapability, Goodman (2006) argued that if a teacher aims to build a 
positive learning and moral environment in her classroom and school, then he/she needs to be 
interested in acquiring more information about problematic student behaviors.  Similar to 
Noddings (2003a, 2005), Goodman (2006) defended acquiring more information on the 
problematic behavior may assist a teacher to prevent the behavior to be repeated and prevent the 
same teacher to jump to irrevocable conclusions that might result in important decisions 
affecting the students’ lives.  To strengthen her argument, Goodman (2006) identified the 
behavior of the caring teachers promoted in Noddings’s TC, who go beyond the school rules and 
“investigate possible causes” (p. 219), as the turnsole test.   
Ideally, the caring teacher described by Noddings (1995a, 2003a) analyzes all types of 
information that might be the cause of a moral problematic behavior performed by the student, 
and he/she uses this information to fix the problem and establish a positive and academically 
encouraging school culture, not the student’s behavior.  Advancing this argument of Noddings, 
according to Goodman (2006), this caring teacher also uses Goodman’s categories on moral 
problems.  Relying on these categories, the ideal caring teacher realizes that tardiness is an 
unimportant moral problem, not “a wrong to punish” (Goodman, 2006, p. 219); hence, instead of 
effectively implementing school procedures such as decreasing the student’s grade or sending the 
student to the school principal’s office the teacher tries to change the student behavior by 
becoming a role model for the student.  Goodman (2006) claims that each student behavior 
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improved is a step taken to building a positive and caring school culture resulting in better school 
performance and safer schools. 
Another group of scholars who have discussed the connection of Noddings’s TC to 
school culture is Mingchu Luo, Wenmin Huang, and Lotfollah Najjar (2007).  Their article is an 
analysis of the impact of the caring relationships on the ethical climate of a school and the 
students’ school performance.  In their article, Luo et al. (2007) argued that the existence of 
positive ethical caring relationships between the school personnel and the students might 
improve the academic success of the students because these students would benefit from these 
relationships and are educated in a positive and ethical school climate.  Based on the article Luo 
et al. (2007) published, the positive relationships they have in mind are the ethical caring 
relationships described and promoted in Noddings’s TC.  In their article, Luo et al. discussed that 
the positive, ethical school climate we need is only possible through the formation and 
establishment of these caring relationships. 
In their article, Luo et al. (2007) defended the idea that the most important purposes of 
education are the moral ones: improving students’ moral thinking within a positive, ethical 
school climate and developing moral and humane citizens who are concerned about the feelings 
and welfare of others.  In this article, after highlighting the importance of the moral purposes of 
education, Luo et al. claimed that “a school’s ethical climate, an integral component of school 
climate or even school culture, may be one of the key determinants of students’ school success in 
the Chinese school context” (p. 108).  In fact, according to Luo et al. (2007), the school culture is 
the studio of the community, where the student’s behavior is reshaped and redefined; therefore, 
the school culture needs to be positive and caring as promoted by Noddings’s TC (1995b, 2005). 
This school culture should be built very carefully and Noddings’s (1996) warning should be 
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taken seriously, otherwise, we would end up with a troubling school community as discussed in 
David Resnick’s (2008) article.  
In his article, Resnick (2008) analyzed the film Mean Girls (originally aired in 2004) to 
discuss the power of the school community over the students’ behaviors while elaborating the 
connection between the unstated school rules [for Resnick (2008), these are a cumulative image 
of the dominant school culture] and students’ moral thinking and behaviors.  In this film, moral 
thinking/behavior and its connection to school culture and unstated school rules was described 
through the eyes of an outsider, a new student (Cady).  Cady is a student whose parents are 
zoologists, and who has been previously home schooled in Africa before transferring to an 
American high school containing a morally twisted school environment.  Throughout his movie 
review article, Resnick (2008) analyzed the tension between individual morality and communal 
morality and, based on this analysis, he claimed the community has been more influential in 
shaping the individual’s moral thinking and behavior than we think.  In fact, according to 
Resnick (2008), this is an influence to be feared or at least to be cautioned, or the results, as 
portrayed in this movie, would be tragic at best.  
The movie represents a high school in which students demonstrate morally problematic 
behaviors and an oppressive system of popularity monarchy that was constructed based on the 
arbitrary and unstated rules.  The tension between individual moral decisions and communal 
moral decisions constructed as a result of these unstated rules is shown through the somewhat 
bitter experiences of Cady.  Over time, in order to adapt to the school environment Cady begins 
to trade her own moral codes for the school community’s moral codes and changes her 
behaviors, even though those behaviors do not represent her values and moral thinking.  As 
represented in the movie, in Cady’s new school, students are categorized through their 
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compliance with the artificial and unstated moral rules of the school community and are assigned 
to certain groups/casts.  The student’s relation/membership to these groups/casts define the 
student’s social status within the school up to the point of where he/she should sit in the 
cafeteria: 
 Where you sit in the cafeteria is crucial ‘cause you’ve got everyone there’ says Janis who 
then literally draws a map for Cady (and us) of the various cliques: JV Jocks, Asian 
Nerds, Cool Asians, Unfriendly Black Haughties [sic], Sexually Active, [fat] Girls who 
Eat their Feelings and— the centre of the film’s plot—the ‘Plastics, teen royalty.’ 
(Resnick, 2008, p. 100) 
 
In his article, Resnick (2008) explained the trade portrayed between Cady’s moral values 
and the school community’s moral values; and he used Noddings’s TC in order to explain the 
power of community over an individual’s moral thinking.  In several of her publications, 
Noddings (1997, 2002a) highlighted the function of community in the shaping of one’s moral 
behaviors and how compliance with the community becomes a vital issue for the members of the 
community, as each individual in this community is dependent on the good of other individuals.  
In these publications, Noddings (1997, 2002a) also warned her readers regarding this power of 
community and described what might happen when community values go awry, as if she has 
seen the movie Resnick has analyzed.  According to Resnick (2008), Noddings’s warning is 
reasonable because “Mean Girls [the movie] acknowledges the power of social groups, but does 
so primarily in their negative mode” (p. 112).  As represented in the movie and discussed in 
Resnick’s article in detail, these problematic social groups/casts transcend the values they 
embrace, which become harmful to the nature of a true caring and sustainable community. 
Fortunately, not all the social groups or school communities are morally problematic or 
harmful as portrayed in Mean Girls or analyzed in Resnick’s (2008) article.  In their article, 
Sanger and Osguthorpe (2009) introduced the Child Development Project (henceforth CDP), an 
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approach employed in moral education, in which they argued that the establishment of a “caring 
school community” is actually possible.  They described the CDP as “a comprehensive 
longitudinal intervention project designed to enhance the social and moral development of 
children through systematic changes in the classroom, school [sic] and home environments” 
(Sanger & Osguthorpe, 2009, p. 20), and this project has been influential because it functions 
through the biological need of the children’s belonging.  Using this need, it cultivates morality 
and the correct moral behavior in children by promoting the need to belong to a caring school 
community.  According to Sanger and Osguthorpe (2009), this long-term project has the 
potential to promote the construction of a positive and caring school culture because it focuses 
on the positive influence of the community over the individual’s moral thinking and behaviors. 
One of the important characteristics of this caring school community constructed through 
the CDP is that it promotes the formation of caring relationships within the community.  The 
supporters of the CDP embrace and employ a principle which was advocated by Noddings 
(2003a): “In … education, … we have to ask how best to cultivate the moral sentiments and how 
to develop communities that will support, not destroy, caring relations” (Preface Section).  
According to Sanger and Osguthorpe (2009), by implementing CDP they aimed to have a caring 
school community in which students have engaged in ethical caring relationships and discussed 
democratic citizenship and justice with integrity.  The aim in their project was to promote a 
moral education that is thematic and integrated across content areas, and school activities and 
norms.  With TC, Noddings (1995a, 2002a, 2005) advocated for this thematic approach 
employed in the teaching of how to care and be moral; however, it is Sanger and Osguthorpe 
(2009) who have really transferred this idea to real-life learning in schools.  Sanger and 
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Osguthorpe (2009) heavily drew on Noddings’s TC when they implemented their theoretical 
moral education within the classroom.   
In the CDP, the presence of good moral behavior in the classroom is highlighted, and 
teachers are encouraged to use it as a tool to create a positive and safe learning environment for 
everyone, rather than connecting this good moral behavior to grading or academic learning.  One 
way of building this positive and safe environment is to promote the existence of diverse cultures 
in the schools and understand the connection between care-based thinking that, ideally, results in 
a caring moral behavior and teaching through culture, a second theme found in the analysis of 
articles about TC. 
Noddings’s TC and Teaching Through Culture/Teaching as a Culture 
One theme frequently discussed within the articles analyzed as part of this dissertation is 
how Noddings’s TC contributed to the discussion of the culture of teaching and the cultural 
teaching.  TC is used to analyze different layers of connection between teaching and culture, 
including the teaching of students of different cultures, and a different lens used to explain the 
moral and cultural concepts found in distant geographical places such as South Africa.  Teaching 
through culture is a relatively new approach practiced in teaching, which has attracted significant 
attention from scholars over the years (Banks, 2009; Gay, 2002; Ladson-Billings, 2009; Nieto, 
2009).  With the passage of time, it has interacted with other fields of research, such as 
multicultural education, the teaching of English as a second language, moral education, and 
teacher education.  Five different articles published in this journal discuss Noddings’s TC in 
connection with teaching through culture (the teaching of African American students and African 
morality) and teaching as a culture. 
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In her article, Mari Ann Roberts (2010) discussed the potential contribution of TC in 
teaching African American students and takes a critical lens to analyze this potential more 
deeply.  At the beginning section of her paper, Roberts (2010) reported that the current rhetoric 
representing care-based teaching is color-blind, and she claimed this rhetoric has to change if 
Noddings wanted TC to address the concerns of different groups of people.  In fact, Roberts 
(2010) stated that care-based teaching needs to take into account and represent the different 
cultural norms in/of teaching because, when educators integrate culturally relevant critical 
teaching with a care perspective in education, they may acquire a rich potential of high-quality 
teaching.  Robert’s article published in JME is all about combining Noddings’s TC with 
culturally relevant critical teaching.  Roberts (2010) argued that her combination is both possible 
and necessary and is confident that her program, Culturally Relevant Critical Teacher Care 
(henceforth CRTC), has been the first and the most advanced step taken in this direction and has 
the potential to change the ongoing rhetoric both in the fields of culturally relevant teaching and 
moral education.   
In her study, Roberts (2010) interviewed eight African American teachers who used 
culturally relevant caring activities in their classrooms when they teach.  Based on the 
interviews, she reported that these eight successful teachers used CRTC in their classrooms, and 
“clearly defined their racially-motivated actions on behalf of their students as care” (Roberts, 
2010, p. 462).  According to Roberts (2010), their care-based teaching activities have a natural 
concept of race and color, as these individuals’ frames of caring and successful teaching are 
established upon the concepts of race, culture, and color.  Moreover, these care-based teaching 
activities are rich in meaning and experience as the students find the opportunity to relate to the 
subject material through these activities (Roberts, 2010).  In describing these activities, Roberts 
103 
 
(2010) drew on Noddings’s discussion of the inclusion of care to teaching and education and 
supported her argument that teachers need to promote care-based teaching in their classroom 
activities if they want to ensure the participation of students from different social groups and 
cultures.  Care-based teaching has a natural connection to culture based teaching for two main 
reasons.  First, Noddings’s TC has a connection to culture and race because caring teachers 
understand the “difficulties of knowing another’s nature, needs, and desires when one party 
holds power over the other or is a member of a group that has historically dominated another” 
(Noddings, 1992, p. 3).  Second, with TC, Noddings (1992, 1995a, 2002a, 2005, 2013) 
encouraged teachers to employ several methods of teaching when they have a diverse group of 
students in their classrooms, even though these students share one basic need: to be cared. 
Similar to Roberts article, Crystal Johnson (2011), in her article, introduced her 
theory/framework of moral education: Cultural Historical Activity Theory (henceforth CHAT), 
which I think is heavily influenced by Noddings’s TC.  According to Johnson (2011), her theory 
and the moral education program constructed upon this theory have the potential to bridge the 
gap between TC and culture-based teaching.  In fact, according to Johnson (2011), her theory 
may bring a fresh perspective to the culturally specific methods of caring/teaching and the moral 
education practiced using care perspective.  Johnson (2011) described one African American 
teacher’s activities, which were constructed around CHAT, that contribute to students’ moral 
thinking and in class learning.   
In Johnson’s (2011) article, she set up the stage by using Noddings’s TC, then drew upon 
how TC insists on the diversity of human beings and their uniqueness to education.  In the 
beginning section of her article, Johnson (2011) reported that Noddings’s TC was first thought of 
as a theory of white, middle-class, heterosexual women. Therefore, it has been criticized as being 
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unable to express the needs of minority women and minority students.  Johnson’s (2011) article 
challenged this criticism against Noddings’s TC.  Throughout the article, she argued that TC has 
the potential to counter this criticism if CHAT is considered as an advanced version of TC, 
because CHAT discussed the influence of race and racism in a caring moral education.  
Confident with her theory, Johnson (2011) stated: “I contend that Cultural Historical Activity 
Theory (CHAT) serves as a potent approach for comprehending the moral agency associated 
with culturally identifiable care perspectives” (p. 472). 
In her article, Johnson (2011) provided field observations and interview notes to improve 
the validity of her argument about the caring African American teacher who uses CHAT in her 
classroom teaching.  Through the portrait of this caring teacher, Johnson (2011) argued that 
caring classrooms and schools may be a real thing. rather than an ideal, when other teachers use 
CHAT too.  According to Johnson (2011), one significant characteristic of this caring teacher is 
that she is more concerned with the moral development of the students than with passing these 
students to the next grade.  Moreover, the favorite question this teacher poses to her students is 
“How are we going to be?” and this question signals that learning is a plural process dependent 
on the contribution of all the students present in the classroom.  Considering that this question 
highlights the importance of the students’ connection to the whole caring classroom, as well as to 
the surrounding community, it is no wonder that this is the favorite question of this teacher.  This 
question also signals that moral education is a process, in which not only the students but also the 
teachers need to reflect on themselves. 
In her paper, Johnson (2011) argued that CHAT has the potential to improve the 
culturally identified care-based teaching practices because the moral caring activities 
implemented in this program promotes the presence of diverse cultures in the classroom, rather 
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than encouraging the teaching and the promotion of one standard culture.  Ideally, any caring-
based teaching method and the program in which this method is implemented advocates for the 
uniqueness of human beings (Noddings, 1984/2003a/2013, 1995a, 2002a, 2005, 2008, 2015).  
The presence and teaching of unique cultures are considered as an enrichment to have in the 
learning environment, not an obstacle to deal with.  The promotion of the concept of ‘human 
beings are unique’ in Noddings’s TC is the beginning point of Johnson’s (2011) CHAT theory, 
and in her article, Johnson (2011) reported that teachers embracing CHAT use care-oriented 
activities of teaching to build a trusting, compassionate, and solid classroom community.  CHAT 
differs from the other culture-based teaching activities because it connects TC to teaching 
through culture.  As Johnson (2011) reported: 
 By itself, CHAT underscores the importance of cultural-historical situations in action and 
goals; as communal experiences situated in the past, culture and history structure a 
person’s possibilities and identity.  This concept is significant in understanding 
culturally-oriented theories of care, as it signifies that the African American experience is 
not morally irrelevant or defective. (p. 477) 
 
Johnson (2011) connected Noddings’s TC to cultural teaching and she drew attention to 
the fact that the culture we live in shapes our frameworks of morality.  Interested in this fact, 
Metz and Gaie (2010), in their article, discussed how Noddings’s framework of caring might 
share certain characteristics with Ubuntu, a framework originated from the African continent.  
Ubuntu is a concept that is closely associated with the moral thinking present in South Africa, 
and it is the product of the sub-Saharan culture.  Metz and Gaie (2010) used the phrases “A 
person is a person through other persons” (p. 274) or “I am because we are” (p. 274) to 
familiarize the reader with Ubuntu.  According to Metz and Gaie (2010), these phrases represent 
a strong sense of a commitment to the community (i.e., to the other people), and this strong sense 
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of commitment to the other people is also present in Noddings’s TC because Noddings (1984a) 
stated in the first edition of the Caring book: 
 As one-caring, … I seek … completion in the other-the sense of being cared-for and, I 
hope, the renewed commitment of the cared-for to turn about and act as one-caring in the 
circles and chains within which he is defined. Thus, I am not justified but somehow 
fulfilled and completed in my own life and in the lives of those I have thus influenced. (p. 
95) 
 
In their article, Metz and Gaie (2010) also introduced the reader to other characteristic 
traits of Ubuntu; however, they mainly drew on Noddings’s TC when they described how the 
morality of a community mirrors the culture of the community.  As discussed in the article, one 
of the most important and distinctive characteristics of Ubuntu is that it does not prescribe moral 
infractions as burdens for individuals to bear (Metz & Gaie, 2010).  Metz and Gaie (2010) 
argued that, on the contrary, when someone does a moral wrong, it is a wrong of everyone in the 
community; and one way to correct this moral wrong is to revise the conditions of the 
community.  In order to strengthen their discussion, Metz and Gaie (2010) compared Ubuntu 
with Western originated theories of moral philosophy (Kantian moral theory and utilitarianism); 
and criticized the dominance of these theories in moral thinking and moral knowledge: 
 In Western societies, there are two dominant rationales for state punishment of adult 
offenders: retribution and deterrence. The retributive rationale, often associated with a 
Kantian morality, is the view that punishment is justified simply as a fitting response to 
the nature of the crime that was committed, that is, merely because the offender deserves 
it for what he has done. The deterrence rationale, naturally at home in a utilitarian ethic, 
is the view that punishment is justified as a way to instil [sic] fear in the offender and 
others so that they will avoid committing other crimes in the future. (p. 278) 
 
Noddings’s TC and Ubuntu are two important approaches discussed in moral thinking 
and moral education, and they share certain important features (commitment to the surrounding 
community and defiance of the need for principles as argued in certain Western theories).  
Although TC and Ubuntu share these important features and advocate for the commitment to the 
107 
 
community, they differ from each other on identifying who is considered as a member of the 
community.  Compared to Noddings (2003a), Metz and Gaie (2010) embraced a much larger 
scope in defining community and argued that, with Ubuntu, “all human beings are deemed part 
of a family who provide some reason to be responded to out of love” (p. 84).  In fact, unlike 
Noddings (1984/2003a/2013, 2002a), according to Metz and Gaie (2010), being moral in the 
global scale is possible.29  
Noddings’s defiance of the possibility of a global theory motivating people acting 
morally has been the center of an important criticism, and it is frequently mentioned in the 
arguments discussing the status of TC.   Drawing on this limitation, David Carr (2003) 
questioned whether TC might provide a satisfactory ground to describe the culture of a globally 
respected profession, the culture/essence of teaching.  Throughout his article, Carr (2003) 
explained what teaching is as a profession and what education is in the moral sense, and 
discussed the different approaches of ethical theories to teaching as a moral profession.  Unlike 
the authors previously discussed in this chapter, Carr (2003) did not focus on the connection 
between teaching and education through culture and Noddings’s TC; rather, he focused on the 
culture of teaching and the culture’s certain theories of teaching such as Noddings’s TC 
promotes.  He identified these theories as metaphors of education which provide “different 
perspectives on the sources of morality in the interests of a student deserving better systems of 
learning” (Carr, 2003, p. 219)  
In his article, one of the categories Carr (2003) used is Noddings’s TC; and he analyzed 
whether this philosophical perspective is satisfactory enough to define teaching as a profession.  
                                                 
29. As the reader of this dissertation might remember from Chapter 1, Noddings (2002a) claims that being 
moral and forming ethical caring relationships in the global scale is impossible because the influence of the caring 
act will be diminished when the distance between two people, the care and the cared-for increases.  
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Carr (2003) argued that teaching is a moral profession which might be classified using five 
different categories, and each one of these categories is a philosophical perspective used to 
describe teaching as culture.  Carr (2003) conceptualized TC to be an ethical theory, specifically 
designed to echo the voice of women, hence, limiting the care-based teaching to the profession 
of women, aka a job that has a predominantly feminine culture.  According to Carr (2003), if 
teachers internalize this maternal, care focused thinking in their profession, then the teaching 
profession will have a low status within the society because:  
 Although the idea of teachers as caring professionals (construed as members of vocations 
rather than professions) is to some extent generalizable, it may have most immediate 
application to the initial educational years of nursery, infant and primary schooling. 
Indeed, some such assumption seems to have been present in the rather provocative 
suggestion of an erstwhile British politician (John Patten in 1993) that a ‘mum’s army’ 
might be recruited to address staff shortages in early-years education. (p. 228-229) 
 
In his article, Carr (2003) claimed that care-based teaching is feminine because it uses the 
language of the mother, the personal, relational language.  He argued that if the teaching is to be 
categorized as a profession acknowledged in the society, then it should not embrace the culture 
of one group and use the language this group promotes (Carr, 2003).  Carr’s criticism of 
Noddings’s TC and how she limited her theory to one group/gender of people has been part of a 
larger debate occurring in the fields of educational theory, philosophy of education, and moral 
education.  In this debate, scholars have argued why the woman’s voice is required for a better 
education system and how this voice is represented best (Martin, 1987, 2002, 2011; Nussbaum, 
2000, 2004, 2005).  Other authors publishing in JME, whose works are discussed in this 
dissertation, have contributed to the debate between maternal thinking vs.  paternal thinking in 
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education, and most connect TC to maternal thinking because TC uses the language and 
decision-making process of maternal thinking.30 31 
In her article, Jane Zhang (2007) investigated the potential contribution(s) of the maternal 
theories of education to the role of teacher and the culture of teaching found in schools, including 
Noddings’s TC.  Zhang (2007) claimed that the roles of mother and teacher should not be 
combined because we need teachers in classrooms, and combining these two roles would 
“prescribe behaviours for teachers that are often associated with the maternal role; in other 
words, teachers become more like mothers” (p. 516-517).  Throughout her article, Zhang (2007) 
intentionally used the term “mother” instead of “care-giver” to draw attention to the connection 
between the roles of these two individuals while she strengthens her argument.   
Zhang (2007) began her article by providing a detailed description of the influence of the 
maternal theories in education, including how they have contributed to educational research and 
the concept of schooling as we have known since 1960s.  According to Zhang (2007), although 
there have been several characteristics of the maternal theories of education, one common 
characteristic that defines these theories is that they all argue “the home is the place where 
children begin their moral development” (p. 516).  Drawing on this characteristic, the scholars 
(Dalton & Watson, 1997; Goldstein, 1997; Martin, 1992; Noddings, 1984/2003a) defending the 
status of the maternal theories representing this kind of thinking in education and teaching have 
argued that the current gap between the school sphere (public and professional) and the home 
sphere (private and personal) should be narrowed, if not closed completely.  These scholars 
                                                 
30. In Chapter 4, there is a section discussing the connection between Noddings’s TC and the influence of 
maternal thinking in education. 
 
31. For detailed information on how Noddings specifically advocates for the implementation of maternal 





(Dalton & Watson, 1997; Goldstein, 1997; Martin, 1992; Noddings, 1984/2003a) also argued 
that the educational system should be designed to include different voices, particularly the voice 
(experience, ways of thinking and knowledge production) of the woman because maternal values 
are “richly applicable to teaching” (Noddings, 1988, p. 220). 
In her article, Zhang (2007) argued that teaching should be provided a more professional 
identity, and one way of providing this identity is to separate it from the identities of mothering 
and caring.  Zhang (2007) continued her article by stating that, without drawing boundaries 
between teaching and mothering/caring, the profession of teaching might be considered as 
burdensome for teachers.  In Zhang’s (2007) opinion, a teacher may acknowledge the fact that 
he/she may make mistakes while teaching as he/she knows that nobody is perfect.  However, “A 
mother knows that only perfect care and perfect teaching is good enough for their kids” (Zhang, 
2007, p. 523).   
Another argument Zhang (2007) constructed in defense of the separation of teaching 
from mothering/caring is that, in most classrooms, teachers are accountable for up to 40 students, 
and they have professional obligations (disciplining the classroom, teaching the curriculum, and 
grading their learning) to take care.  In contrast to teachers, mothers only deal with “either a 
single child or on a relatively small group of siblings” (Zhang, 2007, p. 522), and they are only 
responsible for that kid.  In contrast to Noddings (2005),32 Zhang (2007) claimed that to care for 
a student in the classroom like a mother does for her child is problematic because attending to 
                                                 
32. In her article, Noddings (2005) refutes the strict professional framework designed for teaching and 
defends that a teacher has to have enough time to care for each student like a mother does.  According to Noddings 
(2005), good teaching requires good caring and ideally, teachers will have enough time to care and to educate their 
students through the ethical caring relationships they formed in their classrooms if the teachers are not pressured to 
teach for the tests.  
111 
 
the needs of “a single child or relatively small group in the classroom will result in the exclusion 
of others” (p. 522). 
In her article, Zhang (2007) claimed that, as a profession, teaching requires more than 
caring; hence, the professional teaching should not be understood merely as caring, as suggested 
in TC.  Concerned with the perspective of treating teaching as caring, Zhang (2007), in her 
article, stated that “Rather than viewing a mother as a second-class educator, or a teacher as a 
second-class care-giver, we must learn to treasure the distinctions that exist in those two 
complementary but different roles” (p. 525).  Since Zhang’s critiquing statement is the 
representation of a criticism frequently voiced by certain scholars (Isenbarger & Zembylas, 
2006), how Noddings (1988, 2002a, 2013) has responded to it is presented here. 
In several publications, Noddings (1988, 2002a, 2013) responded to the critics 
(Isenbarger & Zembylas, 2006) who argued that caring is a burdensome task for teachers as 
teachers do not have the luxury of devoting time to form caring relationships with their students 
or care for each student.  To respond to this criticism, Noddings (1988) first clarified the true 
meaning of teaching, then explained that caring is a natural task a good teacher undertakes as 
he/she already spends a significant amount of time to relate to his/her students and care for them 
(Noddings, 1995b, 1995c, 2003b).  Being confident with the framework she has constituted for 
the teachers, Noddings (2013b, 2015, 2016) has continued to discuss that caring is not an extra or 
burdensome task for teachers and argued that teaching for testing is a burdensome task for 
teachers to deal with.   
Because of the language Noddings preferred to employ while constructing TC and how 
she identified caring as the motivating guide to be moral, many critics of Noddings pointed out 
that TC is a gender-centered theory of moral education.  Acknowledging the validity of these 
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critics’ concerns in the last edition of her Caring book, Noddings (2013) stated: “I think critics 
are right, however, to point out that the connotations of “feminine” are off-putting and do not 
capture what I intended to convey.  Relational is a better word” (Preface section).   
The next theme present in this chapter is the representation of the debate discussing the 
status of this gender-centered theory of moral education, and this debate may also be found in 
other relevant fields of research, such as moral philosophy and philosophy of education. 
Noddings’s TC as a Theory in The Field of Moral Education 
Several articles used in this analysis discussed Noddings’s TC and its “fit” with the field 
of moral education as a full and legitimate theory of moral education.  It is not surprising for one 
to encounter this debate in the field of moral education as it has occurred in other frequently 
interacted fields of research.  While discussing whether TC should be considered as a full and 
legitimate theory of moral education, three different authors have focused on the foundational 
weaknesses and strengths of Noddings’s theory and have compared it with other theories of 
morality and moral education, including the well-known theory of John Rawls(1971), Theory of 
Justice.33  Stephen Sherblom (2008, 2009) is one of these authors, and he has written two articles 
about the scope and the legitimacy of Noddings’s TC in the field of moral education. 
In his first article on this subject, Sherblom (2008) reported the new improvements in this 
debate and provided more information regarding the current state of this debate; then he 
                                                 
33. John Rawls has created the mature form of his Theory of Justice at 1971; and his theory is based on two 
major concepts: freedom and equality.  In his work, Rawls (1971) drew attention to the relation between the concept 
of justice and the concept of equality and argued that without the distribution of equal rights there will be no just 
society.  To make his point, he wants us to imagine standing behind a hypothetical Veil of Ignorance and decide 
what kind of society we would choose to live if there is no way to know which position (privileged or not) we would 
occupy.  His answer to this question is “in a society, in which one has a good chance of living due to the equal rights 
provided even if he or she ends up in the worst position possible” because the rational individual knows that equal 
distribution of the rights and duties are necessary to have this good chance of living.  This answer frames an ideally 
just society in which one has no special privileges and rights due to the relationships or special circumstances he/she 




documented the power/influence of care ethics in the research on moral thinking while assessing 
the legitimacy of TC.  After briefly summarizing the debate between care ethics and 
objective/justice ethics, Sherblom (2008) identified the real intention of care ethicists when they 
challenge justice ethicists as “to complement and integrate the philosophical and the 
psychological aspects of carebased [sic] moral response into a broader and more global 
conception of moral development” (p. 82). 
In this article, Sherblom (2008) structured his analysis/evaluation of the care challenge in 
moral education and moral psychology using a plan composed of two phases; thus, he divides his 
article into two main sections.  In the first section of his article, Sherblom (2008) detailed the 
empirical question(s) surrounding care ethics, and this section is more focused on how Gilligan 
has changed the interpretation of Kohlberg’s scale.  In the second section of his article, Sherblom 
(2008) investigated how care ethics contributed to the field of moral psychology, and this is the 
section in which Sherblom pays significant attention to Noddings’s TC and how TC has 
replaced, or at least attempted to replace, certain philosophical tenets in moral thinking and 
moral behavior. 
In the first section of his article, Sherblom (2008) argued that the empirical evidence 
provided by Gilligan (1982) has been powerful enough to change Kohlberg’s Moral Judgment 
Scale constructed upon individual justice thinking and to include the moral value care, the 
woman’s voice to the field of moral psychology.  Sherblom (2008) approached the gender bias 
claim of Gilligan to be the “smaller [less important] claim regarding bias in early versions of 
Kohlberg’s MJI scoring procedure” (p. 94).  This change has also led to other changes in the 
fields of moral psychology and moral education, and Sherblom (2008) considered Noddings’s 
TC to be one of these changes.      
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In the second section of his article, Sherblom (2008) provided a detailed explanation of 
how Noddings’s TC has been successful in changing the rhetoric in the field of moral thinking 
and moral psychology by describing Kohlberg’s treatment of the women’s moral values.  In 
Kohlbergian moral thinking, the moral values promoted in Noddings’s theory are “nice values to 
have” (Sherblom, 2008, p. 92); however, it does not identify these values as necessary to make 
ethical decisions.  According to Sherblom (2008), care ethicists have encouraged others to study 
these values (building relationships, being sensitive to others’ needs, and being in a caring 
dialogue with others to learn more information about the problems affecting them) and been able 
to sell these as a new skill set necessary to defining moral thinking and moral behaviors in the 
fields of moral philosophy, moral education, and philosophy of education.  Sherblom (2008) 
described this to be a bigger challenge for the care ethicists to tackle, and he believed they have 
been successful with this challenge.  His second article, which was published in this journal a 
year later, is a sequel article documenting why care ethicists, particularly Noddings, has been 
successful. 
In his second article (chronologically speaking), Sherblom (2009) argued that care 
ethicists, especially Noddings, have been successful with the inclusion of the moral value care 
and women’s experiences in moral thinking and moral education while analyzing the factors 
behind their success.  In Sherblom’s (2009) opinion, these care ethicists have been successful 
because they have articulately defended the inclusion of certain concepts of care ethics in moral 
education in a way that these concepts would make sense to everyone.  Moreover, since “The 
care perspective embraces a moral epistemology and deliberative process that legitimates 
affectively acquired knowledge, such as empathic perspective-taking or other compassionate 
attention to the welfare of others” (Sherblom, 2009, p. 92), it has become an appealing approach 
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to be implemented in the field of moral education or any kind of education that has a moral 
purpose.  Therefore, Sherblom (2009) appraised TC and concluded that it deserves its place as a 
legitimate theory in moral education. 
In this second article, Sherblom (2009) was especially drawn to the concept of 
engrossment, one of the major components of the ethical caring relationships that Noddings’s TC 
is built upon.  Sherblom (2009) reported that the most significant contribution of Noddings’s TC 
in the field of moral education is her noble effort of bringing new concepts, such as attention and 
engrossment, to discuss in the field of moral education.  Even this effort is satisfactory enough to 
consider as a legitimate theory in this field because TC “allows us to concern ourselves with 
aspects of moral engagement that are otherwise unavailable” (Sherblom, 2009, p. 72), and we 
need these aspects of moral engagement as they are part of the real, practical human life.  When I 
analyzed the articles published in JME between the years of 2003 and 2013, I noticed that 
Sherblom is not the only one interested in the foundational concepts of TC.  David Carr (2005a) 
has also paid attention to the foundational concepts of TC, particularly to the concept of 
engrossment.  
In his article, (Carr, 2005a) analyzed the scope of engrossment in moral thinking, while 
he discussed the place and function of emotions in moral thinking and moral education.  
Understanding the real-life conditions of other people, and using emotions, including 
engrossment, empathy, and compassion as tools to frame and evaluate one’s moral thinking is a 
relatively new perspective attracting attention in the field of moral education.  In his article, 
before announcing its success, Carr (2005a) inquired whether this new perspective–Noddings’s 
TC–may or may not provide satisfactory answers to the questions posed in this field.  In his 
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article, Carr (2005a) identified Noddings’s TC as a theory of affective thinking and one of the 
main trends found in the field of moral education.   
In his article, Carr (2005a) explained the main trends prevalent in moral education while 
setting up the stage for the reader.  According to Carr (2005a), these trends are Kantian thinking, 
utilitarian thinking, character education, Kohlberg’s moral development theory, and, finally, 
Noddings’s TC.  Being unconfident with Noddings’s challenge to the reliance on moral 
reasoning and principled thinking in the traditional sense; Carr (2005a) approached TC with an 
understandable level of doubt and he expressed a potential limitation/caveat on this theory: “For 
one thing, it is far from clear how or in what sense the more affective aspects of human 
attachment or value are implicated in moral formation” (p. 138). 
In his paper, Carr (2005a) reported that Noddings’s stark challenge to/departure from the 
moral reasoning and principled thinking has become a serious limitation for the TC.  It has 
become a serious limitation because this departure may result in having an unprincipled, or in 
other words, an untheoretical nature and this is an undesired situation for TC because if TC does 
not have a theoretical foundation, then: “It is hard to get a very clear theoretical handle on care 
ethics” (2005a, p. 139).  Also, without this theoretical foundation, the status of TC as a legitimate 
theory of moral philosophy and moral education will always be questionable.   
In Carr’s (2005a) view, there is one way out of this problematic situation for the care 
ethicist, and particularly for Noddings.  Carr (2005a) determined this way as re-identifying care 
as a virtue in the Aristotelian sense; however, Noddings (2000) dismissed that possibility by 
claiming it would not represent the true nature of care and she missed the opportunity of 
development.  Being unhappy with Noddings’s dismissal of this suggestion, Carr (2005a) 
claimed TC should not be considered as a full and legitimate theory in moral education and 
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equates Noddings’s TC merely to a new perspective, which has been very influential in moral 
education.  One aspect of this influence has presented itself in the debate on how to educate 
students to be moral individuals, and this is the next theme to be discussed in this chapter. 
Noddings’s TC and Educating Morally 
One theme that has been discussed in the articles in JME is how Noddings’s TC 
contributes to the discussion of moral education and global moral thinking.  Since 1984, the first 
time Noddings fully articulated her theory in the Caring book, the advantages and the limitations 
of TC have drawn the attention of scholars.  This attention has lasted for decades, and has been 
the focus of this dissertation, and I do not think it will die out soon as the citation numbers for all 
three editions of this book increase day by day.  In JME, speaking for the selected time frame, 
three different authors have discussed how this theory contributes to the construction of the new 
programs implemented in moral education in micro scales and to the teaching of morality as in 
increasing an awareness of being moral and morally educating the individuals on a macro scale. 
In his article, Graham Haydon (2006) analyzed the potential of constructing a global 
perspective in moral education and moral citizenship, and his analysis includes Noddings’s TC.  
He argued that moral respect provides a more solid ground compared to love or care if the aim is 
to build a clear perspective of global moral citizenship (Haydon, 2006).  Throughout the article, 
Haydon (2006) inquired whether there is a moral value that might have the potential to be the 
basis of moral global citizenship.  His answer to this question is not one single value.  It is a 
plurality of values; however, one value is of special importance to Haydon when it came to the 
cultivation of moral citizenship in the global sense, and this value is moral respect. 34  Haydon 
                                                 
34. Haydon (2006) derivates the concept of moral respect from the concept of human respect, which is 
already present in Kant’s moral theory.  According to Kant (1785/1993), one should not use another individual as a 
mean to his or her own end because each human being is worthy of respect.  
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(2006) structured moral respect as an umbrella value that “involves recognizing value in 
someone or something independently of its relationship to one’s own desires, preferences [sic] 
and goals” (p. 466).   
One of the characteristics of Noddings’s TC that Haydon (2006) drew on is its 
incapability of responding to the needs of everyone in this world, for example, to the needs of 
people starving or the education policies harming students’ rights in Africa.  In Haydon’s (2006) 
view, this is a serious limitation for Noddings because, understandably, the concept of moral 
citizenship in the global sense includes the students in Africa regardless of their distance from 
Noddings.  Haydon (2006) compared moral care to moral respect and preferred moral respect 
over care as “There is an element of distance–of the recognition of the other as other–inherent in 
respect that does not seem to be similarly inherent in love or in caring, interpreted in Noddings’s 
way” (p. 463). 
Haydon (2006) criticized Noddings’s TC by stating that the theory has been inadequate to 
provide a solid ground for the discussion of the rights of citizens in the global society.  Moral 
citizenship in the global sense is a much broader concept to discuss compared to the concept of 
citizenship in the state sense.  According to Haydon (2006), in TC, it is almost impossible for the 
act of caring to carry itself beyond personal relationships of an individual to a state’s citizen 
because:  
 When it (caring) is detached from the contexts of direct interpersonal relationships, the 
idea of the citizen having a caring attitude towards others can easily slip into the sort of 
benevolence that can be patronizing, in which the one caring operates with their own idea 
of what is good for the other. (p. 161)  
 
In Haydon’s (2006) view, moral respect is a better ground for constructing a framework 
of global moral education because a moral education program designed accordingly with 
Noddings’s TC is more concerned with how people positively respond to each other within 
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ethical caring relations.  Additionally, in contrast to caring, moral respect does not have this 
limitation of benevolence to the citizens of one state and one society.  In fact, Haydon’s (2006) 
definition of moral respect is required in moral education because, through moral respect: 
 people can see themselves as global citizens (though whether they will do so is heavily 
dependent on the kind of education they receive) and thereby can also see others as 
global citizens, who as citizens of the same world have an equal standing. People can, 
therefore, have respect for others as citizens of the same world, and this does add 
something to simply having respect for persons. (p. 463) 
 
Haydon (2006) accurately interpreted Noddings’s TC as a moral theory of education 
which motivates students and teachers to do the right thing through implementing “care.”  If a 
scholar wants to build a moral definition of global citizenship embracing Noddings’s theory, then 
to that definition he or she will have to include that a caring teacher should teach the care for 
other cultures too.  At first, this noble idea might please the individuals; however, without 
knowing and being related to other cultures, it is impossible for a teacher to do this.  Haydon 
(2006) argued–this requirement–to teach the care of other cultures and relate to each one of the 
students’ culture while teaching is very difficult to fulfill.  Thus, according to Haydon (2006), if 
the educators and students want to have a full understanding of global moral citizenship, then 
they might find the moral respect framework he proposed to be beneficial: 
 To focus on respect rather than celebration may help educators and their students to take 
a more sober [sic] view. Diversity in human culture is important because it opens up 
possibilities for human achievement and flourishing that would otherwise never have 
developed. At the same time, unavoidably, it opens up possibilities of disagreement and 
conflict. We should respect the diversity of human cultural contexts, not only in the sense 
that we respect a positive achievement, but also in the sense that we can respect 
something of importance that is outside our individual control, not to be ignored or trifled 
with. (Haydon, 2006, p. 469) 
 
In her article, Hermenegilde Rwantabagu (2010) discussed the position Haydon held was 
wrong and argued that Noddings’s theory has not been in a disadvantageous position. On the 
contrary, according to Rwantabagu (2010), Noddings’s TC may be applied in other countries and 
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may provide a fertile and satisfactory ground to a global perspective that might be used in moral 
education.  Rwantabagu is a scholar from Burundi, which is a country located in East Africa, and 
she analyzed that a moral education program (a pilot program) has the potential to prevent future 
conflicts to happen in this violence-shaken country.  The pilot program she analyzed was utilized 
in the schools of Burundi in 2005, and according to Rwantabagu (2010), it employed a care 
centered perspective in education, particularly practicing moral education benefiting from the 
influence of community.   
In her article, Rwantabagu (2010) argued that the aim of this program was “to realise an 
‘all-round human education’ based on the appropriation, by children and youth, of basic moral 
standards and their integration into daily life at school, in the family, and in the community” (p. 
349).  To achieve this aim, according to Rwantabagu (2010) the instructors of this program have 
identified a core, umbrella orientation which “is based on what Noddings and Slote (2005) called 
the ‘communitarian’ approach” (p. 349).  The instructors determined this approach would be 
more suitable to their country specific needs; therefore, be more advantageous to be utilized 
around the schools because the caring “‘communitarians…hold, contrary to Kant, that it is only 
in relation to community values, traditions [sic] and good habits acquired in their context that we 
can become morally virtuous’ (Noddings & Slote, 2007, p. 342). They add that we become moral 
individuals only within a community with its tradition” (Rwantabagu, 2010, p. 349). 
In her article, Rwantabagu (2010) claimed that one of the fundamental values of the 
Burundi society is the wellness of the community, and education is the way to preserve this value 
while improving the wellness of the community at the same time.  The wellness of the 
community and the commitment to it have also been an important part of Noddings’s TC 
because one learns to be moral through the relationships he/she has with his/her community.  
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Advancing this argument further, Rwantabagu (2010) stressed the importance of the community 
in a child’s education by stating that: 
 Education was too important to be left to parents alone. … the community may be 
considered [as] a wall-less school, each community member is expected to supplement 
the family’s efforts in the upbringing of young people. The extended family and the 
public at large acted as … objective judges and examiners of the behavioural standards 
attained by the young people in their communities. As a result of this community-based 
feedback to their parents, young people had the opportunity to adjust or to reinforce their 
action in the light of the evaluation received. (p. 348) 
 
In Chapter 1, I have discussed that Noddings’s TC objects to one’s or any education 
program/curriculum’s heavy reliance on rules or principles (Noddings, 2002a, 2003a/2013, 
2005).  Rwantabagu (2010) embraced this feature of Noddings’s theory while designing the pilot 
moral education program utilized in Burundi; thus, the program introduced in this article has no 
strict rules to follow or does not prescribe how a teacher should conduct lessons to cultivate the 
traditional values of the educational caring society.  On the contrary, according to Rwantabagu 
(2010), this program has had only six important educational tenets to follow and the lessons 
structured around these tenets may be conducted in outside settings, particularly in settings 
where caring activities naturally take place: 
 Lessons may take place within the walls of the classroom or outside, with occasional 
visits to hospitals or to homes of destitute elderly people as an outworking of the moral 
values of compassion and solidarity. Above all, the learners are encouraged to practise 
and ‘live by’ what they have learnt, because a moral value that is known but not practiced 
is of no value. (Rwantabagu, 2010, p. 350) 
 
In her research, Rwantabagu (2010) argued that her program was successful in 
transferring the values of the community to the students, meaning that the education program 
structured around Noddings’s TC was influential enough in improving the moral development of 
the students.  Roger Bergman (2004) undertook a larger project compared to Rwantabagu 
(2010); however, his aim was similar: a comprehensive evaluation of the influence of 
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Noddings’s TC in the field of moral education.  While undertaking this project, Bergman (2004) 
investigated the possibility of incorporating women’s morality into educational thinking using 
Noddings’s perspective of moral care, and to understand this perspective better, Bergman (2004) 
posed the questions “What is Noddings’s vision of the moral life? How do moral obligation and 
motivation arise?  How can education contribute to the moral life of students?” (p. 150).  
Throughout the article, Bergman (2004) not only analyzed TC in detail, but also discussed the 
similarities between two important approaches employed in moral education: care-based 
education and virtue based character education. 
In his article, Bergman (2004) set the stage by introducing TC before discussing these 
similarities.  In the first half of this article, he explained how Noddings envisioned ethical life 
through caring.  Ethical care uses the language of the mother, and Noddings pointed out the fact 
that the cared-for is dependent on the carer.  This section looks like a detailed instruction manual 
for understanding Noddings’s TC and her vision of moral education through caring.  Simply 
stating, in this section Bergman (2004) explained what constitutes moral thinking in this 
perspective and what to expect from Noddings’s TC in the field of moral education.  According 
to Bergman (2004), “Noddings’s probing analysis of the phenomenon of human caring is 
perhaps her single most significant contribution to our understanding of the moral life” (p. 150). 
The second half of this article is the part where Bergman (2004) particularly drew on TC 
because it is this part of the article, in which he analyzes the stance of Noddings’s TC in 
comparison with character education constructed upon Aristotle’s virtue ethics theory.  In 
Bergman’s opinion (2004), a moral education program based on Noddings’s TC might be 
classified as a feminine variant of character education if one modifies it thoroughly, as the two 
share important characteristics.  According to Bergman (2004), these important characteristics 
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are important to mention as they are the foundational tenets of care-based moral education and 
virtue-based character education: 
 Both character and care proponents agree that moral education should be directed at 
producing better people and not just better principles or reasoning. Nonetheless, and 
secondly, both care and character educators do value moral reasoning, … neither group 
believes moral principles themselves provide sufficient motivation for moral action. 
Thirdly, care theorists certainly respect the virtues.  (p. 156)  
 
Bergman (2004) continued his analysis by arguing that Noddings was mistaken when she 
claimed that virtue-based character education is promoting only a passive, individualistic, and 
rigid system of teaching and learning by stressing character education model is offering more 
than that.  Moreover, according to Bergman (2004), caring might be considered as a different 
form of virtue because Aristotle has introduced relation centered virtues in his theories such as 
friendship.   Therefore, Bergman (2004) concluded Noddings’s criticizing/distinguishing 
argument of character education model and Virtue Ethics Theory is not strong enough  
In Bergman’s (2004) opinion, another problem Noddings encountered with separating the 
two approaches employed in moral education from each other is that similar to care centered 
education, virtue-based character education is also condition dependent.  In his article, Bergman 
(2004) reported that even though some virtue ethicists promoting character education argued for 
the direct instruction of the teaching of virtues, in his book Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle (2004) 
never suggested the direct instruction of the teaching of virtues in a classroom.  On the contrary, 
Aristotle (2004) identified moral education as an active process of learning because the practice 
of the virtues is crucially important for one’s internalization and excelling of the virtues.  Moving 
from this point, Bergman (2004) claimed that interpreting character education as a passive model 
of moral education is inaccurate and scholars such as Noddings (2002a) are simply mistaken if 
they interpret character education so.  With his article, Bergman (2004) reminded these scholars 
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the point that practice is at the center of Virtue Ethics Theory and ideally, at the center of the 
character education approach before discussing the strengths and the weakness of Noddings’s 
TC. 
The third and last section of Bergman’s article (2004) is about how Noddings has 
accomplished incorporating women’s values to theoretical moral thinking and the field of moral 
education through several of her publications.  In Bergman’s (2004) opinion, in implementing a 
two step plan, Noddings has attempted to redefine ethics using the perspective of women.  
Bergman (2004) identified the first step as pointing out why women’s thinking has been 
categorized as problematic and evil in the Western tradition of theology35 and in a field of 
research internalizing this theology.  According to Bergman (2004), Noddings’s second step is to 
incorporate female thinking into moral thinking and to prove that the language of this evil, the 
woman, does not command diabolic things.   
Feeling satisfied with Noddings’s argument on women’s language only aims to develop a 
better self by supporting a more practical and earthly moral thinking, Bergman (2004) claimed in 
her crusade to prove that women do not deserve the titles (evil, diabolic, or half) dehumanizing 
them, Noddings has been successful.  While feeling satisfied, Bergman (2004) warned the reason 
for Noddings’s success is only based on her redefinition of moral thinking.  Unlike the men’s 
language representing the Western tradition of theology, this new and alternate language based 
on caring relationships discusses one does not have to be in “pain, separation, and helplessness” 
                                                 
35. John Milton (1667/2007) was a representative of this tradition, and in his long poem titled Paradise 
Lost, he poetically argued that one needed to embrace the ways of male thinking in moral living to re-enter the 
paradise.  Noddings opposes to this argument and offers not just an alternative way of moral living to reach to 
paradise, but also an alternative concept of paradise in her book titled Women and Evil (1989).  According to 
Noddings (1989), since Milton has already equated the moral ways of living male thinking, he leaves women no 
choice but possessing the category of evil if they insist on not to conform to the male thinking.  In Noddings’s 
(1989, 2003a) view, this is an inaccurate picture of moral living as women’s way of moral thinking also has the 




(Bergman, 2004, p. 160) to be moral and live morally.  According to Bergman (2004), the road 
to live morally through caring is free of these limitations; however, has its own flaws, 
particularly with its reading of Virtue Ethics Theory and character education. 
One of the building blocks of care education is to relate to students and help them benefit 
from these relationships when they are in the process of developing a better self and being moral.  
This connection between Noddings’s TC and relational thinking in moral education is the next 
theme analyzed in this chapter.    
Noddings’s TC and Relational Thinking in Moral Education 
The final theme that has been constructed through the ideas discussed in these articles is 
on how authors publishing on the aspects of relational thinking have included TC in their 
conversations and pointed out the connection between TC and relational thinking.  Since the very 
beginning, Noddings’s TC has been a relational theory of ethics that promotes the cultivation of 
moral thinking through the implementation of the ethical caring relationships.  TC stressed the 
importance of having caring relationships in the educational settings and educating the students 
through these relationships.  Caring educators know the importance of these relationships, while 
they also know that they “affect the lives of students not just in what we teach them by way of 
subject matter but in how we relate to them as persons” (Noddings, 2003c, p. 250).  Focusing on 
this relational tenet of Noddings’s theory, four different authors have discussed how Noddings’s 
TC contributes to the concept of relational thinking in moral education.   
In his article, Mark Tappan (2006) inquired how care perspective can be used to interpret 
the judgments of young people and to improve these judgments.  During his inquiry, Tappan 
(2006) drew on one of the main abilities promoted in Noddings’s TC: putting yourself in other’s 
shoes.  Tappan’s perspective, the socio-cultural action perspective, is structured upon this ability 
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as Tappan (2006) connected Noddings’s TC to his perspective and determined it is capable of 
describing the motivation for the moral behaviors of human beings.   
The research data provided in this article is composed of Tappan’s interview with a 
young woman describing how she has solved her moral problem/dilemma with her roommate.  
While reflecting on this woman’s moral dilemma and the decision-making process she uses to 
handle this troubled situation, Tappan (2006) elaborated on his “socio-cultural action” 
perspective and told the reader how Noddings’s TC might be used to analyze this woman’s 
decision.  According to Tappan (2006), the purpose of the socio-cultural action perspective is “to 
explore the relationship between the individual and the social, cultural, historical and 
institutional contexts in which the individual lives” (p. 3) and it imitates Noddings’s TC in its 
approach, while explaining how one solves the moral problems in real life. 
In his article, Tappan (2006) discussed how the individual he interviewed with, a student 
using this socio-cultural perspective, has altered her behavior based on the cultural values and 
the people with whom she interacted. In fact, according to Tappan (2006), the social 
relationships formed within her environment had been more influential in altering or shaping 
these behaviors compared to the written moral rules as the data proved.  In his article, according 
to Tappan (2006), the student using Tappan’s socio-cultural perspective discussed that she had to 
rely on her social and cultural experiences because the written rules had failed her in solving her 
problem and making the right decision.   
In his article, Tappan (2006) also defended that moral thinking is a developmental 
process, which includes two important components: emotional thinking and putting yourself in 
the other’s shoes to understand the situation while making a decision.  These also happen to be 
the important characteristics of Noddings’s TC, as TC encourages individuals to understand the 
127 
 
conditions of the cared individual (Noddings, 2003a).  Through TC, Noddings (2003a) discussed 
one needed to have a certain degree of the capacity of emotional learning and this capacity is 
improved through these relationships.  In his article, Tappan (2006) embraced this discussion of 
Noddings, while including TC in his socio-cultural perspective and detailing how TC has 
contributed to our understanding of the role of emotions in the framing of moral thinking and 
moral behaviors.   
According to Tappan (2006), the social conditions one lives in defines one’s capacity of 
emotional and moral thinking as these conditions determine with whom and how one builds 
relationships.  Through these relationships (ideally, they are ethical caring relationships), one 
improves his/her capacity of emotional thinking.  This capacity of emotional thinking is 
connected to our capacity of moral thinking, because emotions enrich/improve our moral 
thinking as we learn to socialize with other people (Tappan, 2006).  Tappan (2006) 
acknowledged that Noddings’s most important contribution to moral thinking and moral 
education is her explanation of the place of emotions in moral thinking, particularly how these 
emotions may explain the change(s) in our behaviors.   In her research, Eva Skoe (2010) found 
how emotional thinking is linked to the moral thinking of an individual and presented the 
findings of her study supporting Noddings’s argument of emotions. 
In her article published in JME, Skoe (2010) investigated how emotional thinking is 
related to men’s and women’s care-oriented moral development.  Skoe (2010) employed a 
quantitative research design, in which she used control and experiment groups of human beings.  
According to Skoe (2010), the data representing the results of her experiment supported 
Noddings’s argument that emotional responses enrich the critical thinking skills we have and the 
behaviors we perform because they help us to adapt to our environment.  Skoe (2010) 
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determined that motivational displacement and engrossment are the sampling emotional 
responses that help us to adapt to our environment; and these emotional responses have an 
important place in Noddings’s TC.   
Working through one of these emotional responses, motivational displacement, we can 
relate to the people surrounding us, move beyond our own interests, and react to their situation 
using our capacity of emotional thinking.  In Noddings’s (1984/2003a/2013) words, motivational 
displacement happens when the moral agent begins “feeling with” and “receive the other” (p. 
30).  Moreover, through motivational displacement, the caring moral agent begins to think for 
two different people, himself/herself and the other, and this is a skill needed in the practical real 
life because it helps people to become better reflective and transformative thinkers and better 
persons, who are caring and emotionally well (Skoe, 2010; Thayer-Bacon, 1997, 2003). 
Continuing with the theme of TC and its connection to relational thinking and moral 
education, Jonathan Friday (2004), in his article, analyzed the problematic characteristics of 
moral theories that embrace universal and impartial thinking in acting morally and how these 
theories are implemented to moral education.  Throughout his article, Friday (2004) also argued 
that even though certain moral theories (utilitarianism and Kantian moral theory) have claimed to 
offer satisfactory solutions to moral dilemmas in real life, their claims may not be so strong 
because “the procedure by which the theory-driven applied ethicist arrives at moral conclusions 
does not involve moral thinking at all” (Friday, 2004, p. 23).  Friday (2004) did not list the 
names of the theories that did not involve moral thinking; however, he hinted that utilitarianism 
and Kantian ethics were the ones he focused on.  
Earlier chapters of this dissertation provided information describing utilitarianism and 
Kantian moral theory, but a summary of these ethical theories here might be of assistance to the 
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reader.  Utilitarianism is a theory developed by Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832)36 and John Stuart 
Mill (1806-1873).  37 This ethical theory makes the distinction between right and wrong, good 
and evil, by looking solely at the outcomes/consequences of preferring one action over other 
actions and performing or not performing that action.  In utilitarian thinking, there is only one 
guiding principle to behave morally, and that principle commands to “perform the action that 
will improve the greater good around the society” (Mill, 1864/1998).  This principle is 
universally valid, meaning that it does not depend on the conditions or the personal traits of the 
individual performing the action.  The assumption in this moral theory is that the moral thing to 
do is universal, and Friday (2004) summarized the basic assumption of utilitarianism as “good 
moral thinking (doing the right thing) consists of the unbiased application of normative moral 
theory to particular circumstances” (p. 24). 
In contrast to utilitarianism, Kantian moral theory focuses on the intention of the moral 
agent when he/she performs the action while considering the consequences of the agent’s action 
as irrelevant.  Kant’s moral theory does not attribute any importance to the consequences of 
actions because the consequence of an action should not have any bearing on the decision one 
                                                 
36. Jeremy Bentham was an English philosopher and a politician, who contributed and/or shaped the 
philosophical thought in the continental Europe.  He had a wide range of area of research; yet he is mostly known 
for his work in moral philosophy as he became one of the founders of utilitarianism with John Stuart Mill.  He 
provided the solid theoretical ground necessary for this theory as he discussed why individuals should aim to 
improve the greater good among the society when they acted.  When making his case in An Introduction to the 
Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789/2010), he benefited from his intellectual richness in economics, laws, 
and politics; and offered a number of reforms in these fields.  Considering the conditions of his era, Bentham was a 
radical as he defended the improvement of the women’s rights, abolition of the slavery, and the separation of the 
state from the church in the 18th and 19th centuries of the UK. 
 
37. John Stuart Mill was an English philosopher and a social reformist, who constructed the theoretical 
foundation(s) of the utilitarianism.  Just like his predecessor Jeremy Bentham, Mill had a wide range of area of 
research; but he is widely known for the establishment and development of utilitarianism.  In his work, 
Utilitarianism, Mill discussed what utilitarianism is, what might provide the most happiness to the individual (the 
categorization of the utilities/pleasures), and claimed he found the proof for utilitarianism.  He argued that women 
should have equal rights with men because like men they should have a right to vote and participate to the governing 
system.  He also discussed that the hindering of the woman was an unwanted heritage of the ancient times, the dark 
ages of the Europe; therefore, it should be ended.  
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makes.  Instead, in Kant’s (1785/1993) view, the consequences prove to be unreliable and 
irrelevant; therefore, we need to be concerned whether the action conforms to the universal law, 
and focus on the performing agent’s intentions.  This is something to which Friday (2004) drew 
attention: 
 The distinction between good and bad moral thinking is not to be found in the 
conclusions reached through such thought, but rather in whether or not the thinker has 
structured their thought in accordance with the demands of moral theory.  (p. 24)  
 
According to Friday (2004), even though the philosophers arguing in defense of these 
theories and their practical implementations in moral education programs have good intentions, 
they ignore one important fact: the teaching of a moral theory through teaching its rules does not 
guarantee to improve the moral development of the individual.  In his work, Friday (2004) was 
particularly concerned with this limitation and how it influences the decision-making process of 
utilitarian thinking compared to other theories of moral philosophy, as it promotes the 
impartial/neutral/objective reasoning in moral thinking.  According to Friday (2004), the moral 
theories structured to be conditional do support the development of moral thinking better as these 
theories are not dependent on the rules or teaching of these rules.   
In his article, Friday (2004) identified TC as a conditional/situational theory of moral 
education and argued that Noddings’s TC is in a far more advantageous position in the 
successful teaching of morality compared to universal theories of morality because it teaches 
individuals to assess each condition independent of a moral rule.  Thus, the success of a care-
based education program is not dependent on the teaching of the moral rules; rather, it is 
dependent on the individuals and their understanding of the conditions.  Considering this, Friday 
(2004) argued that lacking this feature, principled theories of moral philosophy and “the study of 
such moral theory and its application to moral problems will not make one a better moral 
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thinker” (p. 24).  On the contrary, Friday (2004) concluded that, since TC is conditionally a care-
based educational program may produce better thinkers who are capable of making decisions 
based on the conditions. 
In Friday’s (2004) opinion, what makes one a better moral thinker and improves one’s 
moral judgment is not the premise and the description of the procedure applied relying upon this 
premise.  On the contrary, the study of a moral theory and its implementation in moral thinking 
make one a better person and a better thinker when one realizes that it is the right thing to do for 
that person at that time, and this right thing changes based on the conditions in which he or she 
lives.  This is reflective of the framework Noddings’s TC provides as Noddings (2003a) 
explained why she opposed the belief that good moral thinking is equivalent to principle based 
moral thinking:  
 What we do depends not upon rules, or at least not wholly on rules— not upon a prior 
determination of what is fair or equitable— but upon a constellation of conditions that is 
viewed through both the eyes of the one-caring and the eyes of the cared-for.  (p. 13-14) 
 
Friday’s (2004) analysis supported the argument that Noddings’s TC is a relational theory 
of moral thinking and promotes the formation and maintenance of these ethical caring 
relationships by educating morally rather than the implementation of the strict moral imperatives 
on which other moral education theories/frameworks rely.  The final article discussed in this 
section analyzed the quality of the specific arguments made by Noddings.  In his second article 
on Noddings’s TC, Bergman (2007b) reviewed the quality and the strength of the theoretical 
discussions of Happiness and Education (2003b), and Critical Lessons: What Our Schools 
Should Teach but Do Not (2006), both written by Nel Noddings.  [Recall that in a different 
article, Bergman (2004) analyzed TC and compared it with Virtue Ethics Theory.]  
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In the review of Happiness and Education (Noddings, 2003b), Bergman (2007b) 
discussed Noddings’s care-based framework of education, including the scope and the role of it.  
In her Happiness and Education (2003b), Noddings identified the purpose of education as 
happiness and in his analysis, Bergman (2007b) revealed where one can acquire this happiness: 
“in action, the practical life of human relationships in community” (p. 258).  Being partially 
satisfied with Noddings’s answers to the questions he posed in his article, such as “What does it 
mean to be happy? To be good? What is the relationship of my happiness to your suffering, to 
the suffering of children in other parts of the city, the country, the world?” (Noddings, 2003b, p. 
258), Bergman (2007b) was sympathetic to Noddings’s care-based framework describing the 
purpose of education and how these questions may work to educate one to be a moral individual.   
In her book, Noddings (2003b) argued that these questions can be the very center of a 
moral education class; however, Bergman (2007b) disagreed with her, stating that these 
questions could only be the beginning, not the center of a whole class.  According to Bergman 
(2007), Noddings at best overrated the influence of posing ordinary questions on the moral 
development of the students and on the students’ critical thinking because, even though these are 
good questions, they are abstract questions in themselves.  In his article, Bergman (2007b) 
continued to say that educators need a sound educational theory with a sound educational 
practice to apply and Noddings’s TC is incapable of meeting this need.  This sound educational 
theory should be implemented to have critical discussions in classrooms under the supervision of 
a caring teacher.  The traits of this teacher and how he or she can improve the student’s critical 
thinking skills is the main theme of Noddings’s (2006) Critical Lessons: What Our Schools 
Should Teach but Do Not, and Bergman (2007b) turned his view to this theme in the second 
section of his book review article.   
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In his review of Critical Lessons: What Our Schools Should Teach but Do Not, Bergman 
(2007b) challenged Noddings over her definition of a good teacher, and how this teacher 
improves students’ critical thinking skills through discussions.  As Bergman (2007b) pointed out 
in his article, the good teacher is the teacher who dares to talk to students about critical issues 
and practices the art of talking.  Moreover, Bergman (2007b) continued that even though being 
an expert in the subject knowledge this teacher teaches is the requirement to teach in schools, in 
the end, the art of talking is different from delivering this subject knowledge to the students.  The 
art of talking includes the necessity of discussing critical issues when it is time, and the caring 
teacher could begin with the questions stated in Bergman’s (2007b) article: 
 Is the best education for the best students really the best education for all? … Is the 
reason we go to school to pass this test, to advance to the next grade, to earn a degree, to 
make a living—and how much of a living is or should be enough to make us happy? (p. 
259) 
 
The caring teacher knows that these questions are the very center of true education and 
“must never impose an answer, much less denigrate the beliefs or practices of any child, family, 
religion or culture” (Bergman, 2007b, p. 260).  Asking the questions provided above is neither a 
job for teachers who are faint of heart, nor a task to be approved by parents who are obsessed 
with their students’ Ivy League college applications.  However, according to Bergman (2007b) 
and Noddings (2003a, 2013, 2015), it should be the job of all teachers if they want their students 
to be a happy and educated person in the real sense.  In the end, through TC, Noddings mapped 
out (at least claimed to do so) a way to live happily and be a moral caring person through 
experiencing the ethical caring relationships.  Noddings also mapped out how TC has been 




In analyzing 20 articles about Noddings’s TC from the JME from 2003 through 2013, the 
ideas of the authors discussing Noddings’s TC might be grouped under five different themes as 
this theory related to their topics of interest and contributed to their discussions. These themes 
might be listed as: 
1. School Culture 
2. Teaching Through Culture/Teaching as Culture 
3. TC as a Theory 
4. Educating Morally 
5. Relational Thinking 
There are two different ways to reflect on and interpret these themes and how the authors 
used Nodding’s TC in their writings.  One way of interpreting them is to divide these articles into 
two main groups, whether they have acknowledged/praised TC.  Another way of interpreting 
these themes as they demonstrate how Noddings’s TC has been present in the field of moral 
education is to discuss how they relate to the relevant literature provided in the previous chapter.  
Here, both are provided. 
The authors, using Noddings’s TC to construct and present their ideas in their articles 
might be divided into two main groups.  The authors of the first group of articles were quite 
critical about Noddings’s theory.  In their papers, these authors highlighted that, since it is a 
theory of emotions, TC is limited in scope and may provide unsatisfactory answers when it 
comes to answering questions that include the words “rights” and “obligation” and who is 
responsible for educating morally.  In their articles, they usually constructed their concepts and 
compared these concepts with Noddings’s theory and other theories of morality.  These authors 
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usually concluded by saying that their concepts are more advantageous compared to the concept 
of moral care.  For example, in his paper, Haydon (2006) discussed the need for a global theory 
of moral education and stated that his concept of moral respect has been a better candidate to this 
need compared to Noddings’s TC and the moral value care promoted in her theory.  The authors 
in the first group expressed their concerns regarding the shortcomings of Noddings’s TC and 
defended the fact that these shortcomings are in fact, important limitations of TC. 
In contrast to these authors, there exists another group of authors, who applauded 
Noddings’s TC, and they explained the positive contributions of her theory to moral education 
research.  In sum, they argued that this relational theory of ethics has been a solid foundation on 
which to build new concepts in education.  For example, Johnson (2011) discussed how 
Noddings’s TC has contributed to the Cultural Historical Activity Theory (CHAT) she 
developed.   
A second way of reflecting on and interpreting these themes is to understand how they 
are addressed in the relevant literature.  For example, the authors of the selected articles 
categorized under theme #one have connected TC to the construction of a morally better school 
environment.  As a careful reader of the care in/as education literature and the person conducting 
this dissertation project, I expected this theme to be present in the articles discussing Noddings’s 
TC, since the literature discussing TC was mainly concentrated on the positive effects of TC in 
building a morally better school culture, and a safer school environment (Baker, Terry, Bridger, 
& Winsor, 1997; Garza, 2009; Noddings, 2003b). 
Similar to this point, the articles categorized under theme #five discussed relational 
morality, and their discussion concentrated on Noddings’s TC, as it is the relational framework 
of ethics and education that has provided a large room in which to talk about relational morality 
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in education and teaching.  The literature of moral philosophy and the philosophy of education 
provided in Chapter 2, have drawn attention to this feature of Noddings’s TC (Thayer-Bacon, 
1993, 1997, 2003); and the articles published in this journal proved that this large room has 
expanded. 
As theme #three suggested, the debate regarding the status of TC, whether or not it is a 
legitimate theory of ethics and moral education, continued.  This debate was mentioned in 
Chapter 2, and scholars have evaluated its scope and the unprincipled language of Noddings’s 
TC and have shared their opinions and concerns on this issue.  This debate has been part of a 
larger debate–moral rationalism vs. moral sentimentalism–and it eventually extended to other 
fields of research, as these fields of research have frequently interacted with each other.  I expect 
this debate to be continued in the field of philosophy of education since this field has interacted 
with the fields of moral philosophy and moral education, and educational philosophers have also 
been involved in the construction and the analysis of new theories of education.   
Theme #four presented an important insight regarding the utilization of TC as a theory of 
education.  Noddings and her supporters interested in care-based moral education have defended 
the idea that TC is an important contribution made to moral education, as it has provided an 
alternative framework on which to rely (Maxwell & Reichenbach, 2007; Noddings, 
1984/2003a/2013, 2002a).  Educators and curriculum programmers like Rwantabagu (2010) have 
applied TC to the real practical life in the classrooms, and this served one of the main goals of 
Noddings in the construction of a practical theory of moral education, a theory that would bridge 
the gap between the theoretical knowledge and practical knowledge of morality.   
The influence of Noddings’s TC in the discussion of teaching through culture, Theme 
#two, was a theme expected to be present in the articles discussing Noddings’s TC and its 
137 
 
connection to teaching through and teaching as a culture for two main reasons.  First, Noddings 
presented her theory to voice the concerns and the experiences of people sharing at least one 
main culture, the culture of the home.  Second, in Chapter 1, information has been provided 
regarding how Noddings treated the topics of diversity and different cultures within her theory.   
In Chapter 4, the discussion regarding the influence of Noddings’s TC in the field of 
philosophy of education from 2003 through 2013 is continued.  Specifically, I employed the 
same methods of analysis on the data present in another journal representative of the field of the 
philosophy of education, analyzing and documenting the influence of Noddings’s TC in the 




CHAPTER 4: THE INFLUENCE OF NODDINGS’S TC IN PHILOSOPHY OF 
EDUCATION: 2003-2013 
 
In this chapter several definitions of the philosophy of education, an introduction to the 
Journal of Philosophy of Education (henceforth JPE), the journal selected as representative of 
the field of philosophy of education, and an explanation of the selection of the articles used as 
data in this dissertation are presented.  The main focus in this chapter is to provide an analysis of 
the authors’ ideas, which are the main sources of the themes, presented in the published articles 
of JPE as related to Noddings’s TC.  In this chapter, also interpreted are how the authors of the 
selected articles have approached and used this theory in their discussions.  There were 16 
articles that fit the criteria selected in this study, and I discuss the influence of Noddings’s TC on 
the ideas discussed in these articles under four different themes.  The word “theme” refers only 
to the group of ideas found in these journal articles.  The analysis of these articles utilized the 
same techniques employed in Chapter 3, in which I documented and studied the influence of 
Noddings’s TC in relation to the field of moral education. 
What is Philosophy of Education? 
The word “philosophy” means the “love of wisdom” (Noddings, 1995b/2011, Preface 
Section), and ancient Greek philosophers defined it as the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake 
while identifying it as a means of examining one’s life.  For example, in Plato’s famous 
dialogue, Apology, Socrates argued that philosophy is the way to live a satisfactory life and is 
credited with saying that “an unexamined life is not worth living” (Plato & Tredennick, 1954).  
Different concentrations of philosophy have emerged (philosophy as language, philosophy as 
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women’ studies, philosophy as education) within its several main branches (epistemology,38 
ethics,39 metaphysics,40 and logic41).   
According to the editors of The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Education (Blake, 
Smeyers, Smith, & Standish, 2002), the philosophy of education has been a relatively young 
field of research which “established its presence–as evidenced by publications, conferences, and 
academic appointments–slowly in the first half of the twentieth century” (p. 2).  Several trends 
exist in the field of philosophy of education and, according to Noddings (1995b/2011), 
philosophers of education aim to address the questions of education: “What should be the aims 
or purposes of education?  Who should be educated?  Should education differ according to 
natural interests and abilities?  What role should the state play in education?” (p. 4) depending on 
the trends or philosophical perspectives they embrace. 
Philosophy of education tends to analyze the issues of education by “taking [them] apart” 
(Stone, 2003, p. 57) and clarifying these issues after a thorough discussion.  Today, there are 
different branches of philosophy, including moral philosophy, analytic philosophy, philosophy of 
social science, and feminist philosophy, all of which fall into one or more of the four main 
branches mentioned above.  For instance, some philosophers have studied education as a social 
                                                 
38. Epistemology is the branch of philosophy concerned with understanding the ways of knowledge.  
Scholars interested in this branch of philosophy usually ask questions similar to “What is knowledge?”, “How do we 
know what we know?” to acquire true knowledge if it is possible to acquire it (Maritain, 2005).  
 
39. Ethics is the branch of study concentrating on the question of “What is the right thing to do?” and it is 
also known as moral philosophy.  Throughout the history of ethics, philosophers have dealt with this question and 
have produced theories of ethics as their answers to this question (Maritain, 2005). 
 
40. Metaphysics is the branch of philosophy where philosophers study the questions of existence and 
reality (Maritain, 2005). 
 
41. Logic is the branch of philosophy, in which scholars systematically study philosophical statements, 
arguments, and theories (Maritain, 2005).  
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problem, and they have constructed educational theories through their studies (Dewey, 
1916/2004; Freire, 1968/1996; Greene, 1973; Martin, 1984; Noddings, 1984/2003a/2013). 
Pinning down a definition of the philosophy of education is somewhat difficult; different 
scholars offer quite different definitions.  This difficulty is mainly the result of its characteristics, 
because it is considered to be an amalgamation of the various branches of traditional Western 
philosophy applied directly to the concepts and practices of education and schooling.  With that 
in mind, I think it is possible to draw a general framework around the issues of philosophy of 
education.   
Philosophy of education is the field of research in which scholars work on the problems 
of education using tools from the various branches of philosophy, such as clarifying language, 
analyzing issues using theoretical concepts, asking more questions regarding these concepts, and 
building theories that would answer problems in real life situations (Noddings, 1995b/2011).  In 
her book, Philosophy of Education, Noddings (1995b/2011) stated that philosophers of education 
“are interested in analyzing and clarifying concepts and questions central to education.  Long 
before there were professional philosophers of education, philosophers and educators debated 
questions familiar to contemporary philosophers of education” (p. 4). 
John Dewey has been one of the most influential philosophers and educational theorists 
of the 19th and 20th centuries, and his influence has been present throughout his works.  As one 
of the educational theorists and philosophers of his era, Dewey was very much concerned about 
the problems of education and schooling, and he posed philosophical questions that centered 
around the concepts of education.  He also established the Laboratory School in Chicago in 
1896, and experimented with education as he connected theory to practice. 
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Throughout his publications, Dewey argued that philosophy of education is essentially an 
experiential method of understanding the problems of education and schooling.  Although 
Dewey worked on many issues centered around philosophy and education, the list of the 
questions he posed might be summed as: What is meaningful education?  What should be the 
aims of education?  What is the relationship between philosophy and education?  Why is 
education important to the construction of a democratic society and how it functions in this 
society?’ In one of his works, Dewey (1916/2004) has defined the philosophy of education as: 
 the educational point of view (which) enables one to envisage the philosophic problems 
where they arise and thrive, where they are at home, and where acceptance or rejection 
makes a difference in practice. If we are willing to conceive education as the process of 
forming fundamental dispositions, intellectual and emotional, toward nature and fellow 
men, philosophy may even be defined as the general theory of education.  (p. 383) 
 
Dewey continued to be an important figure in the history of philosophy of education, but 
he is not the only philosopher of education who has tried to offer a definition of philosophy of 
education.  With his works, Dewey aimed to bridge the gap between the theoretical knowledge 
and the practical knowledge that has certainly been an effort to be applauded, considering that it 
is considered to be rarely possible.  Susan Semel (2010) had the same aim in mind; however, she 
constructed a different definition of philosophy of education.  In her book, Foundations of 
Education: The Essential Texts, Semel (2010) described the philosophy of education as the 
perspective that:  
 [It] helps practitioners to interrogate the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of life in classrooms, the 
choices that they make in their daily contexts of schools and beyond in the larger world 
of schooling. In order to comprehend fully the world of schooling, educators must 
possess a social and intellectual context (the foundations perspective). An understanding 
of the philosophy of education is essential in building this perspective.  (p. 12) 
 
Maxine Greene (1973), a pivotal feminist philosopher of education in the 20th century, 
has called for a liberating philosophy of education and has defined the philosophy of education 
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as “a conscious attentiveness to the actualities of lived experience in the classroom, to the 
common-sense realities in which sense-making begins. … It is a free act, undertaken by a person 
as [the] center of consciousness” (p. 49-50).  In her books, employing a philosophical lens, 
Greene (1973, 1978) analyzed the position of women in the history of educational theory and 
how women may contribute to the education and social life in an equal society.  Even though, in 
some of her books, she asks the same questions posed by Dewey, her answers to these questions 
differ from Dewey’s because of her feminist standpoint.   
The connection between the education and the consciousness has been analyzed more 
deeply by Paulo Freire and, in several of his works (1968/1996, 1993, 1998), Freire argued that 
true education aims to increase the consciousness of the individual, so that one could have a 
philosophical and critical stance, a presence in his/her life.  In fact, Freire (1998) identified his 
perspective of the philosophy of education as “A presence that can reflect upon itself, that can 
intervene, that can compare, evaluate, decide, dream, and give value to.  It is in the area of 
decision, evaluation, freedom, breaking with, option, that the ethical necessity imposes itself” (p. 
26).  In Freire’s (1998) view, the perspective of philosophy of education has dialogue at its 
center because it is an act of liberation which “takes place when there are two learners occupy 
[sic] somewhat different spaces in an ongoing dialogue” (p. 8).   
As these definitions indicate, there are different perspectives that philosophers of 
education embrace, even though some of these philosophers are considered to be the members of 
the same school of thought in the field of philosophy of education.  For example, both Greene 
and Noddings are identified as feminist philosophers of education, yet their definitions of the 
philosophy of education and how women’s voices should be included in the educational theory 
and research differ significantly.  In her writings, Greene (1978, 1993) argued for the liberation 
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of women from household chores because she treated the connection of women to the home as a 
limitation.  In contrast to Greene, Noddings (1984/2003a/2013, 2002b), with her TC, argued that 
the connection to the home is not a limitation, but is the ground for educational (moral) 
improvement. 
Debates over the definition, scope, and focus of philosophy of education have lasted for a 
long time (Burbules, 2000; Burbules & Knight-Abowitz, 2008; Dewey, 1916/2004; Giarelli & 
Chambliss, 1984; Greene, 1973, 1995; Noddings, 1995b/2011; Stone, 2003), and a 
comprehensive analysis of these debates is beyond the limit of this dissertation.  Considering the 
questions that philosophers of education posed and how these scholars answered these questions, 
it is sound to claim that philosophy of education is characterized as a theoretical field of 
scholarship.  As a theoretical field of research, it has interacted with and integrated aspects of 
other theoretical fields of research, such as ethics, psychology, religion, moral education, history, 
and sociology, to name a few.  Nevertheless, as an acknowledged field of inquiry, the theories 
generated by the philosophy of education are used as frameworks for scholars working in applied 
fields of research in education.  The significance of philosophy of education is not limited only 
to theoretical fields of research. 
Noddings’s (1995b/2011, 2003c, 2006) perspective of philosophy of education is a 
philosophical perspective which encourages the utilization of dialogue and role modeling for 
educators.  In fact, some authors (Gotz, 1999; McCarthy, 1999) argued that TC was the feminine 
version of the Deweyan perspective of philosophy of education because they shared important 
characteristics and they were concerned with the future of the philosophy of education as they 
discussed the possibility of connecting theory to practice.  Both philosophers of education, 
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Dewey and Noddings, are interested in the problems of educational practitioners and ordinary 
people and used a practical, jargon free language to educate people on philosophy.   
Noddings provided the details of her caring philosophy of education perspective and 
relational, care-based teaching in several of her books; however, she fully mapped out this 
perspective only in her book, Philosophy of Education (1995b/2011).  In this book, Noddings 
(1995b/2011) explained that the field of philosophy of education has two main components: 
essentially, a knowledge of the history of educational philosophy and a practical, wise vision of 
issues and concepts of today’s educational system.  Therefore, in this book, Noddings 
(1995b/2011) provided a detailed scheme of this hybrid approach employed in the philosophy of 
education and how to teach it.   
Noddings’s TC, grounded in her philosophy of education, is represented in articles in the 
selected journal, JPE, as the authors of these articles have included TC in their conversations.  
According to Scimago Journal Ranking and Journal Metrics, JPE is a well-respected journal 
having represented the discipline of philosophy of education for a long-time period. JPE only 
publishes papers associated with research conducted in the philosophy of education and, 
according to the mission statement provided below, these articles should be: 
 representing a wide variety of philosophical traditions. They vary from examination of 
fundamental philosophical issues in their connection with education, to detailed critical 
engagement with current educational practice or policy from a philosophical point of 
view. The journal aims to promote rigorous thinking on educational matters and to 
identify and criticise the ideological forces shaping education. Ethical, political, aesthetic 
and epistemological dimensions of educational theory are amongst those covered.  (JPE, 
2017)  
 
Even though JPE has published for more than two decades, I chose to use only the 
articles about Noddings that were published from 2003 through 2013. My focus is limited to this 
time frame because, in 2003, Noddings published the second edition of her monumental work, 
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Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education, and, in 2013, she published the 
last and the third edition of this book. I have used only the articles citing Noddings’s TC as the 
main theme. There were 16 articles that fit this criterion, and these articles exemplified how 
Noddings’s theory has been received and appropriated by the authors publishing in the field of 
educational philosophy. 
Themes Present in JPE in Relation to Noddings’s TC  
Noddings’s TC and Moral Thinking Through Relations 
One theme that has been present within the articles analyzed is how Noddings’s TC has 
contributed to the discussion of drawing a philosophical framework of the relational moral 
thinking of people.  Three different authors (Carr, 2004; Cuypers, 2009; Papasthephanou, 2004) 
have discussed Noddings’s TC in relation to the structuring and improvement of the moral 
thinking of students.  Considering that Noddings’s theory is a theory of moral philosophy and 
moral education, and the fields of moral education and philosophy of education often 
overlap/interact, it is expected to encounter the influence of TC in the discussions found in the 
field of philosophy of education, particularly when the authors are interested in the moral 
development of children. 
Stefaan Cuypers (2009) is one of these authors.  In his article, he discussed how 
Noddings’s theory may be helpful in providing a new philosophical perspective on teaching 
morality.  Cuypers (2009) argued that rule-bound perspective employed in teaching morality is a 
harsh method/perspective of teaching, resulting in fear in young children.  Therefore, Cuypers 
(2009) continued it may have detrimental effects on the learning of young children.  In order to 
strengthen his argument, Cuypers (2009) benefitted from Noddings’s dismissal of principles as 
the motivating guide to moral thinking and used her words:  
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 What we do depends not upon rules, or at least not wholly on rules -not upon a prior 
determination of what is fair or equitable- but upon a constellation of conditions that is 
viewed through both the eyes of the one-caring and the eyes of the cared-for.  (Noddings, 
2003a, p.13)  
 
Using Noddings’s (1984/2003a/2013) contra argument on how rules are incapable of 
motivating individuals to moral behaviors and should not be used in moral education as the 
primary source, Cuypers (2009) hypothesized that there is a relationship between individual 
autonomy and the advancement of moral thinking in the education of young students, and 
teachers need to improve this individual autonomy throughout their time spent with the students.  
In fact, according to Cuypers (2009), the individual autonomy of the young students may not 
improve, especially if teachers embrace a perspective that encourages following the principled 
perspectives of moral philosophies implemented in education and the teaching of these 
principles. In Cuyper’s (2009) view, using rules in the moral education of the students might be 
problematic, especially in the education of young children because rules represent the existence 
of the external authority and they “make use of ways that undermine such responsibility-relative 
authenticity” (p. 200) in young children. 
In his article, Cuypers (2009) defended the idea that being responsible is an essential trait 
of the morally educated person, and he suggested that teachers should develop this trait in their 
students using alternative methods of teaching such as caring-based practices.  According to 
Cuypers (2009), these caring-based practices teach students how to construct a healthy notion of 
dependency to other people and an autonomous identity that will balance this dependency with 
individual actions leading to the proper and moral ones.  In TC, Noddings (2003a) explained the 
function of dependency on others in learning how to be moral/care as: 
 We are dependent upon the strength and sensitivity of the ethical ideal— both our own 
and that of others— we must nurture that ideal in all of our educational encountered. I 
shall claim that we are dependent on each other even in the quest for personal goodness. 
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How good I can be is [sic] partly a function of how you— the other— receive and 
respond to me.  (p. 6)  
 
Building this healthy notion of dependency within the individual requires to form caring 
relationships, which is one of the main purposes of an educational system promoting Noddings’s 
TC (Noddings, 1984/2003a/2013, 2002a, 2003b, 2005).  As discussed earlier in this dissertation, 
since relational teaching of morality is an important aim of TC; some scholars (Carr, 2004) 
categorize TC as promoting a romantic and spiritual framework in the teaching of moral 
education, improving moral behaviors and philosophical thinking in students.   
David Carr (2004) is one of these scholars and, in his article, he argued that Noddings’s 
theory is essentially a romantic theory of education, but this does not mean that it is irrelevant to 
educational philosophy and educational thought.  According to Carr (2004), supporters of this 
romantic theory of education put “emphasis on the proper cultivation of sentiment and feeling, 
[which is] a mechanism of de-centering” rational thinking from morality (p. 236).  According to 
Carr (2004), scholars publishing in the field of the philosophy of education have opposed this de-
centering of the rational thinking often; however, this romantic theory, TC, may be beneficial in 
promoting a different kind of environmental ethics and improving the moral thinking of the 
students through the relationships they form with their surrounding environment because 
[before] “we can really think rightly about or behave appropriately towards the environment we 
must first care about it, and caring is no less a matter of emotional attachment and aesthetic 
appreciation than of right reason and conduct” (p. 226).   
In his article, Carr (2004) claimed that compared to other theories of moral philosophy, 
the romantic theory of Noddings’s TC may provide a better ground to discuss and analyze 
environmental ethics education.  According to Carr (2004), an environmental ethics education 
focusing on care encourages students and teachers to ask questions centering around both care 
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and the relation to the surrounding environment.  Carr (2004) imagined that these students and 
teachers would ask questions focusing around caring about someone or something. [Remember 
Noddings’s discussion on caring about and caring for, which is provided in Chapter1.]  Carr 
(2004) claimed that the questions formed as a result of the implementation of TC in the 
classroom might begin a great class discussion or a new group project that might be of interest to 
students and community surrounding the school.   
In that light, Marianna Papasthephanou (2004) stated a potential disadvantage of 
individualistic moral education while highlighting the connection of being part of a community 
and having a philosophical perspective encouraging this community connection.  In her article, 
“Educational Critique, Critical Thinking and the Critical Philosophical Traditions” 
Papasthephanou (2004) argued that current liberal education programs found in the schools may 
not take into account how communities have influenced one’s critical and moral thinking skills.  
Drawing on this limitation further, Papasthephanou (2004) offered to move to the moral 
education programs, such as communitarian education programs, which embrace a care-based 
education philosophy.  According to Papasthephanou (2004), unlike these care-based 
communitarian education programs:    
 Liberal educational moralist or strategic ‘reading’ of response does not constitute a 
proper responsiveness to the other’s desire: what is missing is the destabilising quality of 
eros that questions the subject’s sovereignty instead of glorifying it. Too much 
educational emphasis on the preoccupation with the self and serving its needs produces 
one self-referential voice, a limited entrapping order of articulation (system) and many 
echoes.  (p. 371) 
 
In Papasthephanou’s (2004) view, self-referential voice problem is an important tissue to 
tackle with; thus, one should shift his/her focus to understand the needs of others if he/she wants 
to avoid the problem.  In her article, Papasthephanou (2004) stated that the perspective aimed at 
meeting the needs of others requires a relational understanding of morality, which balances the 
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inner wellness with communal learning and the dependence on the community, improves one’s 
thinking skills.  With the relational teaching component offered in TC, Noddings offered a 
synthesis that would balance these two; and Papasthephanou (2004) identified this advantageous 
synthesis as the only solution to the self-referential problem.  Understanding this is a difficult 
synthesis to form from the scratch, Papasthephanou (2004) offered to use Noddings’s (1996) 
synthesis, which is detailed in Noddings’s article named “On Community.”  
In this article, Noddings (1996) defended the function of the community is “the basis of 
his [one’s] spiritual existence” (p. 254).  The improvement of one’s inner wellness and spiritual 
existence is not something the liberal educational programs may primarily aim as they pay “too 
much educational emphasis on the preoccupation with the self” (Papasthepanou, 2004, p. 371).  
Papasthepanou (2004) concluded her article by arguing that unlike care-based communitarian 
programs, since the teaching philosophy these programs structured around do not deliberately 
focus on relating to students and the needs of others; they can not build a community and an 
individual at the same time.  
An educational perspective and a system designed to promote Noddings’s TC requires a 
relational perspective in teaching, an approach that will highlight the importance of relating to 
students, and this new approach is interested in “feeling with” others, not analyzing their 
thoughts or feelings as information units (Noddings, 2003a, p. 177).  A relational basis of 
teaching and the connection among Noddings’s TC, relational teaching, and students’ needs is 
the next theme analyzed in this chapter.   
Noddings’s TC, Relational Teaching, and Students’ Needs 
The contribution of Noddings’s theory to the discussion of relational teaching and 
understanding students’ needs is a theme present in the articles selected for and analyzed in this 
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dissertation.  Five different authors (Benporath, 2003; Goodman, 2008; Noddings, 2003c; Tubbs, 
2005a, 2005b) discussed Noddings’s theory in connection to the nature and quality of teaching. 
In fact, one of these authors happened to be Noddings herself.  In her article, (Noddings, 2003c) 
first constructed two distinct arguments related to care-based teaching, then criticized Alasdair 
MacIntyre’s (2002) frame of ideal teaching.  42 Noddings (2003c) claimed that any effort to 
represent teaching as a practice to achieve certain ends misses the moral value and flavor of 
teaching while limiting its focus merely to common core standards and standardized testing.  
Noddings (2003c) first discredited the rationale behind the standardized testing and claimed it to 
be sloganistic.  Then she questioned the teachers, educational policy-makers, and politicians 
about their insistence on this sloganistic and standardized form of education: 
What can all children learn?  This is not a trivial question, and we should be given [sic]
 careful attention.  Even if we were able to answer that question satisfactorily, we would
 still have to recognize that, beyond common basics (and we are not even sure what these
 are), every student needs a great deal more.  But what is needed differs from student to
 student.  (Noddings (2003c, p. 243) 
 
In this excerpt, Noddings (2003c) drew attention to the uniqueness of the students and 
explained that each student has different needs to be fulfilled.  In caring classrooms, a teacher’s 
primary concern is to identify the needs of students by building trusting and caring relationships 
with their students.  In Noddings’s (2003c) view, deep down, a good teacher is a caring teacher, 
who knows that these relationships also benefit the students because they “form a foundation for 
the effective transmission of both general and specialised knowledge” (p. 250).  Therefore, 
                                                 
42. In this discussion article titled “Alasdair MacIntyre on education: in dialogue with Joseph Dunne,” 
Alasdair MacIntyre (MacIntyre and Dunne, 2002) defines what teaching is and elaborates on his framework of good 
teaching.  One of the major claims found in this article is that the good teacher is and should be only interested the 
practice of teaching of the subject material well, which equates the teaching practice to something “never more than 




according to Noddings (2003c), a good teacher is also a morally caring teacher, who is 
“committed to establishing and maintaining relations of care and trust” (p. 250). 
In this article, Noddings (2003c) provided more details regarding how the teaching 
practice is understood in the general society, while criticizing the conventional understanding of 
teaching practice.  Noddings (2003c) argued that the conventional framework of teaching is not a 
great choice for students with diverse needs as it structures teaching as a mechanical practice.  
Moreover, Noddings (2003c) continued through this framework teachers have to allocate a large 
amount of time for teaching to high stakes testing rather than to understanding their students and 
meeting these students’ needs.  In her article, Noddings (2003c) claimed this is an unsustainable 
and ineffective framework of teaching because the influence of the teachers embracing the 
conventional framework of teaching is destined to fade away when the class is over.  In contrast 
to these teachers, caring teachers provide a continued inspiration for their students to learn 
because they: 
 are keenly aware that they might have devastating effects or uplifting effect on their 
students. Some of these effects last, or at least are remembered, for a lifetime. This first 
great good of teaching—response-ability and its positive effects—is clearly relational. 
Teaching is thoroughly relational, and many  of its goods are relational: the feeling of 
safety in a thoughtful teacher’s classroom, a  growing intellectual enthusiasm in both 
teacher and student, the challenge and satisfaction shared by both in engaging new 
material, the awakening sense (for both) that teaching and life are never-ending moral 
quests.  (Noddings, 2003c, p. 249) 
 
Reporting that the conventional approach employed in teaching limits the continuity of 
learning; Noddings (2003c) claimed it should be replaced with a better approach to teaching, 
preferably with the caring and relational one.  According to Noddings (2003c), the key to 
improve students’ thinking skills and truly educate them is to inspire the students to learn more.  
Noddings (2003c) observed that the inspiration to learn is an internal motivation to learn, and 
this motivation is not associated with external conditions (i.e.  moving to the next grade, getting 
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a recommendation letter for college applications, or getting a monetary reward from his/her 
parents).  In the end, according to Noddings (2003c), the good teachers are the affectionate and 
caring teachers, who are remembered after college, because these caring teachers take the time to 
relate to the students and understand their needs.  As a matter of fact, in Noddings’s (2003c) 
view, understanding the needs of their students is partially dependent on being expert on the 
subject knowledge, since having pedagogical knowledge is a necessity in identifying the 
moments of disconnection in learning and knowing how to motivate the students: 
 I still remember with great affection a university professor of mathematics who halted a 
lecture with a very stressed class to say, ‘This isn’t a matter of life and death, you know’. 
After a collective sigh of relief, we worked together to figure things out.  We were 
encouraged to concentrate on learning and co-operation instead of competition and acing 
the test.  (p. 249) 
 
Being uncomfortable with Noddings’s framework of relational and care-focused teaching 
practice, which promotes situational learning dependent on students’ needs, Nigel Tubbs (2005a) 
claimed that Noddings’s theory, and the relational teaching practice associated with it, has 
several limitations. In his article, Tubbs (2005a) discussed these limitations in detail even though 
he admitted Noddings’s TC might provide more room to study the practical implications of a 
relational framework in teaching and education.   
According to Tubbs (2005a), one limitation of this theory was that it should be 
implemented only in the smaller home sphere because of the concerns of inequality.  Similar to 
the concern voiced by Singer (2004) in Chapter 1 of this dissertation, Tubbs (2005a) discussed 
that if Noddings’s TC is applied in larger public settings such as schools there will be concerns 
of inequality. Therefore, Tubbs (2005) did not imagine TC had the potential to overcome the 
concerns of inequalities and stated: 
 Noddings’s ethic of care does not survive the transition of the relation of the one-caring 
and the cared-for into the civil sphere precisely because there it is forced to suppress its 
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inequality. Care in parenting and schooling is power, and is recognised as such in the 
onesidedness [sic] of those relationships. Care in civil society is the power of market 
relations, but is misrecognised as equality in the formal mutuality between persons.  (p. 
212) 
In Tubbs’s (2005a) opinion, Noddings’s TC has been incapable of promoting equality in 
the larger society because it does not argue for the equal rights between the carer and the cared-
for.  As a matter of fact, in Tubbs’s (2005a) view, in an education system designed upon care 
theory, there will always be cared-for students getting certain rights and goods, not because they 
deserve it based on the notion of equality but because they are vulnerable or needy.  Using 
teachers’ perspective, Tubbs (2005a) viewed this as a serious limitation of Noddings’s TC 
because it tends to ignore the teacher’s needs or discuss the struggles teachers experience.  
In Tubbs’s (2005a) opinion, this limitation is rooted in how TC defines the job/task of 
teachers based on the power they have on their students; teachers are not identified as the 
vulnerable party in a caring relationship formed between the teacher and the student.  In his 
article, Tubbs (2005a) drew attention to this limitation and argued TC should be modified to pay 
equal attention to the teachers’ needs as well as to the needs of the vulnerable students.  For 
Tubbs (2005a), lacking an interest or being silent in discussing the needs of the carer/teacher 
party is troublesome for both TC and Noddings because these signal that “Noddings deserts 
teachers in their hours of need” (Tubbs, 2005a, p. 215). 
Noddings’s silence on the needs of the caring party/carer became the basis for Tubbs’s 
criticism of TC, and this is a common concern raised against Noddings’s TC.  The original 
grounds for this criticism might be traced back to the first edition of the Caring book (Noddings, 
1984), in which Noddings devoted only limited space to discussing the needs of the caring party 
while she describes the ethical and natural caring relationship and the vulnerability/dependency 
of the cared-for at length.   
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Another criticism of Tubbs (2005a) regarding Noddings’s TC is that it is limited in scope 
as it is more concerned with the well-being of individuals living in proximity.  In his article, 
moving from this limitation, Tubbs (2005a) claimed that, compared to other theories of morality, 
such as utilitarianism and Kantian moral theory, TC is an easy theory to apply if the individual is 
not bothered about having a limited morality in his or her life.  Employing this limited lens of 
morality, the caring teacher only pays attention to the students he/she knows and pays little 
attention to the students’ rights or basic needs if they live on the other side of the world. 
Sympathetic to the criticism Tubbs (2005a) developed regarding Noddings’s theory and 
its promotion of a needs-based thinking approach to teaching and moral thinking, in her paper, 
Joan Goodman (2008) argued that a teaching pedagogy favoring needs-based thinking is a 
difficult and burdensome teaching task for professional practitioners and parents.  Goodman 
(2008) drew on the characteristics of the natural caring relationship formed between a mother 
and an infant, and she claimed this relationship may not provide a satisfactory background to 
moral thinking and educating one morally. 
In her article, Goodman (2008) discussed that natural caring relationships, from which 
ethical caring relationships develop, are troubling because they are need-based and paint pictures 
of dependency between two parties, not the path to better thinking and improved moral 
understanding.  In Goodman’s (2008) view, people should distribute rights based on their moral 
obligations to each other, not based on their dependency or the significance of their needs.  
Unlike Noddings (1984/2003a/2013), Goodman (2008) described these caring relationships to be 
the ground of constant struggle between two parties, the child and the parent:  
 The needs of both child and parent are multiple and often opposed the relationship is 
essentially ambivalent: a constant holding-close and letting-go, leaning into and resisting.  
The enormous challenge for parenting (and teaching) and for care theory is how to strike 
a coherent balance.  Tip too far in the child’s direction and risk a poorly adapted adult.  
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Tip too far in the adults’ direction and risk distorting the child’s emerging self.  No two 
care-takers will reach the same judgments—making parenting so endlessly various— but 
all, if they are conscientious, will be constantly alert to the tradeoffs—making parenting 
so endlessly difficult.  (p. 234)  
 
In her article, Goodman (2008) pointed out that Noddings’s (1984/2003a/2013) 
observation of the caring relationships described only a limited view of the educative 
connections occurring between parents and children, as education is more than the conversations 
parents have with their children.  Goodman (2008) argued that, due to this limited, even biased, 
observation, Noddings’s framework of ethics and education lacks the answer to the question of 
how to balance between the children’s needs and the parents’ needs.  In fact, according to 
Goodman (2008), lacking a satisfactory answer to this question constitutes an undesired situation 
for Noddings and her relational theory of education because it fails to address the difficulties 
parents and teachers face when they try to teach through TC (Goodman, 2008).  In Goodman’s 
(2008) view, a more reliable observation describing the caring relationships is needed, as the 
relationships described by Noddings (1984/2003a/2013) are hardly the source of being moral or 
provide a sufficient background in learning to live morally.  Finally, in Goodman’s (2008) 
interpretation, care-based education and the TC complicate things even further because: 
 Caring theory, with its emphasis on empathy, compassion, and attentiveness to the child’s 
present state undervalues the role of adult restraint and imposition in a rounded caring 
philosophy.  Parents (and teachers) must continuously balance gratification with 
suppression, support with restraint, engrossment with detachment.  (p. 233)  
  
I think an important flaw with Goodman’s reading of TC is that she ignores TC is all 
about shaping moral knowledge and moral education through relationships.  Considering this, it 
is natural for TC to be structured around the language of the mother and operate on a relational 
framework of education rather than describing and assigning a role for each parent and their 
child(s).  Finally, Noddings (2003a, 2003c, 2005) never undermined the role of adults in shaping 
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the moral knowledge of the child as she identified the function of the caring parent and teacher 
as a major tenet of her theory.  On the contrary, for Noddings  (1984/2003a/2013, 2002a, 2010b), 
parents, particularly mothers play a crucial role in shaping the moral thinking and moral 
education of the individuals; and this makes TC an important and influential member of the 
maternal theories of education.  43  
The influence of maternalism in education is present in discussions about the role of 
feelings in education and how women contribute to educational thought and philosophy (Martin, 
1985, 1992, 2002, 2011; Noddings, 1984/2003a/2013; Nussbaum, 2000, 2004, 2005).  As a 
feminist philosopher of education who constructed a theory of ethics and education using the 
lens of women, Noddings (2003a, 2003b) discussed how certain feelings (joy and happiness 
found in a caring relation) motivate students to improve their moral thinking and be moral 
persons.  For instance, in her book, Happiness and Education (2003b), Noddings related 
happiness to the satisfaction of children’s needs and discussed that “Happiness should be an aim 
of education, and a good education should contribute significantly to personal and collective 
happiness” (p. 1). 
Even though Noddings felt confident regarding her claims that TC is fully capable of the 
fulfillment of children’s needs, Sigal Benporath (2003) disagreed with Noddings and challenged 
her stance on this issue.  In her article, Benporath (2003) argued that Noddings’s theory, at best, 
was an optimistic theory of education that preferred care and attention, feeling and emotive 
capacities, and the students’ needs over school discipline and the curriculum taught and valued in 
                                                 
43. Several frameworks of maternalism in connection to feminism exist in feminist thought, sociology, and 
political studies (Koven, & Michel, 1993; Ladd-Taylor, 1993, Ruddick, 1989), and I view maternalism as a concept 
which is originated through and during the historical movements of feminism.  I associate Seth Koven and Sonya 
Michel’s (1993) framework of maternalism with TC because they define maternalism as “ideologies and discourses 
that exalted women’s capacity to mother and, applied to society as a whole, the values they attached to that role: 
care; nurturance; and morality” (p. 4). 
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schools.  Benporath (2003) drew on Noddings’s preference for the maternal language and the 
presence of this language in TC.  Throughout her article, Benporath (2003) challenged the 
potential educational implications of maternal educational theories and the practical influence of 
the maternal language in an educational theory.   
Similar to Tubbs (2005a) and Goodman (2008), Benporath (2003) claimed that 
Noddings’s TC has a hard time with balancing the rights and interests of two parties in a 
relationship.  Benporath (2003) analyzed this issue on a somewhat different scale compared to 
Tubbs (2005a) and Goodman (2008), and asserted that schools need to be more paternalistic if 
they want to be in the business of educating students for future moral societies.  Different than 
Noddings, Benporath (2003) believed that these moral societies and the social communities of 
the classrooms represent a small part of these larger moral societies and happen to be just 
societies at the same time: 
 Many times society’s aims challenge or disregard personal ones, and therefore a just 
society must assign specific adults (parents, teachers, health-care professionals) to protect 
the interests of the more vulnerable members of society.  The fulfillment of adults’ 
obligations in schools, as in other public institutions, should take the form of protective 
 paternalism—it should take into account not only the expressed views of children 
(whenever possible), but also a careful interpretation of their interests.  (p. 141) 
 
In her article, Benporath (2003) defended the idea that there must be a balance between 
care-based (maternalistic) education and individual rights and justice thinking based 
(paternalistic) education.  Otherwise, the child’s best interests would not be served adequately.  
Benporath (2003) drew heavily from Noddings’s TC when she sampled TC as the influence of 
the maternalistic in education and teaching.  In Benporath’s (2003) opinion, maternalistic 
pedagogies of education like TC have been grounds to the problematic applications found in 
education because even though “it is not clear that additional rights can in fact promote 
children’s well-being” (p. 128), they still assign additional rights to children.  In fact, Benporath 
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continued (2003) with these additional rights, the problem of educating the children about who 
should be responsible for what portion, becomes even more complicated.   
Throughout her article, Benporath (2003) argued that the function of schools is and 
should be different from the function of the homes.  Therefore, these two spheres of living (home 
and school) need to be separate, not combined.  Furthermore, Benporath (2003) claimed that 
societal institutions like schools need to embrace a protective paternalistic education system, not 
a maternalistic one because maternalistic approaches to education function on the core principle 
of vulnerability, and this principle “creates immanent inequality between children and adults” (p. 
127).  In fact, according to Benporath (2003), schools need to operate on an equal respect and 
equal rights pedagogy, not on a caring based pedagogy, if they want to solve this problem and 
serve society and its members as they deserve.    
There are three problems with Benporath’s argument if my interpretation of TC is 
accurate.  The first problem is that Benporath’s (2003) interpretation of Noddings’s TC as a 
maternal theory of education that only addresses the problems of women is inaccurate since 
Noddings (1984/2003a/2013) repeatedly stated caring is not limited to one gender and there are 
male examples of carers.  The second problem with Benporath’s reading of TC is that the 
vulnerability of the cared-for is the front view compared to the discussion of the rights of the 
both parties involved in this relationship, because TC prefers the forming and maintenance of the 
human relationships over individual rights.   
The third problem with Benporath’s (2003) argument is that the best interests of the child 
may not be determined without relating to the child and encouraging the child to obtain some 
sort of access to self-knowledge.  In Noddings’s (2002a, 2003b) view, the caring parents 
demonstrate their love by discussing certain important decisions with their children, employing 
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positive and constructive ways of talking.  Imagining that these discussions ideally serve the 
child’s best interests for educating the child to morally care, Noddings (2002a, 2003b) 
encouraged the adults, especially parents to have these educative conversations with their 
youngsters.  These discussions compose a certain type of dialogue Noddings (1989, 1995c, 
2002b, 2003b, 2005,2013) had in her mind, while educating the child to develop a better self.  
Throughout her article, Benporath (2003) view these conversations to be additional rights 
provided to children and by nature, adults need to know how to handle these problems. 
Unlike the previous authors (Tubbs, Goodman and Benporath), who challenged 
Noddings’s TC over the issue of maternal thinking in moral education and how to balance the 
needs of the cared-for with other important concepts that require deep thinking, Megan Laverty 
(2004) aligned herself with Noddings on maternal and relational thinking in moral education and 
claimed that TC has been positively influential on moral development and teaching pedagogy.  
In fact, according to Laverty (2004), since Noddings’s TC is a maternalistic theory of education 
and uses the language of the mother, Noddings’s effort has merit in itself and TC should be 
discussed in more detail.   
Throughout her article, Laverty (2004) constructed her pro argument discussing the 
inclusion and implementation of maternal thinking in the education of young children.  Her pro 
argument of TC focused on the detrimental effects of the power differences present in the 
relationships formed between adults and children (Laverty, 2004).  Due to these power 
differences and some other psychological and social factors that affect the adults participating to 
these relationships, the paternalistic thinking in education, which defends adults should be the 
sole responsible in the students’ education, has its own disadvantages:  
 Adults cannot be trusted always to do what is in the child’s best interests: children have 
been, and continue to be, subject to the most violent abuses from parents, welfare and 
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educational institutions, war and political turmoil, and are at these times particularly 
vulnerable to the exploitations of the mass media.  It follows that we need, in our 
communities, to think very carefully about what children are owed as children.  (Laverty, 
2004, p. 302) 
 
In the introduction section of her article, Laverty (2004) first provided a detailed 
chronological account of the philosophical debate between maternal and paternal thinking in 
education, then described how this debate/competition has created quite a tension in the 
academy.  In Laverty’s (2004) view, this tension is divisive in several ways; therefore, we need 
to eliminate it if we are unable to combine maternal thinking and paternal thinking.  In the final 
section of her article, by posing the questions provided below, she called for the integration of 
the male and female languages and perspectives influencing education:  
 Are there ways to ensure the protection of children that do not make the difference 
between adults and children dangerously divisive?  How are we properly to address the 
power dynamic of the adult–child relationship?  A genuine interest in children as human 
beings—with appetites and souls—seems a step in the right direction. (Laverty, 2004, p. 
303) 
 
Any theory of education essentially has a connection to and a framework that describes 
how students should think and learn, because at some point it defines or recommends ways to 
improve student thinking using the theory suggested.  Noddings’s theory is not an exception to 
this, and how it contributes to student thinking is the next theme to be discussed in this chapter.   
Noddings’s TC and Student Thinking 
Student thinking and its connection to Noddings’s TC is another theme that has been 
discussed in the articles I have analyzed for this study.  Five different authors discuss TC in 
connection with the development of the students’ thinking, including empathy and thinking, 
thinking through the experience, caring and its contribution to the discussion of the development 
of moral education and critical thought. 
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In his book review article discussing The Ethics of Care and Empathy by Michael Slote 
(2007), Paul Smeyers (2010) constructs two major arguments in favor of the theoretical 
improvement of TC.  In his first argument, Smeyers (2010) states that the debate between caring 
ethics and justice ethics is not recent; it is almost 30 years old, hence, it is past time for scholars 
to move beyond this debate.  In fact, according to Smeyers (2010), by now scholars should be 
discussing how to improve without endangering its status in the fields of moral philosophy and 
philosophy of education.  As part of his theoretical discussion about how Noddings’s TC might 
complement other theories of moral philosophy, Smeyers (2010) provided a detailed account of 
this debate before moving to Slote’s framework of care ethics, which is reconstructed around 
empathy.  As Smeyers (2010) is interested in the potential improvements to TC, he reviewed 
Slote’s book and his framework of care-based thinking and the caring philosophy.  In his book 
review article, Smeyers (2010) promoted Slote’s (2007) construction of the just and caring 
society and the law found in this just society using the emotional concept of empathy:  
 A society is just to the degree or extent that its laws, institutions, practices, attitudes, and 
customs are just, i.e.  in terms of ideals of empathic caring that apply at the level of social 
groups; and further ‘a law is just if it reflects or expresses empathically caring motivation 
toward their compatriots on the part of the legislative group that is responsible for passing 
it … less demandingly, a law is just even if it merely fails to reflect or exhibit a lack of 
appropriate empathic concern on the part of those who promulgate it.’ (Slote, 2007, p. 95) 
 
In his second argument in favor of the theoretical improvement of TC, Smeyers (2010) 
elaborated on Noddings’s TC and compares it with Slote’s empathy included version of care.  
Smeyers (2010) pointed out that Noddings’s original theory, the one without the inclusion of 
empathy, has a hard time providing a satisfactory answer to the issue of critical thinking and 
autonomy.  Smeyers (2010) identified this to be a necessary move in overcoming the limitations 
of TC and stated that with Slote’s inclusion of empathy, care ethics and TC shall have a better 
argument constructed on the issue of teaching and discussing critical thinking and autonomy 
162 
 
because in empathy included TC “the autonomous person is seen as not afraid of his or her own 
desires or aspirations; she realizes the initial human capacity for thinking and deciding things for 
herself” (p. 174).  44 
In relation to student thinking and philosophy of education, Azadeh Osanloo (2008) 
evaluated the contribution of Noddings’s theory to students’ critical thinking in her book review 
of Critical Lessons: What Our Schools Should Teach but Do Not (2006) by Nel Noddings.  
Noddings’s theory promotes inner motivation to act morally and encourages people to know 
themselves better.  In Noddings’s (2006) view, the questions that could lead to the improvement 
of critical thinking and moral living are “What sort of person am I? What sort of person should I 
become? What does it mean to be good? To be happy?” (p. 215-216). 
The questions provided above require the skill of self-reflection, which I think is the basis 
of critical thinking and philosophizing in Noddings’s (1995b/2011, 2006) view.  In her book 
review, she claimed that in Noddings’s view, “critical thinking [is synonymous to reflective 
thinking for Noddings] is a necessity for schools in particular and liberal democratic society in 
general” (Osanloo, 2008, p. 341).  The teaching of critical thinking in schools is only possible 
through extensive, sometimes off the topic discussions, and these discussions may not happen 
within the boundaries of a designed curriculum.  Moreover, high-quality teachers are needed to 
lead these discussions because “without teachers specifically addressing controversial issues, 
critical thinking does not exist readily in schools” (Osanloo, 2008, p. 341).  Apparently, the term 
‘high-quality teachers’ defines teachers who are experts in their curricular subject, but also have 
the skill of using this curricular knowledge to discuss controversial issues beyond, or even 
outside of, the written school curriculum.  [In Chapter 3, this skill is defined as the art of talking 
                                                 
44. In her article titled “Complexity in caring and empathy.” Noddings (2010b) describes why she has used 
sympathy not empathy, when she is constructing TC.  
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under the theme Noddings’s Theory of Care and Relational Thinking in Moral Education and 
Roger Bergman (2004) discussed it in connection with the characteristics of the caring teacher.]  
Students may ask personal questions after experiencing a care-based critical thinking: “What 
happens to my family if my father does not return from his tour in Iraq?  Who will care for my 
family after his death?”  I have constructed these questions based on my reading of Noddings, 
but I am sure several other questions might be constructed too.   
Personal questions provided in the above paragraph represent the personal and cultural 
experience of the students and how they reflect on these experiences when they perform critical 
thinking.  The influence of culture and one’s experience with the culture over one’s critical 
thinking and doing philosophy has attracted the attention of Nigel Tubbs (2005b), and to 
elaborate on this influence he writes his article titled “The Culture of Philosophical Experience.” 
The notion of culture in philosophical thinking and how culture contributes to the philosophical 
thinking compose the center point of Tubbs’s article.  In this article, Tubbs (2005b) discussed 
that culture is a necessary ingredient to consider when it comes to philosophy and thinking, while 
he is pointing out how TC discussed the culture to philosophical thinking as it explained one’s 
moral judgment level based on one’s firsthand experiences, living conditions, and culture.  Tubbs 
(2005b) drew on this explanation of TC and determines culture is a concept which: 
 has a specific educational meaning and import within speculative philosophy. It refers to 
the way in which an idea or an experience, in being known, re-forms itself in this being 
known.  Ideas without such a notion of culture or re-formation tend towards dogma 
because they are asserted without philosophical or educative significance.  (p. 219) 
 
Tubbs (2005b) identified Noddings’s TC as a theory promoting the contribution of 
culture to philosophical thinking because it highlights the importance of women’s culture in 
philosophical thinking and education.  Moreover, one can adopt several different cultures as one 
can be the member of various cultural groups such as being a Black, lesbian, graduate student.  
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According to Tubbs (2005b), teachers embracing Noddings’s TC acknowledge their culture to 
educate their students morally, and this culture might be any form of culture including the 
women culture present in Noddings’s TC: 
 If teachers cannot see how they are re-formed in their struggles with theory and practice, 
then not only are they destined to repeat the abstraction of culture, they are also denied 
the means to learn from these difficulties.  In short, denied of the notion of education as 
culture, as their formation and re-formation, they are denied themselves as an object of 
philosophical thinking ...  The philosophy of the teacher aims to retrieve the culture of the 
teacher, not least in response to the appearance of their work as increasingly apolitical.  
(p. 220) 
 
Cultural thinking is an advantage when it comes to the teaching of critical thinking, as 
educational policies and programs that define critical thinking in the schools of today are the 
cultural products of the society.  Additionally, in today’s world, critical thinking is not a skill that 
is only associated with numerical and book thinking.  It is a skill that is also associated with 
‘practical street thinking’ (Crawford, 2009) and political thinking.  This critical thinking skill 
could be acquired through experiencing the different forms of culture, such as school culture, 
teacher culture, and student culture.  One way to experience different forms of culture is to pose 
questions about several cultures in schools and to think critically about these questions and the 
answers provided to these questions.  A number of questions serving this purpose may be 
originated; however, I borrow a representative set of questions present in the second edition of 
Noddings’s Philosophy of Education (2011) book: 
 Do we as Americans demonstrate the universal values embraced by cosmopolitanism?  
Should immigrants to America give up their ethnic culture and give first priority to being 
American?  Should we be open to learning from others whose values are different from 
those we have been taught to accept?  Should we be critical of some of these values? (p. 
213 - 214) 
 
The questions written in the above quote are philosophical questions in nature.  Different 
programs of education are applied around the USA and the world to improve students’ critical 
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thinking; and in her article, Maughn Gregory (2011) analyzed one of the oldest philosophical 
programs for teaching young children in the USA.  In a group discussion over how this program, 
Philosophy for Children (henceforth P4C), has been influential in the philosophy of teaching 
literature, Gregory (2011) discussed the main tenets of this program.  While discussing these 
tenets, she names a number of the educational theorists the program’s executive staff followed.  
Noddings is one of the educational theorists, who has had some influence on this program.    
According to Gregory (2011), one of the main tenets of P4C is that it strives to teach 
critical thinking and educational philosophy employing a “caring thinking” approach (p. 200).  In 
her article, Gregory (2011) reported this program of the philosophy of education promotes an 
understanding of teaching philosophy to young children through living it and reflecting on their 
first-hand experiences.  The developers of the program do not push young children to read 
difficult and complex texts of ancient philosophical thought, instead they encourage the children 
experience critical thinking using philosophical methods of inquiry by helping them interpret 
their experiences through reflecting on these experiences.  Gregory (2011) summed the mission 
of the program as teaching philosophical thinking and/or improving critical thinking to the 
individuals using a teaching pedagogy composed of “self-examination, a certain ethics of 
dialogue, communal caring” (p. 201).  
I have discussed somewhere along Chapter 1, how dialogue is an important part of 
Noddings’s TC and her care-based philosophy of education and relational teaching.  In 
Noddings’s (2013) view, “The purpose of dialogue is to come into contact with ideas and to 
understand, to meet the other and to care” (p. 186) because it provides the opportunity to 
understand the others’ reality and thinking.  Noddings (2002a, 2003a/2013, 2006, 2015) 
encourages teachers to use TC in their classrooms and have a dialogue with their students 
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regarding ordinary life issues on which students and teachers have differing opinions.  In fact, 
according to Noddings (2006), it is not possible to care and teach something to individuals, 
especially to the young individuals without having a dialogue with them first because “One 
function of dialogue is to help us and our students to reflect upon and critique our own practice.  
It gives us an opportunity to ask why we are doing certain things and with what effect” (p. 230-
231).  Agreeing with Noddings on the function of dialogue within teaching, Gregory (2011) 
argued that teaching philosophy and improving students’ critical thinking skills through dialogue 
is an effective method used in the P4C program.  
Teaching philosophy through living is part of an important debate in the field of 
philosophy of education and several philosophers (Freire, 1998; Greene, 1973, 1978), including 
Dewey (1916/2004) contributed to this debate.  Following Dewey’s ideas in educational 
research, Geoffrey Hinchliffe (2011) attempted to answer the question ‘What is a significant 
educational experience using a Deweyan perspective?’ and discussed TC in connection to 
student thinking and Dewey.  In his article, Hinchliffe (2011) argued that TC has encouraged the 
teachers to promote the construction of the significant educational experiences in diverse 
settings, particularly in a caring home environment.   
In Noddings’s theory, a caring home environment is the first place to have this 
experience; therefore, home learning is as valuable as school learning.  According to Noddings 
(1993), by nature, any caring relationship has its own educational value because ideally, the 
educative caring experience is a result of a social and continuing caring relationship, and this 
caring experience present in home environment transcends schooling: 
 When we say that learning is not the only purpose of schooling, we do not have to invent 
activities demonstrably devoid of learning and show they are somehow valuable.  All we 
have to do is to point to activities that we think are worthwhile and that we would 
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continue to promote even if we could not state what children are learning from them.  (p. 
735) 
 
In his article, Hinchliffe (2011) discussed the importance of ‘experience based home 
learning’ and sided with Maughn Gregory, John Dewey and Nel Noddings on promoting having 
practical learning experiences and extending the scope of learning to settings outside the schools. 
over the importance of teaching using other methods and curricular tools.  Throughout the 
article, Hinchcliffe (2011) elaborated on the differences between the significant educational 
experiences and the conventional educational experiences, while arguing that an experiential 
curriculum structured around care may be the grounds for constructing these significant 
educational experiences.  In Hinchliffe’s (2011) opinion, traditional turgid book learning should 
be replaced with a liberating caring curriculum not only because the traditional school 
curriculum may not be the grounds for the significant educational experiences, but also the 
liberal caring curriculum has supported the idea that “Excellence (and a significant educational 
experience) can take many forms” (Hinchliffe, 2011, p. 428).   
As an additional point to this discussion, Hinchliffe (2011) claimed teachers 
implementing this liberating caring curriculum knows that “there is no point in compelling 
children and students to undertake subjects for which they have no liking or aptitude” (p. 428).  
Similar to Hinchcliffe, Noddings (1993) structures this liberating care-based curriculum as the 
curriculum, in which a wide range of courses exist, and students learn to care after experiencing 
a thematic learning approach.  Unlike the students of today, who follow the prescribed and test-
driven curriculum, and students benefiting from this liberating care-based curriculum “would 
follow programs in which these interests would be allowed full play ...  its students could invent, 
construct, repair and maintain machinery ...  the list is endless” (Noddings, 1993, p. 740). 
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In his article, as an interesting point of the discussion, Hinchliffe (2011) discussed how a 
significant educational experience included in a liberal caring curriculum can improve the 
student’s thinking through the co-creation of “eureka” moments.  Hinchliffe (2011) defined this 
special Eureka moment, in which the student understands the material, relates to and reflects on 
his/her experience with the material. His definition provided in this article was similar to the 
awakening moment found in an educational curriculum constructed around Noddings’s theory.  
In Hinchcliffe’s (2011) words, this eureka moment “can often come about when a pupil or 
student manages to make a connection or link with material that is clearly related but has not 
been explicitly mentioned thus far” (p. 429).  These eureka moments are the results of the 
interaction between the student and the social environment, he or she has, and Noddings (2003b) 
observes these awakening moments in which “the challenge and satisfaction shared by both in 
engaging new material, the awakening sense (for both) that teaching and life are never-ending 
moral quests” (p. 249). 
Student learning and how to design educational environments in order to improve student 
learning is an important issue to investigate for philosophers of education (Dewey, 1916/2004; 
Freire, 1968/1996; Martin, 1985, 2002, 2011; Noddings; 1995b/2011,2013).  As discussed in the 
introduction section of this chapter, the philosophers of education use unique lenses to define the 
ideal education, and most of the times these lenses have been used to construct educational 
policies.  The fourth and final theme found in this chapter discussed the influence of Noddings’s 
TC in educational theory and its contribution to the development of educational policy. 
Noddings’s TC as A New Perspective and Theory on Educational Policy 
Noddings’s TC and its influence on the realm of educational policy is another theme that 
was present in the articles selected for this dissertation project.  Three different authors (Knight-
169 
 
Abowitz & Roberts, 2007; Sockett, 2009; Stitzlein, 2013) discussed TC in connection with 
theoretical thinking in educational philosophy and with recent developments in the field of 
educational policy established in the micro and global sense.  All articles analyzed under this 
section are book review articles.  Each one presented in this section discussed how the selected 
book was connected to Noddings’s TC and eventually became a topic to analyze in the article. 
Kathleen Knight-Abowitz and Jay Roberts (2007) analyzed The World is Flat: A Brief 
History of the Twenty-First Century, written by Friedman (2007).  In their words, Knight-
Abowitz and Roberts (2007) were especially interested in the “notion of the social contract, the 
moral centre of Friedman’s hopeful vision of a globalised world” (p. 471).  Even though they 
were impressed with Friedman’s hopeful vision of a globalised world and an educational system 
to carry out this vision, they still challenged this vision and benefit from Noddings’s TC in order 
to strengthen their review.   
In the introduction to their article, Knight-Abowitz and Roberts (2007) described the 
processes (economic changes, the influence of the political establishments, and the wide spread 
of the Internet) that have paved the way for the globalization trend in education.  Then, they 
named the educational theorists interpreting the influence of this globalization trend in education, 
and Nel Noddings was one of those theorists.  As an educational theorist interested in the 
philosophical studies of education, Noddings (1995b/2011, 2005, 2015) has written on how 
globalization changes the educational landscape.   
 Noddings’s account of global/universal education and how it changes educational theory 
and schooling as we know it can be summarized in these words quoted in Noddings words: 
“Children are not equal in their capacity for academic learning, and a universal, academic 
curriculum may well aggravate academic differences” (2003a, p. 30).  Noddings’s TC is a 
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perspective frequently employed in education; however, according to Knight-Abowitz and 
Roberts (2007), Friedman did not favor this perspective in his book for several reasons.  In 
Knight-Abowitz and Roberts’s (2007) opinion, Noddings’s care-based perspective on education 
called for a more inclusive thinking in schooling and education.  However, TC does not side with 
Friedman’s system/perspective of education which promotes one standard culture and the 
educational system created within this culture, while Friedman (2007) defends an education 
system based on contract theory referenced back to Rawls (1971): 
 social contract provides a rationale for how a government can re-distribute resources so 
as to provide all workers with education and training opportunities at all levels, similar to 
the life-long learning initiatives in the European Union and elsewhere. His social contract 
not only involves educational investment but a ringing endorsement of the idea that 
schooling is primarily an instrument for economic prosperity of individual  and nation.  
(Knight-Abowitz and Roberts, 2007, p. 475) 
 
In Knight-Abowitz and Roberts’s (2007) view, Friedman’s global account of education 
and schooling was a utilitarian account of education, and it should not be preferred by 
educational policy makers.  It acknowledged that human beings should have ideals in education, 
but these ideals rely on external goods, such as better schools that graduate the students who 
score in the top percentile of the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) test 
and compete in the world economy.  Considering these disadvantages, Knight-Abowitz and 
Roberts (2007) concluded in any education system serving to this end and promoting this ideal:  
schools, students, teachers, and administrators increasingly feel the pressure to ‘perform’ 
and ‘achieve’, terms borrowed from the market, popular texts such as The World Is Flat 
feed into perceptions that our schools, like our corporations, must be made more nimble 
[sic], efficient, and productive. … This moral vision (in education), however, is 
dangerously naïve.  (p. 478-479) 
 
In her Educating Moral People: A Caring Alternative to Character Education, Noddings 
(2002a) opposed the negative terms and effects of globalization in education (competition, 
teacher pressure, sloganized education, and the reign of standardized tests in schools).  In 
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Noddings’s (2002a) view, globalization resets the priorities of education and there is confusion 
regarding the needs of society and aims of the education provided in societal institutions because 
of this resetting.  Knight-Abowitz and Roberts (2007) acknowledged Noddings’s caution 
regarding the aims of education and agreed with Noddings on what should be prioritized and 
aimed for in education.  Their position on this argument with Friedman (2007) became even 
clearer when they quoted Noddings (2002a): 
 The society does not need to make its children first in the world in mathematics and 
science.  It needs to care for its children to reduce violence, to respect honest work of 
every kind, … to produce people who can care.  (p. 94) 
 
The second article analyzed in this theme was Hugh Sockett’s (2009) book review about 
the influential theorists of education.  In this article, Sockett discussed how the development of 
the field of educational policy could be analyzed using the unique self-portraits of important 
educational theorists.  Nel Noddings had written a chapter for this book, Leaders in Philosophy 
of Education: Intellectual Self-Portraits (2008) edited by Leonard J. Waks.  In the chapter 
written for this book, Noddings (2008) described her relation to the philosophy of education and 
policy shifts in education, and, according to Sockett (2009), this chapter represented how she 
was influenced by “the women’s movement” (p. 169) in education.  
In his article, Sockett (2009) explained how Noddings’s work is different from the works 
of other feminist philosophers and scholars, such as Iris Murdoch and Patricia White.  Even 
though these two scholars have also written about “the absence of women in (analytic) 
philosophy of education” (Sockett, 2009, p. 169), Noddings’s work with caring, education, and 
TC signaled a different direction in educational philosophy, policy, and women’s philosophical 
thought.  In his book review, Sockett (2009) drew on Noddings’s TC in order to argue in defense 
of this different direction. 
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Noddings’s TC signaled a direction in which women’s contribution to educational 
philosophy is important because it sees the world from an alternative perspective, specifically 
focusing on the relational bonding experience of women, not on the general experiences of 
women described by Roland-Martin (1985, 2002, 2011).  It is true that they are both trying to 
include women into educational philosophy and change the educational policy in this direction.  
However, they focused on distinct character traits of women’s thinking.  In promoting the moral 
value care, Noddings reinitiated the debates found among feminists about how women should be 
viewed in society at large: the same and equal or different and equal.  The former centered on the 
belief that until society (men) see women as having the same ability as men, they will never be 
considered equals.  The latter argued, as in the case of Noddings’s TC, that women are not the 
same but, nevertheless, they should be considered equal.   
The third and the final article analyzed in this section was an article written by Elizabeth 
Stitzlein (2013), and in this article, she reviewed the quality of the arguments present in Dear 
Nel: Opening the Circles of Care (Letters to Nel Noddings) (Lake, 2012).  Stitzlein’s (2013) 
review had been about this book edited by Robert Lake, and Stitzlein’s (2013) aimed to provide 
a review discussing how TC has contributed to our thinking on many issues (family relations, 
relations with students, and how Noddings’s career was shaped by these relations) and general 
educational research (educational standards, teaching through care, and applying the care ethics 
in her life).  The review article did its job in a simple way, and Stitzlein (2013) criticized this 
simplicity. 
In Stitzlein’s (2013) opinion, the book represented a noble effort to explain the 
importance of Noddings’s TC in educational research, but that is all the good things she could 
say about this book.  She found several problems with the book, but her main concern was 
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related to the rationale for the grouping of chapters as circles are ill described and need to be 
detailed by stating “It is unclear to the reader whether these circles are divisions of life that 
Noddings herself has asserted” (Stitzlein, 2013, p. 663).  In general, Stitzlein (2013) criticized 
Lake’s style of discussing the need to compile this book, his job as the editor of the book and she 
was uncomfortable with the quotations present in this book, as she claimed the selected 
quotations were either irrelevant to Noddings’s work or are incapable of representing TC’s true 
strength.   
I agree with Stitzlein’s (2013) criticism that Lake’s book should be more comprehensive 
and provide a better argument regarding the construction of the circles/themes and that the 
chapters should be categorized in a better way.  However, I think the book has more merit than 
Stitzlein (2013) claimed because of several reasons, including that it is the first book of its kind 
to study and document the influence of Noddings’s TC in educational research, and its simplicity 
may be appealing to other readers if not to the academicians.  Finally, there are two major 
problems with Stitzlein’s reading and analysis of this book, and they need to be reported here.  45 
One problem with Stitzlein’s review of this book is that Stitzlein (2013) looked for rigid 
lines that separate the personal/relational chapters from the public/research chapters discussing 
Noddings’s life and work and how these contributed each other.  In her review, Stitzlein (2013) 
criticized that the chapters are grouped based on a rationality unknown to the reader and there is 
no target audience for this book.  I think Lake (2012) had purposefully avoided answering the 
                                                 
45. Unlike Stitzlein (2013), I categorize Dear Nel: Opening the Circles of Care (Letters to Nel Noddings) 
as a good resource to start with if one wants to understand the influence of Noddings’s work in educational research 
as a general field of scholarship.  I agree with Stitzlein over her criticism claiming that this book should have been 
more comprehensive in scope and provided a better introduction argument discussing how he has ended up with the 
circles/themes it has, the chapters should be categorized in a better way.  However, I think these criticisms Stitzlein 
(2013) voiced may only be the beginning point of the possible modifications to the book and an important 
discussion about Noddings’s TC, which is a very important theory for the continuation of the certain discussions 




questions of “why” and “who” as he wanted his book to reach a wide group of people interested 
in Noddings’s work.   
The second problem with Stitzlein’s (2013) current review of Lake’s book is that I think 
she wanted this book to be the textbook of a hypothetical Introduction to Noddings’s Caring:101 
course, but the book failed to undertake this job.  In my opinion, there exist two reasons for this 
failure.  First, Lake (2012) never intended this book to be a textbook.  Second, compared to other 
theories of education, such as Dewey’s experiential education and Montessori’s naturalistic 
education, Noddings’s TC is still a very young theory of education and ethics; therefore, the 
scholars are far from agreeing on the scope and the content of the words composing the 
vocabulary of TC, meaning that there is a lot to be studied within TC and its contributions to the 
relevant fields of research.   
Noddings’s TC is a theory, framing an educational policy representing the “new 
scholarship” described by Roland-Martin (1986, p. 10), and by using the language of the 
excluded other, this theory and an educational policy constructed upon it would, ideally, address 
a number of concerns many people have.  How this theory has addressed these concerns, 
contributed to the discussions mirroring these concerns, and influenced the field of philosophy of 
education have been the focus of this chapter.  The four themes analyzed in this chapter 
represented these discussions, and they helped me explain the influence of Noddings’s TC in 
philosophy of education.  The interpretation of these themes concludes this chapter.   
Conclusion 
In analyzing 16 articles about Noddings and TC from the JPE published from 2003 
through 2013, the ideas of the authors published in this journal within the selected time frame 
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might be categorized under four different themes as they related to Noddings’s TC.  These 
themes are:  
1. Moral Thinking Through Relations 
2. Relational Thinking and Students’ Needs 
3. Student Thinking 
4. Educational Policy 
There are two ways to reflect on and interpret these themes and how the authors used 
Nodding’s TC in their writings.  One way of interpreting them is to divide these articles into two 
main groups, whether or not they have acknowledged TC.  Another way of interpreting these 
themes as they demonstrate how Noddings’s TC has been present in the field of philosophy of 
education is to discuss how they related to the relevant literature provided in the previous 
chapter.  Here, I offer them both. 
The authors using Noddings’s TC to construct and present their ideas in their articles 
might be divided into two main groups.  The authors of the first group of the articles have been 
quite critical about Noddings’s theory.  These authors have pointed out the drawbacks of this 
theory; therefore, their articles have been quite critical about Noddings’s theory.  For example, in 
her 2008 article, Goodman argued that this theory promoted a need-based perspective in 
educational thought and in the philosophy of education, and it had a hard time determining 
whose needs should be identified and met first. 
In contrast to these authors, there exists another group of authors, who have applauded 
Noddings’s TC and have pointed out the advantages and positive contributions of this theory to 
educational thought and the research in the philosophy of education.  For example, in her article 
published in 2008, Osanloo discussed how Noddings’s TC had contributed to culturally relevant 
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critical thinking, and educators serving in classrooms may begin great discussions that might 
improve students’ critical thinking skills by giving them the opportunity to talk about 
controversial issues affecting their living conditions.  If a teacher embraced this theory, then the 
teacher acknowledges that there is no one way to start these discussions and there are multiple 
answers to the questions posed in these discussions, as all the questions posed are unique and all 
the answers received in response to these questions are subjective and valuable in themselves. 
A second way of interpreting these themes is to understand how they are addressed in the 
relevant literature.  For example, the authors of the selected articles categorized under theme 
#one have discussed how the discussion of TC is relevant to the discussion of relational thinking 
and the improvement in the moral thinking of students through relations.  With the relational 
framework it provides, TC has significantly contributed to the discussion of the relational and 
emotional thinking in educational philosophy also.  Considering that particularly influential 
scholars have categorized Noddings’s TC as a relational theory of ethics and thinking, it is 
expected that this theme be discussed in the articles.  I have provided these authors’ opinions in 
Chapter 2 under the section of women’s contribution to the philosophy of education. 
As theme #two in this chapter suggested, Noddings’s TC has contributed to the 
discussion of meeting diverse student needs after understanding these needs.  TC has become a 
natural party to this debate because, in her writings, Noddings (1984/2003a/2013, 2002a, 2003b, 
2005, 2015) devoted a significant amount of time to understanding the reality, the problems, and 
the needs of the cared-for students and offers teachers several strategies to meet these students’ 
diverse needs.  Finally, I expect this debate to continue further as the teachers serving in the 
schools meet with groups of students from more diverse backgrounds each school year. 
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Theme #three concentrated on student thinking as the articles contributed to the 
connection between TC and the development of the students’ learning of philosophy and critical 
thinking through empathically thinking and experience.  Noddings (1995b/2011, 2003b, 2005) 
promoted the idea that emotions could support the development of critical thinking and 
philosophical thought through caring relations and emotional dialogues teachers have with their 
students.  TC’s insistence on the reliance on emotions within all types of critical thinking and 
moral decision making has found a place in the fields of moral philosophy and in the philosophy 
of education, particularly in the discussion of whether emotions can replace reason in moral 
philosophy and in the discussion of emotional reflective thinking, as presented in Chapter 2. 
The articles present in the final theme of this chapter discussed the contribution of 
Noddings’s TC to theoretical thinking in education and educational policy.  Theme #four focused 
more on the general representation of TC in educational policy, educational theory, and 
philosophy.  The literature provided in Chapter 2, signaled that TC has been a theory of major 
influence in the field of educational theory, and theme #four has confirmed this influence. 
Chapter 5 is composed of three different sections.  The first section presents concluding 
thoughts regarding this dissertation project.  The second section is the section; in which the 
limitations of this project are noted.  In the third and last section of Chapter 5, I humbly offer a 
number of suggestions for future research that might be of interest to the future researcher who 




CHAPTER 5: CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
In Chapter 5, the themes as they relate to the larger literature of moral philosophy, moral 
education, and philosophy of education are interpreted and these themes are presented as the 
findings of this research.   I reflect on the connection of these themes to TC and the relevant 
literatures of moral and philosophy of education.   More information is provided regarding how 
this study might be limited only to the articles published in the representative journals within the 
pre-set time frame.   In this chapter, several recommendations are offered that might be 
conducted as future research on Noddings and TC. 
Nel Noddings’s (1984) work about care has provided the theoretical basis for this concept 
in educational research.   Scholars have primarily used and cited her books and/or articles when 
they referred, reflected on and analyzed the concept of care in more detail; therefore, in most 
cases, the TC has become the starting point for discussions related to care in education, ethics, 
and relevant fields of research.   The influence of Noddings’s TC and how it has contributed to 
the research in more practical fields of education has been documented by the studies of several 
scholars;46 however, understanding the influence and the potential contributions of TC will be 
incomplete without research implemented in the more theoretical fields of education.   This is an 
important gap to be filled in educational research, as these more theoretical fields are more 
relevant to Noddings’s TC and they harbor and cultivate the main lines of argument mirroring 
the influence and the contribution of TC to the ongoing discussions in these fields.   With this 
dissertation, my aim was to fill this gap in the larger literature of educational research and to 
                                                 
46. See the works of Salehian, Heydari, Aghebati, Moonaghi, & Mazloom (2016) on nursing education; 
Chalke, (2013) and Goldstein (1998) on early childhood education; and Louis-Seashore, Murphy, & Smylie (2016) 
on educational administration. 
179 
 
document the influence of Noddings and TC within a certain time frame in moral education and 
the philosophy of education. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the fields of moral education and philosophy of education 
frequently interact with each other, while scholars publishing in one of these fields trade ideas 
with scholars publishing in the other field; thus, certain debates in these fields tend to co-occur.   
As a matter of fact, it is very difficult for one to draw a line separating moral education from the 
philosophy of education or vice versa.   Still, in order to properly document the possible 
influence and contribution of TC fully in several debates, and for the sake of the clarity of the 
issues/themes debated, I approached moral education and the philosophy of education as two 
distinct fields of education.   This approach helped me to explain the influence of TC on the 
issues discussed by other authors and to underline this influence several times, which also 
improved the quality of this project as it clarified a number of connections of TC to several 
topics related to educational research.   
Providing insights regarding the influence of Noddings’s TC in the fields of moral 
education and the philosophy of education required a systematic reading of the articles present in 
JME and JPE, as these articles documented how TC has contributed to the discussion of certain 
themes in these fields.   Although the number of articles discussing Noddings’s TC in these 
journals was overwhelming; my focus was on the articles fitting the criteria of being published 
between the years of 2003 and 2013 and having treated Noddings’s TC as the main issue within 
the text.   The number of articles fitting these criteria and published in the JME was 20, and I 
grouped these articles under five different themes based on the discussed in them in connection 
to Noddings’s TC.   Similarly, 16 articles fitting these criteria were published in the JPE during 
the same time span, and their connections to the discussion of TC in the field of the philosophy 
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of education are discussed under four different themes.  The themes discussed in this dissertation 
reflect the areas, in which Noddings’s TC has been most influential.  
Throughout the articles analyzed in this dissertation, the connection of TC to these fields 
were discussed using themes.   The themes presented in Chapters 3 and 4 raised the suggestion 
that the influence of TC in moral education and the philosophy of education has co-occurred as 
the authors publishing in both fields of education have discussed similar educational issues.   
Identifying this co-occurrence, the connection between moral education and philosophy of 
education has been an important finding of this study even though that was not my prior 
intention when conducting it.    
The connection between these two fields of education has resulted in the discussion of 
certain topics to be repeated.   Moreover, the discussion of certain topics, such as the scope of 
TC and how it deals with the important questions of moral thinking and education have been 
repeated over time, meaning that the topics to which TC is connected have gained attention from 
diverse groups of scholars and have influenced their way of thinking as they have used TC in 
their articles.   The attention of these scholars, at least the attention of the ones published in JME 
and JPE from 2003 through 2013, has presented itself as a number of themes in this dissertation. 
The influence of TC in moral education and the philosophy of education has gone 
undocumented for a long time; however, it is beginning to get attention (Bergman, 2004; Lake, 
2012; Stitzlein, 2013).   The lack of this documentation has been a problem both for 
understanding the influence of an alternative perspective/theory of education in educational 
research and the modifications/developments done to this theory due to the criticisms it has 
received.   I have documented this influence by looking at how it has shaped the direction of 
conversations related to schools, cultures, teacher student relationships and additional 
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conversations, which are named as themes in this dissertation.   The dissertation at hand has 
contributed to the relevant literature by clearly documenting Noddings’s TC’s influence because 
the dissertation pointed out exactly to which concepts it has contributed as the authors of the 
selected articles appropriated TC. 
As the reader of this dissertation might remember, the first theme presented in Chapter 3 
discussed TC’s connection to the school culture.   The articles analyzed under this theme either 
stated TC’s potential to build a better school environment or provided a descriptive picture of 
what schools would look like in the absence of a care-based teaching and relational perspective 
of education.   This was an expected debate for me to witness in the field of moral education 
considering that Noddings (1995a, 1996, 2002a, 2003b) has described what caring classrooms 
look like and has repeatedly defended the nurturing effects of the caring classrooms on students.     
TC has been a theory of moral philosophy and moral education, which offers to redefine 
the concept of the “practical ethics.”  Moreover, it has had implications for teaching through 
culture, as both teaching and culture are dynamic and relate/connect to the social and practical 
aspects of real life.   This connection is important to note here because it is the direct 
consequence of the two notable changes TC has brought to the table of moral philosophy and 
education: Noddings’s (2003a/2013, 2005) defiance of the dominant male voice found in 
mainstream ethics and moral thinking, and Noddings’s insistence on hearing the diverse and 
alternate voices, which are mostly muted and unheard, in moral thinking and education.   One 
way to hear these alternate voices is to include teaching through culture to the teachers’ 
inventory of teaching methods and encourage its practice in the classrooms. 
In Chapter 3, the discussion of theme #two was mostly in favor of this inclusion and the 
kind of culture TC embraces while elaborating on the connection between TC and teaching 
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through culture.   In the original version of the theory offered in the first edition of Caring 
(Noddings, 1984/2003a/2013), Noddings did not necessarily connect TC to culture or cultural 
learning.  However, I think TC already has a cultural flavor in it as this theory is derived from 
the culture of the home sphere.   This, in fact, is a point of discussion in one of the articles 
analyzed under this theme, and this discussion/debate is expected to continue as other scholars 
from diverse backgrounds continue to be involved in this debate.    
The current debate centering around the status of TC, whether or not it is a 
sufficient/legitimate theory/framework of moral thinking and education, is a theme that appears 
in both Chapters 3 and 4 with different names: TC as a theory and TC and educational policy.   
The literature presented in Chapter 2 documented the general information on this debate, and I 
anticipate it to be discussed in the field of moral education and the philosophy of education.   
However, these themes have offered more detail about this debate, which has grown to a large 
extent when compared to the original debate presented in Chapter 2.   To a large extent, the 
debate has grown because scholars have not only limited their focuses to the status of TC but 
also have discussed its possible implications for moral education, philosophy of education, and 
educational theory and policy when they have debated TC’s status.    
In Chapter 1, the reader was familiarized with TC and its characteristics, including 
relational teaching, women’s language, and the alternate way of thinking it proposes.   According 
to Noddings (1995a, 2002a, 2003a, 2005, 2011), to apply care-based teaching requires one to use 
relational thinking in teaching, and this represents an important change that deeply concerns 
those in the fields of moral thinking, moral education, and philosophy of education, as this 
change relates to the philosophy of teaching, child pedagogy, and the teaching of philosophy.   
Naturally, this shift is present in the debates (theme #three in the JME and themes #s one and 
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two in the JPE) occurring in the representative journals selected for this study, as relational 
thinking is one of its most obvious features.    
Theme #two in Chapter 4 concentrates on students’ rights and how one might interpret 
these rights when employing TC and other theories.   The authors, whose articles were analyzed 
in this chapter, have participated the debate about how this shift has influenced, and will 
continue to influence, the educational research, and they have argued that TC is the cause of this 
shift as this shift is understandably promoted by TC.   There have been several articles in JPE 
mirroring this shift and these authors have responded to TC and contributed to the relevant 
literature when they have tried to answer the questions: ‘How do we balance students’/childrens’ 
needs with their rights and parental obligations?’ or ‘How do we serve the best interests of the 
children?’ Documenting TC’s connection to these questions and the problems of education 
represented in the selected articles demonstrates how Noddings’s TC has influenced two 
different fields of education within a pre-set time frame.  The contribution of this study to the 
larger educational research literature becomes even more significant when the analysis and the 
interpretation of the articles revealed that TC has been particularly influential on the discussion 
of several themes/educational issues.     
As one might remember from Chapters 1-3, TC is a theory addressing the questions: 
‘What is moral knowledge?  How do we teach moral knowledge to students so that they will 
become morally educated individuals? and Whose knowledge is considered to be worthy of 
teaching as moral knowledge?’ Almost each one of the themes discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 has 
touched upon to at least one of these questions, underlining the fact that TC is concerned with 
educating (individuals) morally; hence, the debates in which TC is relevant are more likely to be 
the debates addressing the questions found in moral education.   This is an anticipated result as 
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the literature surrounding TC is focused on these questions, although I had expected the articles 
present in these journals to offer additional themes of discussions other than these.    
I think the repetition of particular themes in Chapters 3 and 4 has been both an 
enrichment and a limitation to this study.   On the one hand, I consider the repetition of certain 
issues in the articles selected for analysis in this dissertation as an enrichment because it has 
provided an opportunity to analyze TC’s influence on the discussion of these themes and how it 
contributes to these themes in a deeper way.   On the other hand, I recognize this to be a 
limitation of this study as these themes have suggested TC has been influential only on the 
discussion of certain educational issues found in the fields of moral education and the philosophy 
of education.   One may interpret this as limiting the influence of TC to only a couple of 
discussions related to care and relational thinking, which might be an inaccurate interpretation as 
TC has also contributed to the discussion of issues that have not been analyzed in these journals.   
Limitations  
This study has been successful in documenting how Noddings’s TC has been influential 
in the fields of moral education and philosophy of education as it has identified the issues 
discussed in connection to Noddings’s TC in these fields within a pre-set time frame.  However, 
it has limitations.   These limitations do not alter the importance and/or contribution of this 
dissertation to the relevant literature and educational research; yet they need to be discussed.   In 
light of this, I want to mention them here, as they are relevant to the research design and future 
research suggestions.   It is also my hope that future researchers reading this dissertation make 
the necessary improvement(s) to their research after analyzing these limitations and dealing 
adequately with them.    
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The themes documenting the influence of Noddings’s TC are limited to the articles 
selected for this dissertation project, meaning that the criteria used to select these articles are also 
limitations in this study.   The discussion describing and documenting the influence of 
Noddings’s TC in these fields of education was limited to the articles published JME and JPE, 
and this interpretation might potentially be different if journals other than than JPE and/or JME 
had been selected.    
The intent in this study was only to analyze how Noddings’s TC influenced the 
discussions occurring in the fields of interest.  Therefore, it was designed to explain this 
influence by analyzing only the articles that discussed Noddings’s TC as a main theme in the text 
within a pre-set time frame.   Due to time constraints, my analysis of the articles was limited to a 
time framework of 10 years and two different journals.   However, this study might have 
provided a different and a more detailed picture if a longer time frame had been used as a 
criterion in the selection of the articles.   Being aware of this limitation, future researchers might 
use a longer time frame of publication, for example 20 years, and provide a quite different 
argument documenting the influence of Noddings’s TC. 
At the beginning of this dissertation project, I limited my focus to the journals publishing 
high quality articles in the selected fields of education, as I was interested in documenting the 
influence and the contribution of Noddings’s TC in these fields by analyzing the discussions to 
which it has contributed from 2003 through 2013.   However, the influence of TC has been vast 
and has, thus far, spread to other fields of educational research (Rice, 2016), and the detailed 
discussion of the literature in each one of these fields was beyond the limits of this dissertation.   
Thus, the reader of this dissertation should be aware of the fact that the literature cultivating this 
study was limited only to the fields of moral education and the philosophy of education. 
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Following the limitation stated in the paragraph above, this study used only a small 
sample of articles discussing Noddings’s TC as their authors’ main theme in the selected areas of 
research.   Another researcher, who does not want to divert his/her focus in either area of 
research, may use more than one journal representative of these fields and analyze these journals 
while comparing the themes/discussions they provoked based on the influence of TC.   A study 
of that kind may include the discussion of additional themes that have not been discussed in this 
dissertation, and may add more concepts to the educational research literature and the literature 
surrounding TC.     
Suggestions for Future Research 
Nel Noddings and TC are cited frequently by scholars publishing in philosophy and 
educational research, particularly in the fields of moral education and philosophy education.   In 
fact, according to Bergman (2004), due to ownership of the patent on TC, “Nel Noddings is 
arguably one of the premier philosophers of moral education in the English‐speaking world 
today” (p. 149).   This is understandable considering that the crux of the TC is the concerns of 
Noddings regarding moral thinking and how to improve it.  However, as this dissertation project 
proves that the influence of TC has spread to several other fields of educational research, it is my 
belief that this dissertation may and will inspire future researchers to document the influence of 
TC in other fields of research and to study this particular relational theory in more detail.    
One of these fields of educational research is multicultural education, as the findings and 
the themes indicate TC has an influence on the discussion of cultural teaching and the teaching 
of cultures.   TC’s influence on these themes may, in fact, be referring to multicultural education, 
which is a larger field of research.   I imagine that multiple layers of issues referring to TC are 
present in multicultural education and these issues may be connected to other issues.   One 
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researcher might study how TC is located within the larger body of the literature about 
multicultural education, and another researcher might be interested in exploring whether 
different perspectives employed in multicultural education are compliant with an educational 
system established upon TC.   There is also the topic of investigating how a specific subculture 
may have been the basis of a care-based education model or how care-based education programs 
may be implemented to students when their teachers are informing/educating them about other 
cultures.   I think these are interesting topics to investigate, and I believe that they certainly have 
the potential to contribute to the further development of research in multicultural education and 
culture through teaching. 
Another possible suggestion for future research might be to investigate the contribution 
of Noddings’s TC to teacher education.   Considering that TC is a theory of education that 
addresses the improvement of student knowledge by employing several strategies of caring, and 
how these strategies might be developed to target the needs of a diverse student body, I think this 
theory needs to be deeply analyzed by both current and future teachers.   One way to analyze this 
contribution is to implement a care-based teacher education course in a school of education and 
reflect on the experiences of both students and professor(s) interacting through this course.   
Ideally, the content of this course needs to be structured very carefully; and the professor(s) 
teaching this content should be able to integrate it into his/her classroom based on the strategies 
discussed in Critical Lessons: What Our Schools Should Teach but Do Not (Noddings, 2006).   
Certainly, the content of the course needs to be modified during the process, and the students 
taking this course will have to put a great amount of trust in their professor(s) before 
participating in this project.    
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This study employed a reflective and descriptive framework of understanding the 
influence of Noddings’s TC in moral education and philosophy of education.   Through this 
framework, how TC is connected to the academic discussions occurring in the fields of interest 
and how it has been influential over the discussion of issues related to education while 
undergoing slight modification by Noddings over time.   The future researcher interested in 
understanding the changes present in Noddings’s TC may analyze all the books and articles 
written solely by Noddings to see how TC has been modified over time not only by Noddings 
but also other scholars like Slote (1998, 2007). 
This study was by analyzing the articles published solely in the English language since 
the journals selected for this study use this language.   As mentioned in Chapter 1, Noddings’s 
books have also been translated into other languages, and their influence has been present in 
other countries’ literature about educational research.   A future researcher who is fluent in one 
of these languages and interested in Noddings’s TC, may analyze the influence of Noddings’s 
TC in the literature of educational research specific to other countries using one or more of these 
languages. 
There are peer-reviewed journals that publish articles that only discuss the problems and 
advancements of one major philosophical theory.  Utilitas is the name of a journal that embraces 
this kind of framework in moral philosophy, and Education and Culture47 embraces this same 
framework in educational research.   The researcher interested in both Noddings’s TC and John 
Dewey’s educational theory and the philosophical framework shaping this theory may delve into 
                                                 
47. The Education & Culture journal publishes essays inspired by John Dewey’s theory contributing to the 
academic research and the interests of him.  According to the information posted on its website, Education & 
Culture is a peer-reviewed academic journal supported by John Dewey Society.  Since 1935, the year it was 
founded, this society mainly focuses on the educational theory of John Dewey and supports the research 
concentrating and improving this theory.  For more information regarding this journal see 




the archives of this journal and bring both theories of education into a comprehensive and 
inspiring conversation.   Noddings was a former president of the society publishing Education 
and Culture; therefore, the results of that research project might yield several interactions 
between these two frameworks. 
As discussed earlier in Chapter 2, TC has had a major influence in other fields of 
research, including moral philosophy, feminist thinking, and moral and developmental 
psychology.   I have connected TC to these fields; however, my connections were only brief.   
They may provide the necessary grounds for studying the influence of Noddings’s TC in these 
fields employing either the theoretical framework I have used or a different one.   Either way, I 
think it is necessary for researchers to study the influence of TC in these fields and encourage 
them to share their studies discussing the theoretical contributions and the practical implications 
of it in these fields.    
Conclusion 
Chapter 5 has presented the findings of this dissertation and how the findings/themes 
present in JME and JPE relate to Noddings’s TC, its major components, and, in part, the changes 
these components and TC theory offer to educational research.   Some of the themes analyzed in 
Chapter 3 may also be found in Chapter 4, as these themes both highlight the connection 
between the fields of moral education and philosophy of education and the fact that scholars 
have discussed TC under different names.   These themes are the representations of the academic 
conversations in which TC has been influential and how authors publishing in these fields have 
received and used TC to participate in these conversations based on the journals selected for this 
study, which were limited to the pre-set time frame of 2003 to 2013, and the second and the third 
editions of the Caring book.    
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In this chapter, the reader can also find the limitations of this study detailing what 
decisions I made while I designed this research.   These limitations do not diminish the 
significance of this study or change its findings, which discuss the influence and the contribution 
of TC to the ongoing conversations in moral education and philosophy of education and how 
scholars have used TC in their writings while they are structuring their arguments.   I think it is 
important to report them, as they are relevant to the study and may help the future researcher to 
construct his/her project in an improved way. 
Finally, one may find several suggestions for future research and work through his/her 
own study/project on Noddings’s TC either by directly transferring these research suggestions to 
their own research projects or modifying their research projects based on these future research 
suggestions.   In this last section of my dissertation, I have tried to offer various ideas about 
future research that might be beneficial to researcher(s) interested in the diverse areas of 
academic research.   Finally, the future research suggestions provided here are not fully 
developed research projects; they are merely ideas that are worth (in my opinion) pursuing, as 
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